

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

ON THE

A F F A I R S

OF

THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,

FEB. 13th to JULY 17th, 1832.

VI.

Political or Foreign.

LONDON.

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JAN. 1833.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Lunæ, 13^o die Februarii, 1832.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES MACINTOSH, in the Chair.

WILLIAM M'CULLOCH, Esq. called in and examined.

VI.
POLITICAL
or
FOREIGN.

1. WHAT opinion have you formed upon the general nature and character of our subsidiary treaties in India, and of their effect upon the good government of the respective territories to which they relate?—The subsidiary system gives the British Government a more complete command over the military resources of the countries to which it extends, and better security against treacherous combination on the part of the native powers, and popular insurrection on the part of their subjects, than probably could be obtained by any other means; it must, however, be confessed that these advantages are purchased at a considerable (some may be of opinion) too high a price. I cannot so well describe the evils incident to the system, as by the following quotation from a letter, addressed by the late Sir Thomas Munro to the Marquis of Hastings, dated 12th August 1817: "There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force. It has a natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists weak and oppressive, to extinguish all honourable feeling among the higher classes of society, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The usual remedy of a bad government in India is a quiet revolution in the palace, or a violent one by rebellion or foreign conquest; but the presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy, by supporting the prince on the throne against every foreign and domestic enemy. It renders him indolent, by teaching him to trust to strangers for his security, and cruel and avaricious, by showing him that he has nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects. Whenever the subsidiary system is introduced, unless the reigning prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it, in decaying villages and decreasing population. This has long been observed in the dominions of the Peishwa and the Nizam, and is now beginning to be seen in Mysore. A subsidiary force would be a most useful establishment if it could be directed solely to the support of our ascendancy, without nourishing all the vices of a bad government: but this seems almost impossible. The only way in which this object has ever in any degree been attained, is by the appointment of a Dewan. This measure is no doubt liable to numerous objections, but still it is the only one by which any amends can be made to the people of the country for the miseries brought upon them by the subsidiary force, in giving stability to a vicious government. The great difficulty is to prevent the prince from counteracting the Dewan,

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and the resident from meddling too much; but when this is avoided, the Dewan may be made a most useful instrument of government. There is, however, another view under which the subsidiary system may be considered, I mean that of its inevitable tendency to bring every native state into which it is introduced, sooner or later, under the exclusive dominion of the British Government. It has already done this completely in the case of the Nabob of the Carnatic, it has made some progress in that of the Peishwa, and the Nizam; and the whole of the territory of these princes will unquestionably suffer the same fate as the Carnatic." Sir Thomas Munro proceeded in that most able and interesting letter to show, with prophetic sagacity, how this result was likely to be brought about, and to state the grounds on which it appeared to him "very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired." To the observations of that excellent man I only beg leave to add, that the multiplicity of perplexing details arising out of the extension of our political relations, has trenchd most seriously upon the time and attention both of the governments in India and of the authorities at home, and have thus tended in no slight degree to divert to foreign interests a large portion of those cares, which might perhaps have been more profitably bestowed on improving the administration of our own territories.

2. Have you any observations of a general nature to add to the answer you have given?—I have only to add, that the policy of introducing a system of that sort, and of retracing our steps after it has been widely established, are very different questions. It may be liable, as I think it is, to all the objections already stated; but if the question be put, what is to be done now, I confess I am unable to give an answer.

3. Do you think it has produced more harm than good?—I think in the countries where it has been introduced the evil preponderates. In Mysore, while Poorneah was at the head of the government, it went on exceedingly well, during the minority of the rajah; but since the death of Poorneah, and the rajah has chosen to take an active part in his own administration, and, in fact, has been acting almost without any minister at all, things have gone on badly. The whole of his treasure, amounting to about 70 lacs of pagodas, that Poorneah left in the treasury, has been squandered; and I believe there has been lately an insurrection in the Mysore territories. But serious as the evils of the system are, it appears to me a matter of almost insuperable difficulty to retrace our steps, because this can only be done with the consent of the other parties to the treaties; and though some of them might not hesitate to give their consent, yet the mischiefs that would ensue would probably be very great, and might throw the whole country into confusion.

4. Would it not in fact be opening the treaties of all those states?—Yes. If there was a question respecting any of them, it would be respecting those with the Rajpoot states. I think it would be easier to dissolve the subsidiary connexion with those states, and that there would be less danger in doing so than there would be in abrogating the treaties with the small states in Central India, for in the latter case, I am satisfied those states would fall into great confusion and anarchy, and a new predatory power might again rise up in the heart of India. On the other hand, the Rajpoot states, though they might not improbably quarrel among themselves if they were emancipated from British control, have never been considered as be-
longing

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longing to the predatory association ; and I have in my memorandum, in reply to one of the questions put to me, expressed a doubt whether it was necessary to exact the permanent sacrifice of their independence, in order to secure the future tranquillity of Central India.

5. Can you state shortly the changes which have recently taken place in our relations with the state of Nagpore?—Under the treaty of 1826 it was stipulated, that the lands then reserved for the maintenance of the rajah's military force should continue under British management until the rajah should give satisfactory evidence of his ability and disposition properly to administer those territories. By a provisional agreement, concluded in 1829, those territories were delivered over to the rajah's own management, on his agreeing to pay eight lacs of rupees per annum to the British Government ; and he was at the same time relieved from the obligation of maintaining any force for our use beyond 1,000 horse. The British officers who had been appointed to the command of the rajah's force under the treaty of 1826, were likewise withdrawn. The subsidy which his Highness had agreed to pay, and the expense of the contingent which he had agreed to maintain under the treaty of 1816, were, by the provisional engagement of 1818, commuted for territory, and hence we got possession of the districts upon the Nerbudda, yielding a revenue of upwards of 20 lacs.

6. Are you prepared to offer any suggestions by which the disadvantages attending the present system can be obviated?—No general suggestions. In particular cases means may be found for preventing mischief in sometimes increasing and occasionally in relaxing our interference ; and upon a judicious choice of the persons selected to fill the office of British Resident at Native Courts much will always depend. But I cannot offer any suggestions calculated to counteract the general tendencies of the system.

7. What opinion have you formed upon the subject of Sir Thomas Munro's suggestion, of managing the country through a Dewan?—We have two instances in point, the one favourable and the other unfavourable. In the case of Mysore, under Poorneah, whom I have before mentioned, things went on very well. In the Nizam's country this expedient has not succeeded so well. In 1808, when Meerallam died, there was a good deal of correspondence between the Bengal government and the Nizam, upon the subject of the choice of his successor, and it terminated in a compromise, by which the Nizam was allowed the choice of his nominal prime minister, and we of the effective minister. The result was, that Mooneer ul Moolk was appointed minister by the Nizam, in which capacity, however, he never acted, the whole public business of the country having been transacted by Chundoo Loll, the deputy of our selection, and things have certainly not gone on prosperously. The great objection to such an arrangement is, that under it you never can know who is really the author of the measures adopted. If anything very objectionable occurs, the minister may plead that it was done at the recommendation or by the desire of the British resident, to whom it was his duty to defer : the latter, on the other hand, may say that it was solely the act of the minister, and that he had nothing to do with it. There is thus a sort of divided and undefined responsibility, which amounts to no responsibility at all. To the arrangement in question may be in great measure ascribed the enormous debt contracted by the government of Hyderabad, to the house of

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Palmer & Company; the decline of the revenue and the re-accumulation of the public debt, after it had been almost wholly paid off; and, I may add, that the aristocracy of the country have been completely sacrificed to the personal interests of the acting minister.

8. Do you consider, from what you know upon the subject, that the Nizam's country is a particularly ill-governed country?—I do not know precisely what has been the result of the measure adopted by Sir Charles Metcalfe, about the year 1820, when he appointed European officers to assist in forming the revenue settlements, a measure which, though disapproved by the authorities at home, continued in operation until the accession of the present Nizam; but the last report that I read respecting the Nizam's revenues, and the state of the debt, certainly was not favourable.

Jovis, 16^o die Februarii, 1832.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES MACINTOSH, in the Chair.

JAMES MILL, Esq. called in and examined.

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9. HAVE you prepared for the Committee an outline of the territories and tributaries acquired by us in India since 1813?—I have.

[The Witness delivered in the same.]

10. How many of the chiefs and princes do you consider in the light of mere pensioners, the payment of whose pensions are stipulated by treaties?—In this statement are included tributaries, and states in alliance, without payment on the one side or the other. You may consider all those as distinct from mere state pensioners.

11. Do you consider the first nine articles in the Statement I now show you, of our political relations, as being the case of pensioners who may be excluded from our present consideration?—Yes.

12. Have the goodness to enumerate the chief subsidiary princes and the protected states?—I have in my hand a list which, I believe, contains the answer, and which, with permission of the Committee, I shall read.

Native States, with which Subsidiary Alliances exist.

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------|---------|
| Oude. | Holkar's State. | Cochin. |
| Nagpore. | Mysore. | Baroda. |
| Hydrabad. | Travancore. | Cutch. |

Native States under the Protection of the British Government, but without Subsidiary Treaties.

Siccim.
The Sikh and Hill States, on the left bank of the Sutledge.

Rajpoot

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|---|---|---|
| Rajpoot States - - - - - | { | Bickaneer. Jesselmere. Jyepore. Joudpore. Oudeypore. Kotah Boondee. Serowey. Kishengurh. Dowleah and Pertaubgurh. Doorapoore, Banswarra. |
| Jaut, and other States on the right bank of the Jumna. | { | Bhurtpore. Ulwar, or Macherry. Kerowlee. |
| Boondela States - - - - - | { | Sumpthur. Jhansi. Jaloun. Oorcha, or Tehree. Dutteah. Rewah. |
| States in Malwa - - - - - | { | Bhopaul. Dhar. Dewas. Rutlaum. Silana. Nursinghur. Amjherra. &c. &c. &c. |
| States in Guzerat - - - - - | { | Pahlunpore. Rahdunpore. Rajpeepla. Loonawara. Soonth. The States in the Myhee Caunta. The Kattywar States. |
| States on the Malabar Coast (chiefly Mahratta). | { | Sattarah. Sawunt Warree. Colapore. Colabba. |
| Burmese Frontier - - - - - | { | Cachar. Jyntia. |

States not under British Protection.

Scindia.
The Rajah of Dholapore, Barree, and Rajakera (formerly Rana of Gohud).
Runjeet Sing of Lahore.
The Ameers of Scind.
The Rajah of Nepaul.

13. Where

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13. Where are the seats of the people called Seiks?—The principal part of the territory they occupy is the Punjaub, or country within the five branches of the Indus. Those under British protection are some small communities on the left bank of the Sutledge.

14. They are a sort of predatory tribe, are they not?—They consisted of various tribes, of unsettled and predatory habits, until they were combined (as those beyond the Sutledge are now), under a chief of great power, who has consolidated them into a sort of kingdom, very likely, however, to go to pieces when he dies. Properly speaking, his territory may be considered as the only one in India that is not substantially British dominion. The subsidiary and protected states are, in truth, part of our empire.

15. The smaller states on the left bank of the Sutledge, which we have taken under our protection, are not subject to Runjeet Sing?—Those smaller states on the left bank of the Sutledge solicited our protection, to prevent their being swallowed up by Runjeet Sing. We willingly granted them our protection to prevent that chief's coming more close upon our frontier. He has agreed to respect our alliance, to confine himself to the north bank of the Sutledge, and not to meddle with those states.

16. Nepaul is the whole length of the northern frontier?—Not the whole, though the greater part. It is bounded by Siccim on the east, and by Kemaon, ceded to us, and some protected Seik states, in the west.

17. How would you class Scindia?—He is nominally independent, but in truth, as dependent as any of the allied states; for he is perfectly surrounded by our territories, direct or allied, and can have no intercourse with any state but our's.

18. But he is an independent prince, with whom we have treated, is he not?—He neither at present has subsidiary alliance with us, nor do we include him among the protected states; in that respect he stands alone; while every state by which he is surrounded is bound not to negotiate, except through us; by consequence, Scindia can negotiate with none but us.

19. Malwa belonged to Scindia, and Holkar is in the same condition?—We have a subsidiary alliance with Holkar, whose territory is now reduced to an inconsiderable extent. The simple mode of considering our position in India, is to consider the extent actually pervaded by our power, really and truly under our dominion; that is, whether the subsidiary and protected princes are not entirely nominal. The case is this, with respect to all of them: we take the military powers of government entirely into our own hands, allowing them to keep only a small number of troops, to be employed in preserving internal order. Now if it is considered what the military power implies; that it is, in truth, the whole power, it will be seen that what we do with those protected princes is merely to delegate to them the powers of internal administration, which, in such a case in their hands, are in truth the powers of oppressing their subjects. This unfortunate intermediate state between British government and native, is filled up with nothing but abomination.

20. Does this description apply to Nepaul and Ava?—Nepaul and Ava are to be classed with foreign states really out of India, with which we have only occasional intercourse; and with such our relations are merely of a commercial nature. We have agreements of this kind with several of the ruling people in the Persian Gulf, and

and of the maritime states to the eastward, between India and China. In fact we have hardly any political relations that deserve attention out of India. We maintain indeed a resident at the court of Persia, but with more of reference to European than Indian politics.

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21. You have a resident independent of any envoy immediately from this country?—The envoy we maintain at Persia is accredited from the Bengal government. Instructions, which do not originate with the Bengal government, are commonly transmitted to the Bengal government, and forwarded to the envoy, who is put in communication with the King's minister at Constantinople and at St. Petersburg.

22. He does not communicate with the Supreme Government at Calcutta?—Yes, directly.

23. And directly here?—When he thinks the emergency requires it; and then he corresponds with the Secret Committee.

24. Do despatches always go by the way of India?—That is the general rule; but there are exceptions when expedition is considered of importance.

25. Have the French and Dutch foreign possessions in India, or anything but factories?—Nothing deserving the name of territory. Some small places were restored to the French at the general pacification. Pondicherry is something of a mercantile station, and they have Mahé, on the Malabar coast, and some other places. The Dutch have nothing on the Indian continent.

26. Have not the Swedes some?—The Swedes never had any. Serampore belongs to the Danes, near Calcutta, and has been distinguished as a missionary station, most meritoriously employed in promoting the education and instruction of the natives; they have also Balasore, and they have Tranquebar, in the Madras territory.

27. Is there a French factory at Chandernagore still?—There is.

28. Singapore is nothing but a factory of our's, is it?—It is an island conveniently situated for an emporium, a depôt of merchandize in transit; and is of importance in no other light.

29. Is it fortified?—I believe not, nor should I think it required.

30. Is it valuable as a naval station?—It is valuable as a port for merchantmen, and I believe for that only.

31. To supply the loss of Batavia or the Dutch settlements?—Batavia was not considered an important possession for us; this was reckoned a more convenient station, as in the route of all ships to the eastward.

32. Has it turned out as good and as useful as was expected?—It has answered the purposes expected from it. The quantity of traffic has not been so great as entered into certain sanguine expectations; but all the traffic the state of the countries yields has found accommodation there, I believe sufficient.

33. You think we should not be much better off if we had Batavia?—It would probably have cost us more than it is worth.

34. Batavia would have been a Government possession, and Singapore belongs to the Company?—Singapore belongs to the Company.

35. Is the defence, in your opinion, of our dominions more easy from having the whole of India, not a part merely?—Greatly so. It is not easy to find a great empire

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empire with so small a frontier to defend as India, when you possess the whole; as in three parts it is bounded by the sea, and in the other by mountains, which can only be passed at a few places, or through a desert scarcely passable at all. The best of these passes, by Attock through the mountains of Caubool, we might defend (such I believe is the opinion of the best judges) against all the world.

36. What is your opinion as to the effect of the subsidiary system upon the well-being of the inhabitants of the countries to which it relates?—With respect to its effect on the people of the country, my opinion is very unfavourable. The substance of the engagement we make with these princes is this: we take their military protection upon ourselves, and the military power of the state into our own hands. Having taken from them the military powers of government, that is, all the power, we then say to them, We give up to you the whole of the powers of civil government, and will not interfere with you in the exercise of them. It is well known what the consequences are. In the collection of the revenue, one main branch of the civil administration, they extort to the utmost limits of their power, not only impoverishing, but desolating the country. In regard to the other great branch of civil government, the administration of justice, there is hardly any such thing. There is no regular establishment for the administration of justice in any native state of India. Whoever is vested with a portion of power, great or small, hears causes when he pleases, and when he does not please, refuses to hear. The examination of the case is commonly very summary and hasty, and liable to be erroneous, when the examiner is not (what he is generally) appealed to by something more prevailing than a sense of justice, and then the case is decided according to the motive by which he is actuated. It has been found by experience (and the same was predicted), that misgovernment under this divided rule does go to its utmost extent, far beyond its ordinary limits, even in India. And the causes cannot but be considered equal to the effect. In the ordinary state of things in India, (though under such governments as that of India there was little of anything like a regular check,) the princes stood in awe of their subjects. Insurrection against oppression was the general practice of the country. The princes knew that when mismanagement and oppression went to a certain extent, there would be revolt, and that they would stand a chance of being tumbled from their throne, and a successful leader of the insurgents put in their place. This check is, by our interference, totally taken away; for the people know that any attempt of their's would be utterly unavailing against our irresistible power, accordingly no such thought occurs to them, and they submit to every degree of oppression that befalls them. I may refer to the instances of Oude, of the Nizam's country, and that of the Peishwah while he was in the state of a subsidiary prince. Misgovernment went to its ultimate excess, and there have hardly been such specimens of misgovernment as exhibited in those countries. Complaint has been frequently made of the effect of these subsidiary alliances, in subduing the spirit and relaxing the springs of the government of those native princes. It appears to me that the subsidiary alliance does not take away the spirit of sovereignty by degrees from those princes; this is taken from them, along with the sovereignty, at the first step. It does not remain to be done by degrees. We begin by taking the military power, and when we have

have taken that, we have taken all. The princes exercise all the power that is left them to exercise, as mere trustees of our's, and unfortunately they are very bad trustees.

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37. Then upon the whole, you consider that under the subsidiary system the people are worse off than before we interfered at all?—Yes; and I believe that is the natural tendency of such a state of things.

38. What would be a better state of things?—There are two other modes; one, that of letting them alone altogether, not meddling with them.

39. That would be reducing it to what it was before?—Yes; and there is the other mode: when we have taken really the dominion of the country, to take the government of it wholly into our hands; and instead of leaving it to be governed abominably by the old rulers, to govern it ourselves as well as we can.

40. What is your opinion of government through the means of the dewan?—Governing by the dewan is, in reality (if I correctly take the meaning of the question), assuming powers of civil government, but under infinite disadvantages. We place a resident, who really is king of the country, whatever injunctions of non-interference he may act under. As long as the prince acts in perfect subservience, and does what is agreeable to the residents, that is, to the British Government, things go on quietly; they are managed without the resident appearing much in the administration of affairs; in the detail of the government his presence does not become conspicuous, for it goes on quietly, in a manner that is agreeable to him; but when anything of a different nature happens, the moment the prince takes a course which the British Government think wrong, then comes clashing and disturbance. The mode of preventing such collision which has been generally resorted to, has been the creating a dewan; that is, forcing the prince to appoint a prime minister of our choosing. A dewan, or prime minister, who knows he depends on the support from British power, and would be dismissed the moment that support should be withdrawn from him, takes care to conduct business in conformity with the inclinations of the British Government.

41. You consider the dewan as a less effective or more clumsy mode of absolute government?—When you appoint a dewan, you still can interfere only in a very imperfect degree for the prevention of misrule. Unless you take the collection of the revenue into your hands, and appoint your own collectors, with your own people to supervise those collectors, you may be perfectly sure the people will be plundered. In like manner, there will be no justice unless you administer it. All you can accomplish through the dewan is, to a certain degree, to prevent the prodigal expenditure of the government, improper interference with neighbours, and the violation of some of the general and broader lines of good conduct; but you cannot, without taking the government entirely into your own hands, know that he does not overcharge the people; and you know that you cannot have any security for anything like the administration of justice. All this goes on according to the usual plan in native states, and although a dewan or minister, who manages in accordance with your wishes, endeavours to prevent abuses, the means are wanting, and it is well known that they still go on.

42. Has it not been rather the disposition of the Indian government lately to restore the princes to their sway, to leave them to themselves, than to carry the

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interference further, and extend it?—The instructions sent from England have been very strong against interference, and against extending our relations at all. Both the British Legislature and the East-India Company have declared strongly against extending our conquests, but every now and then it has happened that those conquests were pressed on the Indian rulers by a species of necessity. All our wars cannot perhaps be, with propriety, considered wars of necessity; but most of those by which the territories we possess have been obtained, and out of which our subsidiary alliances have grown, have been wars, I think, of necessity, and not of choice. For example, the wars with Tippoo and the Mahrattas. The conquests actually made by these wars, the dominion acquired and kept, we have frequently chosen not to acknowledge. There being a certain anticipation on the part of the conquering government that the avowed conquest, taking, in short, the government of the acquired territory, simply and frankly, as we took all the military power into our hands, would raise a storm of indignation in England, where, so long as we only made the conquest, but took care to call it by the wrong name, all would be very well received,—the expedient of subsidiary and protective alliances was resorted to. The misfortune is, that to elude this species of prejudice in England, we were obliged to incur all the evil of the most perfect misgovernment in those states in the mean time.

43. Then the spirit of those instructions is diametrically opposed to your opinion of what would be the best thing for the happiness of the people?—In my opinion the best thing for the happiness of the people is, that our government should be nominally, as well as really, extended over those territories; that our own modes of governing should be adopted, and our own people put in the charge of the government.

44. That would lead to the deposing of the native princes, would it not?—It would lead to the making them all Rajahs of Tanjore, with palaces to live in, and liberal pensions, both for comfort and dignity, assigned them.

45. Do you imagine that the influence of the resident is never applied to alleviate the sufferings of the people?—It is always applied; sometimes more, sometimes less directly, but under infinite disadvantages. He has no instruments in the provinces to let him know what is going on. What he hears is incidentally; he may know that the country is oppressed, not prospering; that it is impossible it should prosper, and yet find it wholly impossible to use any effectual means to prevent the mischief. Such has been found to be the case in a most remarkable degree both in the Vizier's and Nizam's territories; and matters were still worse under the Peishwa, so long as territory was left to him.

46. In those cases where there is no special clause, as in some cases, for larger intervention with the internal affairs of the country, the only plausible ground on which the resident could put his interference to protect the people from oppression, would be, that the oppression might endanger the peace of the country and the produce of the revenues which paid our subsidy, and might render our protection more difficult to be afforded; do you not think so?—Yes; and even on that ground, the resident is always restrained by his instructions not to interfere but on occasions of the greatest urgency. Upon certain occasions we have considered ourselves bound by some of our treaties to interfere, in order to coerce refractory subjects.

47. That

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47. That emergency might chiefly consist in the way in which the oppression of subjects of a particular state might endanger the security of government, and increase the burden upon us in consequence of our alliance?—In the case of subjects, unless the resistance to exaction took the shape of a regular force, so as to threaten seriously the efficiency, if not the existence of the government, the resident would not think himself entitled to interfere further than by his advice.

48. Do you imagine the people themselves had rather be under the immediate dominion of the Company than that of their own native princes, circumstanced as those princes are?—The question admits of two answers; one, as regards the class of people who have held the powers of government, or might hope again to hold them under native princes. They are of course averse to our rule. The mass of the people, I believe, care very little by what sort of persons they are governed. They hardly think at all about the matter. They think of the present pressure and of relief from that pressure; but if they find themselves at peace in their dwellings and their fields, and are not burthened by too heavy an annual exaction, they are equally contented whether their comfort is under rulers with turbans or hats.

49. Then it brings itself to this: whether the immediate government of the Company is better than the intermediate or virtual government?—Yes; I consider the only other choice, that of leaving the entire dominion to the princes themselves, as wholly out of the question. I conceive that territories not only surrounding our own, but actually mixed with them, given up to princes whose great and almost sole object of ambition is to maintain a great rabble of irregular troops, more than they are able to pay; who are therefore perpetually hurried on to enterprizes of plunder, for the gratification of their predatory bands, are inconsistent with relations of amity. It would be impossible for us ever to feel in security against neighbours of this description, quarrelling with and plundering one another, and perpetually tempted, by the riches of our peaceful dominions, to turn their ravages upon them, without incurring such an expense for standing defence as would be equivalent to that of a perpetual war. The most obvious policy would call upon us to make war on those states and subdue them; which, to any power so far advanced beyond the native in civilization as the English, is never likely to be a matter of difficulty. Such a power, finding its own views of order and regularity constantly broken in upon by neighbours of that description, is not only naturally, but in some sort inevitably, induced to go on conquering one state after another, until it has got the whole territory. When you have proceeded to that extent, where nature seems to have pointed out the most admirable boundary, then you should stop, and govern what is included as well as possible.

50. The seat of the Pindarees was on the Nerbudda?—Yes; to the south of Malwa, whence they carried their incursions in every direction.

51. What has become of them?—They were entirely extirpated by Lord Hastings; I do not mean that every individual was slaughtered, they were entirely broken up, their leaders taken off, and they dispersed.

52. Had they any place that was their capital at all?—No; the different chiefs had forts and small territories, granted them chiefly by Scindia, where the marauders collected at a certain part of the year, and then issued out in parties of 500, 600, or 700 horsemen.

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53. Have we not established our supremacy over all that it is desirable for us to obtain?—I consider that we have nothing now between us and the most desirable frontier every where, but the territory of Runjeet Sing. If we were threatened on the north-west frontier, for example, by an invasion of the Russians, we should, in self-defence, be obliged to take possession of the country to the foot of the hills, as we could not leave an intermediate space, in which the enemy might establish themselves.

54. Is his country in the mountains?—He occupies the Punjaub, or the country within the streams of the Indus. The boundary between him and the Hill States is not very definite.

55. Does the pass through the mountains at Attock open into his dominions?—Attock is in his dominions.

56. Where is Cashmere?—It is a valley up in the mountains, north of the Punjaub, and belongs to Runjeet Sing.

57. You may then almost be considered to say, that India has been conquered and administered in spite of instructions from England?—To a considerable degree that is the truth.

58. What is the meaning of the word Circars, in the term Northern Circars?—Circar means a government. The Northern Circars are on the eastern coast, south of Cuttack. They are five districts, which got that name, probably, from being under separate governments. They have always belonged to the Madras presidency.

59. Were they administered by the Madras presidency directly, or through the medium of the native princes?—By the Madras presidency directly; though in the case of some of the hill districts, where the people are wild and unmanageable, the owners, a sort of local chiefs, have not been much interfered with in the management of their own people.

60. Do they come under the head of protected states?—We do not consider them as states, but as subjects. The Northern Circars were among the earliest of the Madras possessions.

61. Have you anything further to add on the subject of the subsidiary and protected states?—I can only repeat my opinion, that their real condition, in respect to us, is that of subjugation; they are part of our dominion, which we manage by no means to the advantage either of the people of those states, or to our own advantage. And farther, we bear all the expenses of the government pretty nearly, while we obtain but a part of the revenues; and the native rulers, ruling as our delegates, are wasting the rest, and destroying the resources of the country.

62. In a financial point of view, then, a more competent incorporation would be profitable?—Decidedly so. Beside what I have already said, one thing is clear, that under an obligation to maintain subsidiary troops within the territories of these states, you incur an unnecessary expense. A smaller force, disposed where it might act with greatest advantage for general purposes, would be equally efficient for general protection. It is still possible that this may be an intermediate state, through which it is expedient to pass. But what is of chief importance is duly to estimate an opinion maintained by persons of high name, whose opinions deserve the greatest attention (among others Sir John Malcolm), the opinion that we ought to

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to endeavour to retain this intermediate state as long as it is possible. From the view which I take of the matter, my opinion cannot but be, (of little weight, indeed, compared with that of Sir John Malcolm), that the more speedily we get out of it the better.

63. Do you imagine that the longer it continues the greater will be the difficulty in putting an end to that eventually?—No, I think that by degrees we are proceeding towards it; and one effect of it, pointed out not by those who, under the name of conservative policy, would preserve the intermediate state as long as possible, is, that in the mean time these troublesome parties, the old military families who formerly enjoyed power, and do not willingly give up the hope of it, are gradually worn out, without bringing odium upon us. They would ascribe the cause of their declension to us, if we were to take the government entirely into our own hands; but when we merely take the military power, and leave a nominal sovereignty in the hands of the old sovereigns, they are equally unemployed and exposed to this decline and gradual annihilation, but do not seem to owe their calamities to us. I believe, however, that a good deal of this supposed advantage is fanciful; for they are not so ignorant as not to know that we are the cause of all the change which has taken place.

64. Do you conceive that it will be facilitated, the assumption of the power, by its still being allowed to continue some time longer?—I think the facilitation is more with respect to English feeling and prejudice than to India. There would be very little risk, I think, in putting all the subsidiary and protected powers in the state of the Rajah of Tanjore by judicious means; but I conceive there would be a very great outcry against it in England.

65. If you took the whole of the government, you would take the whole of the revenues?—Yes, and grant pensions to the chiefs.

66. You think the best policy would be always to have that object in view and that tendency?—Yes, and to accomplish it according as circumstances would allow.

67. Taking advantage of opportunities as they occur for realizing that system?—Yes, it is a result to which the nature of things is carrying us; it is inevitable; in the mean time the present state is attended with deplorable consequences; my opinion is, that it ought to be as short as you can conveniently make it.

68. During this suspense the exaction of the revenue is so much greater, and we bear the odium of it?—Yes, certainly so.

69. The means of levying the revenue is perhaps more objectionable than the amount?—Yes, because there is endless fraud and exaction by the subordinate people, who are under little or no control.

70. Do not the assignments of the revenue tend particularly to the distress of the inhabitants?—When they are not managed by our officers.

71. That is when assignments are made to individual natives for debts?—Yes, such assignments are invariably found to be a great source of oppression. When a needy government, unable to pay its creditors, gives an assignment of the revenues of certain territories to its creditor, and permits him to collect the revenue under no restraint, he takes whatever he can get; he is not in the least interested in the welfare of the ryots, in their being enabled to cultivate their land next year or not, which

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which the Government is ; he carries off the bullocks of the ryot, all his implements of industry, even his miserable furniture, and leaves him nothing.

72. Do you imagine that the native princes, who are in fact under our government, attach much importance to the name and dignity of sovereign, or that they very much dislike being reduced?—Yes, they dislike it exceedingly ; nothing is more ridiculous than their attachment to their mock majesty. The pageantry kept up at Delhi by the Mogul is an example. He holds his durbar every day, and gives pensions to people to come and present nuzzers, morning and evening, as if he were on a real throne.

Martis, 21^o die Februarii, 1832.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES MACINTOSH, in the Chair.

HENRY RUSSEL, Esq. called in and examined.

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73. How long were you Resident at Hydrabad?—I held the office of resident there 10 years ; I was there nearly 21 years altogether.

74. Were you 11 years assistant?—No, I was eight years assistant ; I was then a year and a half at Madras, on a commission for the investigation of the Nabob of Arcot's debts ; I was a year and a half in charge of the residency at Poonah, and for 10 years held the office of resident at Hydrabad.

75. What opinion have you formed, from your experience and observation of the manner in which the subsidiary system affects the well-being of the inhabitants of the countries where it is established?—One of the most striking effects, perhaps the most striking of all, which a close connection with us, upon the subsidiary system, has produced upon the native states that have embraced it, is the condition of premature decrepitude into which it inevitably hurries them. Every faculty that is valuable to a state, every organ that contributes to its wholesome existence, seems to decay under our alliance. From the moment that we engage to protect a foreign prince, he ceases to have any inducement to maintain himself. The habit of going upon crutches deprives him of the use of his own limbs. By taking away the occasion, we take away, in the end, all power of exertion. Let a prince in this state of tutelage do what he may, his government must progressively decline. He has no longer anything to hope from good measures, or to fear from bad ; he has no longer any inducement to strengthen himself against the hostilities of foreign powers, or to conciliate the affection of his own subjects ; all community of interest or feeling between them is at an end, and having no longer any occasion for their attachment or support, he treats them as if he had none. He exacts, in the shape of revenue, not what they ought to pay, but what his own rapacity desires to receive. Those impediments which his people, if left to themselves, would raise against him, are prevented or removed by the dread of the exercise of our power, and he proceeds in his course of injustice, violence, and extortion, without any fear of resistance

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or rebellion. I speak here principally of the Nizam's government, as that with the condition and progress of which I am best acquainted; and perhaps it furnishes the fairest example that could be chosen, as it is the one with which our alliance has been longest in operation. If the Nizam had not been protected as we were bound to protect him, either he must have abstained from the system of internal misgovernment which he has pursued, or his subjects would have been driven to redress themselves. This system of confederation, which we have hitherto pursued with the protected states of India is inevitably progressive in its nature. Every new alliance that we contract brings us into territorial or political contact with other states, which, in their turn, submit to the same system, and fall under the same consequences. A state that has once resorted to an alliance with us can no longer remain stationary. By degrees our relations become more intimate, the habit of relying upon foreign support gradually paralyzes its own faculties, and in the end it loses the form as well as the substance of independence. If it is galled by its trammels, and makes an effort to shake them off, as the Peishwa did, it only precipitates its own destruction; if it submits, it declines, by degrees, from one stage of weakness to another, until, like the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore, it expires from exhaustion. The choice is between a violent and a lingering death. When once we changed the character of our establishments, and relinquished our capacity of merchant for that of sovereign, we entered upon a career in which it was difficult to check, and impossible to stop ourselves. Our largest and most frequent acquisitions of territory have been made since the declaration of the Legislature in 1784, that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of the nation." Lord Cornwallis arrived in India in 1786, with this declaration ringing in his ears, and found Sir J. Macpherson engaged in a negociation with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, in which the object of those powers was to inveigle us into a war with Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis's first act was to break off this negociation, under a declaration that the English would engage in none but strictly defensive wars. His second act was to propose an alliance to those very powers for a war, of which the result produced a large accession to our territory: but this was the fault, not of Lord Cornwallis, but of the circumstances in which he was placed. Events were no longer under his control; he was controlled by them; and the same has been the case with almost every one of his successors. Unless we are arrested in our progress by some formidable disaster, the result of our present course must be the falling to pieces of all the native states, and the acquisition of the whole territory of India to ourselves. The collection of the Pindarries, and the war we were obliged to undertake for their dispersion, were another consequence of the relations established by us with the principal states of India. Predatory bands have in all ages existed in India, and the name of Pindarry was known, I believe, as long ago as the time of Aurungzebe; but organized bodies of such magnitude as those which were collected before the war of 1817, permanently occupying tracts of country acknowledged as their own, openly treating with the governments in their neighbourhood, and systematically conducting predatory expeditions, from which even our own territory was latterly not exempt, were unheard of before the extension of our power, and while the principal states retained their independence; but as they declined

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declined in power, and entered successively into more intimate relations with us, they no longer required, nor were able to maintain the same military establishments as before. Large bodies of cavalry were consequently discharged, both in Hindostan and in the Deccan; legitimate service was no longer open to them; they could not, or would not change their mode of life; and by degrees they congregated and established themselves in those districts next the Nerbudda, which were at once the most accessible to them, and the most secure from our reach; the rapidity of their increase was promoted by the same causes that had produced their original foundation, and by the success with which their early enterprizes were attended. They were constantly recruited by parties, or individual horsemen, who fell out of employ; and the regular states, too feeble to resist them, had recourse to the fatal policy of buying off their incursion, in some cases by payments in money, in others by cessions of territory. But this, though a serious, was a temporary evil. Having once been encountered with decision, it was extinguished. The source in which the Pindarries originated has been stopped; the native states have no longer large bodies of cavalry to discharge, and even if they had, there is no longer any secure position in which those bodies could assemble and establish themselves.

76. Can you shortly state to the Committee the progress of subsidiary treaties with the native states; for instance, what was the first subsidiary treaty with the Nizam?—We had an early treaty, in the nature of a subsidiary engagement, with the Nabob of Lucknow, now called the King of Oude. But that was so old in point of time, and so distant in respect of place, that it cannot be considered as forming a part of what may now be considered as our subsidiary system.

77. That treaty?—Yes; that treaty.

78. When was that treaty made; was it by Lord Clive?—I do not immediately recollect.

79. What was the time of the first treaty with the Nizam?—Our first treaty with the Nizam was made in 1766. By that treaty we engaged, on receiving three months' notice, to afford him military assistance, and he, in consideration of the yearly payment of nine, afterwards reduced to seven, lacs of rupees, granted to us the tract upon the sea coast, between Ganjam and Masulipatam, called the Northern Circars. The next was a treaty of peace in 1768, the Nizam having in the interval joined Hyder Ally in a war against us. By that we agreed to furnish the Nizam with two battalions whenever he should require them; but he never did require them.

80. Their being furnished depended upon a requisition from him?—Yes.

81. They were both subsidiary treaties?—They were only for temporary assistance.

82. They were not for keeping up a force?—No, the first treaty, that can fairly be called a subsidiary treaty, was that of Paungah, concluded with the Nizam in 1790, preparatory to Lord Cornwallis's war.

83. Was that a subsidiary treaty?—Yes; but the force furnished by us, under it was not permanent. It was preparatory to the war with Tippoo; it made the Nizam a member of the triple alliance, consisting of himself, the English, and the Mahrattas, against Tippoo. The force furnished under that treaty consisted of only two battalions.

84. Did

84. Did we do it by one general treaty with the three powers, or by separate ones?—By separate treaties.

85. The Nizam was no party to the treaty with the Mahrattas, nor the Mahrattas to that with the Nizam?—No, not directly.

86. Was this intended as a permanent arrangement, or merely for that particular purpose?—It depended upon the pleasure of the parties; it was determinable at any time that either party chose; and in point of fact, the two battalions were dismissed by the Nizam in 1795, in resentment of our refusing to assist him in his war with the Mahrattas; but they were recalled almost immediately afterwards, in consequence of the rebellion of his eldest son.

87. Was the occupation of any part of the territory of the Deccan or of the Nizam's dominions, any part of the stipulations of that treaty?—No; no territorial cession was provided for until 1800.

88. Having in view a war with Tippoo, and contemplating a partition of dominions?—Yes; and there was a partition treaty afterwards.

89. Was that partition treaty after the peace?—It was; in 1792, after the peace.

90. It was understood, was it not, that there was to be a partition treaty when they first went to war?—It was expected, though I think there was no specific provision made for the scale of partition. We had then a second subsidiary treaty with the Nizam in 1798, preparatory to another war with Tippoo.

91. That was Lord Wellesley's?—Yes; and that was the treaty that made the subsidiary force permanent, though it did not provide for any cession of territory for the payment of it. The Nizam was still bound to provide a money payment for the subsidiary force. The last subsidiary treaty took place in October 1800, the year after the fall of Seringapatam.

92. Did that treaty provide for the cession of territory?—Yes, it did.

93. With the same Nizam?—Yes.

94. Can you tell the Committee what was the outline or plan of that treaty?—The force provided for by that treaty consisted of eight battalions of native infantry, of 1,000 men each, and two regiments of native cavalry, of 500 each, with the due proportion of artillery, and the Nizam agreed, in commutation of the money payment, to cede to us all the territories acquired by him under the two partition treaties of 1792, and the other in 1799, after the wars with Tippoo.

95. In respect to the subsidiary troops, do we levy them in the dominions of the princes for whose protection they were intended, or in our own possessions?—Generally speaking we levy them in our own possessions, but on one occasion a recruiting establishment was formed in the Nizam's country to supply the regiments with troops, but I believe that even the men recruited there were inhabitants of our own territories, who came into the Nizam's country in search of service.

96. The inhabitants of the territory of the native state would not be reckoned safe, would they?—No, nor are they the kind of persons we should like to take.

97. Were those 10,000 men to be stationed in the Nizam's territories?—Yes, permanently; there was a provision made, that in the event of war they should all be applicable to the purpose of general hostilities, with the exception of two battalions, which were to remain near the person of the Nizam.

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98. Was he to pay them?—He ceded territory in commutation of the money payment; he ceded to us all the territory acquired by him under the treaty of 1792, after Lord Cornwallis's war with Tippoo, and under that of 1799, after Lord Wellesley's war.

99. We were to maintain them after that cession?—Yes.

100. And we were at liberty to increase them if we saw occasion, were we not?—No.

101. Not in the event of hostilities?—We might, considering his territories as the territories of a friendly power, have sent troops to act in them; but we had no power to increase the subsidiary force permanently stationed in them.

102. Was, then, the first cession of territory in consequence of a subsidiary alliance?—The first, with the exception of the Northern Circars ceded to us in 1766.

103. Was there any subsequent alteration in the provisions of the treaty?—There was one trifling alteration in the composition of the force immediately before the war with the Mahrattas, in 1803; it was thought inconvenient to have so large a force as the Hyderabad subsidiary force, consisting of natives only; a separate arrangement was therefore entered into with the Nizam, by which he agreed to receive a regiment of 1,000 Europeans instead of 2,000 sepoys.

104. There was no other alteration in the federal relations?—No.

105. What year did you go to Hyderabad?—Originally in the year 1800, just before the conclusion of the treaty of that year.

106. You had occasion to see a good deal of the Nizam's country, making excursions of various sorts, going down to Madras, travelling, and so on?—Yes.

107. Did you observe any, and if so, what alteration in the state of the inhabitants of the country from the beginning of your acquaintance with that province to the end of it?—I should say, that a very material and constant change was going on for the worse; the population was becoming more scanty, their poverty was increasing, and they were being gradually and progressively reduced to a still more and more abject condition of misery.

108. Between what years?—1800 and 1820.

109. There was a commercial treaty in 1802, that had nothing to do with subsidiary arrangements, was there not?—Yes; but it was hardly attended with any practical consequences.

110. To what was the deterioration to which you have alluded to be ascribed?—To the increasing rapacity and misrule of the government. The government was originally a bad government; and the persons composing it were of one religion, while the people were of another. I think a great deal is to be referred to that cause.

111. It was a Mahometan government?—Yes, with a Hindoo population.

112. Did it ever occur to you, that any part of that constant degeneracy of government arose from its inability to protect?—A great deal arose in this particular instance from the personal character of the old Nizam, and of his minister, Azim-ool-Omrah, a man who was in absolute power for many years; they were both very weak, very extravagant, and very rapacious men.

113. After

113. After making all allowance for personal character, do you consider the subsidiary relation itself as having a tendency to produce that?—I have no doubt it gave efficacy to all the bad features of that character.

114. Were you for some time resident at Poonah?—Yes, a year and a half.

115. At that time the Peishwa was a subsidiary ally?—Yes.

116. In the space of time between 1800 and 1820, what sort of change did you happen to observe in the ceded territories?—I never had an opportunity of seeing the ceded territories. I have no doubt the progress that had taken place there had been precisely the reverse of what I have mentioned; having been transferred to our government, they were reviving in much the same ratio in which the rest of the Nizam's territories were declining. I have always understood they were progressively improving. Our own territories are better governed than those of the native states in close alliance with us, but not so well governed as the territories of those native powers which have retained any considerable portion of their original independence. There was a great difference between the character of the Peishwa's government, under the influence of our subsidiary alliance, when I saw it, from what I noticed in that of the Nizam. The alliance with the Peishwa was of more recent origin, and his government was in a much more vigorous state. And that I take to have been one of the causes of his breaking out as he did; he relied on his own people and on his own vigour. His government had not been weakened and humbled like the Nizam's; he could not brook the weight of our control, and he fell in the effort to cast it off.

117. Was he a Hindoo?—Yes, a Mahratta, as well as his people.

118. You think upon the whole, that the marks of the vigour of his government were discernible in the better condition of the people?—Remarkably so; his people were contented, and had great reason to be so.

119. Is there the same importance attached to caste that there was?—Among the Hindoos as much as ever.

120. Would they not dislike being governed by princes of inferior caste?—Yes; they look down with great disgust upon their own lowest castes.

121. Had we ever a subsidiary treaty with the king of Tanjore?—Yes, I think we had.

122. Is the natural course of a subsidiary treaty that it will end in the complete dependence of the state in time?—Yes, inevitably.

123. Lord Wellesley was the first who begun that subsidiary system, was he not?—Yes, that system in the shape and to the extent in which it is now contemplated by the Committee.

124. Were you at Poonah before or since the termination of the Peishwa's government?—Before the war with him.

125. You have no knowledge of the actual state of it?—No; I left India shortly after the war which placed his territories in our possession.

126. You do not know anything particularly of the Nagpore country?—I apprehend it was better governed than the Nizam's, but not so well as that of the Peishwa; and in point of condition, it occupied perhaps an intermediate place between the two.

127. Our first connection with the Peishwa begun when he was under a regency?—No; we had in early times a close connection with his father Ragobah, but not

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of a permanent nature; we espoused his interests when he was opposed by the other branches of the Mahratta confederation; but we had no connection with this individual Peishwa.

128. He was an infant when he came to authority?—Not when our first treaty was concluded with him; we had no treaty with him till that of Bassein, concluded in 1802. An attempt was made by Lord Wellesley to induce him to join the alliance with the Company and the Nizam against Tippon in 1798, but he refused. After the conquest of Mysore a considerable portion of territory was reserved, and offered to the Peishwa as a gift, on condition of his becoming a member of the subsidiary alliance, but he persisted in his refusal.

129. You mean of the triple alliance?—No; the triple alliance was that of 1790.

130. Was not territory offered to Holkar, which he refused?—No.

131. Were not treaties made with Scindia and Holkar before the war of 1790?—No, not on that occasion. I believe that Scindia and Holkar joined as dependents of the Peishwa, but not as independent powers.

132. We have treated with them as independent powers?—Yes, we did long anterior to that, though the treaty of Sahley in 1782 was rather negotiated through Scindia than concluded with him. By our treaty with the Peishwa in 1817, the Mahratta confederacy was “dissolved in form and substance.” Since that time, therefore, Scindia, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, the Guicowar, and the other smaller Mahratta princes have been nominally as well as really independent. Our first *subsidiary* treaty with the Peishwa took place in 1802: he was dethroned or abdicated, whichever it may be called, in 1818; he therefore survived his alliance with us only 16 years.

133. You say, in your answers to the written questions proposed to you, that the only danger we have to apprehend is from a well-concerted conspiracy, or a rebellion of our own army; do you mean a conspiracy among the immediate subjects of the Company, or among the native princes under our control?—Among our own subjects. The greatest danger is from our native army; and the next, and perhaps the only other, is from our own subjects. I do not apprehend that there is any danger from a conspiracy of the native princes; they might concur in it, and render assistance, but the greatest source of danger appears to me to be in our native army, and there, I think, there is very considerable danger.

134. Immediate danger?—It might occur at any time; particularly if among the native officers a man of considerable talent were to arise, and to acquire influence, as such a man might, over the sepoys.

135. You do not think there is any foundation now for such an apprehension?—No; I think the occurrence of the danger would be sudden; if there were time to discern its approach, I think it might be averted. In 1806 we had a formidable and an extensive insurrection among our native troops.

136. That arose from a particular cause?—It is doubtful what the real cause was. Those generally assigned lay upon the surface. The efficient causes, I believe, lay deeper.

137. You do not apprehend there is any settled disaffection?—Certainly not.

138. But you think there is a constant indefinite danger belonging to our position in India?—The magazine is charged, though at present there is no spark likely to be

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be applied to it. The danger most to be apprehended is the appearance of any person of considerable talents and ambition among the native officers, whose situation would enable him to take advantage of any accidental disaffection among the sepoys. I have no doubt that many of those individual native officers having got all that they can get, are very much discontented.

139. Would a Hindoo be readily received into Mahometan society if he abandoned his religion?—Yes; they do not look upon an apostate with the abhorrence that we do. The Mahometans receive converts readily. The Hindoos, as they do not admit proselytes, look with great indifference on the followers of other religions.

140. Do you conceive that employing a great number of natives in civil and military stations of trust would be attended with danger, or would be an improvement?—The process of introducing them would necessarily be one of time and considerable difficulty; but the result would be very beneficial. The great mischief of our internal government in India has been, the abolition of the respectable class of natives; it has occasioned the utter extinction of that class.

141. You think it could not be done immediately?—It must be a work of both time and difficulty.

142. And of some danger?—Yes, of course; all very great changes involve some degree of danger. I think, however, that it might be accomplished without any serious danger; and it is a measure of such eminent importance, that I am satisfied it ought to be attempted.

143. The effect of it would be, raising natives to become conspicuous among their countrymen, so far setting them forward to do mischief?—We should hardly increase their power of doing mischief, and we should very much diminish their inducement. By affording them, what we do not afford them now, respectable employment, and placing them in a creditable condition of life, we should do more than we could effect in any other way to reconcile them to our government. At present they cannot but be dissatisfied with it, not as a foreign government only, but as a government in which they have no stake, and which holds out to them no objects of hope or expectation. I take the reign of Akbar, who was contemporary with our Elizabeth, to have been that under which India was the best governed. We have no reason to suppose that it had ever been so well governed before, and we know that it has never been so well governed since. The instruments that were principally chosen by him were not of his own race and religion, but Hindoos, the natives of the country; and the result justified his choice.

Martis, 6^o die Martii, 1832.

VI.
POLITICAL
or
FOREIGN.

The Right Hon. CHARLES WATKINS WILLIAMS WYNN, in the Chair.

Lieutenant-Colonel BARNEWELL called in and examined.

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Lt. Col. Barnewell.

144. How many years have you been in the service of the Company?—Thirty years.

145. During that time what diplomatic situation have you held?—During the last 10 years I have held the situation of Political Agent in Kattiawar.

146. During that time had you many opportunities of witnessing the effect of the subsidiary system upon the native powers?—As far as our subsidiary treaty with the State of Baroda, I had an opportunity of witnessing its effects.

147. What power was the subsidiary in the service of?—The Guicowar, one of the Mahratta powers, with whom we entered into a treaty in the year 1802.

148. For what period can you speak to what has been the effect of that arrangement on the internal state of the country?—From the period of our treaty with the Guicowar until the year 1820, during which the natural defects and condition of the prince caused the government to be controlled under the advice and aid of the resident.

149. Do you mean the whole internal government?—A minister and a regency conducted all the details of the Baroda government, subject to the advice of the resident, who superintended their proceedings, reporting every thing that took place to his own government for their approbation and information; the effect of this control was very favourable. In 1802, at the period of our first connection, this government had been nearly subverted by the Arab soldiery, and by disputes that existed between the different members of the Guicowar family; it also was so oppressed by pecuniary embarrassments as to be in a state of bankruptcy. Through our interference money was advanced and loans were raised by mortgaging, or rendering (under our bhanderry) the revenues of the State liable for the sums advanced; the effect of our control and arrangements up to the year 1818, cleared nearly all the old debt of the State, and raised it from a condition of anarchy and bankruptcy to one of comparative prosperity and tranquillity.

150. You were in Goozerat as late as a year ago?—I was, 18 months ago.

151. Can you state in what state the country now is with respect to its revenue?—A depreciation in the value of agricultural produce had taken place, and the revenues had decreased. The eastern districts of Goozerat are very rich and fruitful; especially those under the direct rule of the British Government.

152. Part of the country has been ceded to us, we understand?—We have a great number of districts in the Goozerat, others came under us by the conquest of the Peishwa's dominions.

153. What is that depreciation arising from?—Agricultural produce being depressed, and not being saleable at the former prices.

154. What

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154. What is the cause?—The changed state of India; it was formerly greatly disturbed, and it is now in a state of internal peace; this prevents the employment of numbers of men, as well as all extra demands; from this cause a larger part of the population have become agricultural, and the supply of grain, which is the principal produce, so far exceeds the consumption, that there is a glut which causes a depreciation in the value of the produce.

155. I should have thought, as the country was less disturbed, that would have been counterbalanced?—This has not been the case in India. During the disturbed state of that country, larger establishments were maintained; these were consumers of the produce of the soil; they have now become its cultivators for a subsistence. There is therefore now a great deal of increased tranquillity, but a less demand.

156. You say the cultivation of the country is improved, and tranquillity increased?—Tranquillity has generally increased, but the profits of the farmer is reduced, and therefore a remission of his revenue has become requisite.

157. Are the native powers in general consenting to a remission of the revenues in consequence of the fall in the prices of agricultural produce?—I can only speak with respect to Goozerat, the part that I was employed in: I do not think that they have made any remission to the degree that they ought to have done, but they have been obliged to make some remissions, because if they had not, their ryots would seek shelter in the Company's districts; their vicinity affords to the ryots of the native states a place of refuge, and this asylum, which they can always obtain, tends materially to lessen the power that the native governments would otherwise possess of oppressing with impunity their ryots by over exactions.

158. Are you of opinion that that counterbalances the increased power which he has of collecting the revenue by the service of a more efficient force, which is subsidiary to it?—In a degree it does so, the force within the Guickwar possessions affords increased security to the subjects of it, while it also gives increased power to the ruler of the State.

159. What I mean to say is this, does the increased power which that subsidiary force gives it, is it counterbalanced by the facility which the vicinity of the Company's territory affords them of transferring their residence there, and of migrating from the State?—How far it operates in doing so it is very difficult to specify.

160. Previous to the employment of the subsidiary troops for collecting the revenue, is it necessary for the Guicowar to obtain the approbation of the resident?—Certainly, he cannot employ any part of the troops unless the resident concurs in the justice of the way in which they are employed; he is not entitled to the aid of the force unless to obtain a just object.

161. Have the force been employed for collecting the revenue?—Never; the Guicowar, by mismanagement, might excite a disturbance that would make it necessary to employ the forces to put it down, and to preserve the general peace of Goozerat; we cannot deprive the Guicowar of the aid he is entitled to by treaty, but we have a right, which would be rigidly maintained, of not allowing our aid to be used for unjust purposes.

162. The only security then appears to be in the conduct of the prince?—While we have no control over his government it is so; and it is the most difficult thing to suggest an effectual check against our protection being abused. So long as the resident

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resident had a control sufficient to influence the government, our protection could not have been made use of to a bad object ; this control ceased with the life of the late prince, whose natural defects caused it ; the succession of the present prince was accompanied by his assumption of the management of his own government, and our influence being limited to the fulfilment of our bhanderry contracts to bankers and other individuals.

163. Since what time is that?—Since 1820. I beg leave to refer the Committee to the Minute of Mr. Elphinstone, dated in April 1820 ; it will supply all the particulars that rendered it necessary for us to retire from a greater interference. Sir John Malcolm's Minute of the 1st March 1828, and his further Minute and his Journal of his proceedings at the Court of Baroda in January 1830, will furnish the Committee with a detail of all transactions with this State up to the latest period.

164. Is Sir John Malcolm's Minute published in his book?—No. There is a letter also of the 7th January 1820, from the Bombay government to the Supreme Government of Bengal, in which they take a full review of the nature of our Baroda relations, which would be also a useful paper to refer to.

165. Are you prepared to suggest any effectual check under the subsidiary system short of assuming the entire direction of the native forces?—I cannot suggest any plan. I believe experience has shown the impracticability of carrying on interference, with benefit to the people or the ruler, unless the prince will be entirely controlled by our advice ; this is a species of management few independent princes will ever be reconciled to. Our political relations with Oude are similar to those at Baroda, and I believe all attempts to induce the king of Oude to make arrangements for an improved system of internal government have proved ineffectual, in consequence of the Prince being decidedly opposed to any degree of control that is calculated to lessen his patronage, or to limit his profits of management.

166. In point of fact, previous to the year 1820 our resident was himself the acting governor?—The ruling prince being, from his natural defects, unable to conduct the details of his government, they were managed by a minister and a regency, who acted under the advice of the resident, and the State was relieved from a great debt it had incurred. Under this control, by this period, could a similar system have been continued, it is probable the old as well as the new debt would have been paid off ; but the result is now very different, as, after we withdrew from interference, the prince has not paid the loan contractors, but put the revenue in his private coffers.

167. Is not that very general in consequence of the interference, the prince having a private coffer of his own, independent of his public treasury?—In the Mahratta State it is frequently the case ; I believe no state in India has derived so much benefit, both as affecting the government and the people, as the Guicowar State, from our interference. Soon after the prince was left his own master his government fell into disorder, and his avarice involved it in great pecuniary embarrassments.

168. Is that from profusion or avarice?—In this instance avarice impelled him to violate our guarantee. That offence would justify, according to usage, any degree of severity or penalty that Government might have thought proper to inflict, as the
State

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State failed to fulfil its obligations to the bankers who had advanced loans on the faith of our bhanderry. This is a contract by which our government comes under an obligation to fulfil a mortgage on the annual revenues. The prince pledges a certain portion of the receipts of the government, or the revenues of particular districts, to pay it; we are bound, as the bhanderry, to use all the power we possess, if such becomes necessary, to enforce the fulfilment of this contract: we might confiscate. It differs from a guarantee so far, as if we had been guarantee, a pecuniary responsibility would attach to us, but a bhanderry obligation is limited to the enforcement only of the contract.

169. It seems to be the disposition of these princes rather to amass treasure than to waste it?—Their object is to accumulate private treasure and hoard it.

170. Do they lead a jolly life?—The present prince is not of a disposition to do so, or to spend money, as he is very parsimonious.

171. Is their object in amassing this treasure to provide for their family?—No, the treasure of this prince would be the property of his successor at his death: his family are provided for by the State.

172. It seems now to be more the continuance of inveterate habit than anything else?—The habits of all the Mahratta princes lead them to desire to accumulate treasure, as the possession of it gives them weight and consideration.

173. Can you inform the Committee whether it is a usual clause in the treaties with these princes to give a bhanderry for the public?—No clause in our treaties mention it; the practice we found to exist on forming a connection with the Baroda State: this custom was general throughout the Goozerat, and shows the mistrust of the people with respect to their government. In every contract between the prince and his subjects mistrust was so great that security was essential to produce confidence from those possessing sufficient power: the Arab zemindars were selected to be the security to every contract for money lent and the engagements of government, and we were obliged, as a condition for obtaining quiet possession of the fort of Baroda, to substitute our bhanderry in the room of that of the Arabs, which we removed.

174. Who stipulated for that?—Government. It is a point of honour with the Arabs not to withdraw unless replaced by a new security; their character is concerned in the observance of this rule; the native governments in Goozerat all observed this system for enforcing claims; in fact it was the only way in which all engagements were entered into and fulfilled.

175. For what time and in what part of India were you employed?—In the province of Goozerat.

176. In what department were you employed?—In the Revenue department for about 12 years, in the Political for nine years.

177. You were employed in the collection of the revenues for the districts ceded for subsidy by the Guicowar?—I was.

178. Will you mention the comparative state of the ceded districts compared with the districts under the direct sovereignty of the Guicowar?—The Company's districts are in a better condition, and both person and property are more secure.

179. The revenue of the Guicowar is in a most involved state?—It is embarrassed from the misconduct of the present sovereign.

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180. What

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180. What is the revenue of the Ceded Districts now, are they in arrear?—It is impossible for me to state the arrears. The provinces under our direct rule in Goozerat yield about 38 lacs of rupees of revenue, but within that sum are included provinces that we have acquired by conquest from the late Peishwa.

181. Have the revenues of the Goozerat districts fallen off since they have been in our possession?—No, they have rather increased by increase of cultivation, and by the increase of population; the rates of revenue I believe have not been increased.

182. Have they been diminished?—The revenues have been diminished, and are diminishing with the price of produce; our system was not to increase but from new cultivation.

183. Is the general cultivation of the Ceded Provinces superior or inferior to that of the provinces in the direct dominion of the Guicowar?—Both are remarkably well cultivated.

184. Do you say there is any difference between them?—I think there is a greater increase of cultivation in the Company's provinces than in the Guicowar.

185. You consider the profits of cultivation to have diminished since the war, in what proportion?—I do; from the depreciated value of produce: it is felt particularly by those who have a fixed property, and who pay a fixed rent; their produce of course yields a less profit than it formerly did.

186. I think you said the value of the land in cultivation generally was decreased since the war in the proportion of about one-third, if I understood you?—Cotton had fallen in price, and so had grain; the market prices would be the best criterion for ascertaining to what extent; I cannot exactly state the degree, from memory, that they have fallen in the market.

187. You can only state that there is a considerable decrease?—Yes, a considerable decrease in the revenues, and a fall in the prices of produce.

Martis, 27^o die Martii, 1832.

HENRY GALLY KNIGHT, Esq., in the Chair.

Colonel MUNRO, called in and examined.

27 March 1832.

Colonel Munro.

188. In what part of India were you?—In the Madras establishment.

189. Only at Madras?—Yes.

190. In what situation were you?—I was Resident at Travancore and Cochin for about ten years.

191. What opinion have you formed of the general nature and character of our subsidiary treaties in India and their effect on the good government in the respective territories to which they relate?—I may state that our subsidiary alliances appear

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appear to me eminently calculated to strengthen our military and political power in India. How far they may be conducive to the internal good government of the several states with which we are connected must depend entirely on the use we make of our influence over the administration of those states.

192. Are you aware of any states in which it was usefully exercised for the happiness of the inhabitants of the country?—Yes; in Mysore, while the late Sir Barry Close and Mr. Webb were residents, it promoted the prosperity and happiness of the country; and in Travancore, when I was resident, several measures were adopted at my suggestion for the amelioration of the condition of the people.

193. Were there any particular features in the possession of the resident with regard to these countries?—In Mysore there was a very able dewan, who acted under the superintendence of the residents. In Travancore I was obliged to take direct charge of the administration of all the branches of the government and to act myself as dewan, in consequence of the great difficulties and embarrassments in which all the departments of the state were involved.

194. Was that by native mismanagement?—By native mismanagement.

195. Previous to any subsidiary alliance?—Both previously and after it. The country had declared war against the British Government, and it was soon after the conclusion of peace that I was appointed resident. But no description can exhibit an adequate idea of the oppressive character of the native government of Travancore, and of the great embarrassments under which every part of the administration laboured.

196. You found great fiscal exaction and mal-administration of justice?—There was no administration of justice whatever; the Rajah was absolute; the dewan exercised in the most despotic manner all the powers of the government. There was a chain of officers, from the dewan to the meanest inhabitant, exercising also all the powers of government, judicial, revenue, and military; bribery and extortion prevailed in all parts; every officer of the government had authority to impose fines on the people at his pleasure; the property of the inhabitants was considered to belong to the Rajah on their death, and was only redeemed by very oppressive fines.

197. Were you authorized by treaty to take upon yourself that direct interference?—The treaty authorized the general interference of the British Government; but I assumed the charge of the administration at the express request of the Rajah, with the authority of the British Government.

198. In short, it was completely voluntary on the part of the Rajah?—It was at the earnest request of the Rajah.

199. With the concurrence of his subjects?—They were never consulted.

200. Have the kindness to state the changes that were introduced in consequence of your suggestions?—Many most oppressive monopolies and imposts were abolished, improved arrangements were adopted in the collection of the revenue, the powers of the public servants were limited and defined, a system for the administration of justice was introduced under their own laws, and all the debts of the state were paid off.

201. You made an attempt to introduce the Hindoo law?—That is the law of the country; no other law has ever been admitted.

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202. You

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202. You introduced that because there was no law at all before?—Only the arbitrary will of the servants of government; practically there was no law whatever, although the Hindoo law is the law of the state.

203. With what success was this measure attended?—In general the results were extremely satisfactory, and the administration, after these objects were effected, was delivered over to a native dewan.

204. Then subsequently did it go on well?—While the influence of the resident was employed in guiding the administration of affairs, it did go on well; but I have understood that latterly that influence has been very much withdrawn, and that affairs have relapsed into their former state of misrule and disorder.

205. And that the condition of the inhabitants is much less happy than it was?—I have understood so.

206. How long had you the charge of the situation?—About three years.

207. Between the years 1809 and 1812?—About the year 1811. I was appointed in 1810; I took charge in 1811; from 1811 to 1814.

208. What was the nature of their relations with this country?—It was connected by a subsidiary alliance, authorizing the British Government to interfere for the good of the people.

209. To an indefinite extent?—The degree of interference was not specified.

210. That was the treaty of 1795?—There were two treaties; the last was negotiated by Colonel now General Macaulay: I believe it was in 1805 that the last subsidiary treaty was made.

211. Those treaties authorized our almost indefinite interference?—They authorized our interference, without stating or imposing any limits to the exercise of it.

212. Was this treaty accompanied by any stipulation of military protection?—Yes; it was a subsidiary treaty, by which a military force was to be maintained for the protection of Travancore.

213. And in the country?—The Government, to the best of my recollection, reserved to itself the power to employ part of the force in the Company's territories, if it should be necessary.

214. This force was there while you were there?—Yes, it was; I have understood it has been since withdrawn by Mr. Lushington's government, but that the subsidy has been continued.

215. There was a subsidy as well as protection?—Yes, to pay the troops.

216. Was not the subsidy converted into a cession of territory latterly?—There was no cession of territory.

217. It was hard cash, in short?—Yes, and is now paid, since the removal of the troops.

218. You know that of your own knowledge?—I have understood so, it is only from information.

219. Have you reason to suppose the natives viewed your interference with satisfaction, when you took upon yourself the administration of the government?—I have every reason to believe they did; it relieved them from a most oppressive system of government.

220. What opinion have you formed on the subject suggested a good deal by Sir Thomas Munro, of employing a dewan in the management of a country?—A dewan

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dewan must necessarily be employed if the states preserve any appearance of independent government; while they retain the appearance of independent government the British influence must be exercised through a dewan.

221. Will the country be better managed indirectly through a dewan, or directly by a resident?—While the native states retain possession of the government of their territories it would be highly inexpedient that the resident should take charge of the administration; it is only in a case of great exigency that it would be necessary for the resident to assume the direct management of affairs.

222. Do you think a country is more happily and better governed indirectly through the dewan, or directly by the resident?—It must depend on the character and capacity of the dewan; I suppose there would be a greater security for good government in the integrity and ability of a British resident; but that measure could be employed only in a case of great extremity; its permanent adoption would excite extreme jealousy, and involve, in fact, the subversion of the independence of a state.

223. Have you reason to believe that since the resident has exercised a less direct interference, the affairs of government have relapsed into disorder?—I have been informed so.

224. Do you recollect the amount of the subsidy?—It is eight lacs of rupees a year, and it is now drawn from the country without any return, as the subsidiary force has been removed.

225. Of course it is on the understanding that the troops shall be forthcoming in case of necessity?—Yes; but if no subsidiary treaty existed, we should find it necessary, from a regard to our own interests, to protect that country, both against foreign invasion and internal anarchy.

226. You seem to be of opinion that it would be more for the happiness of the natives to continue the subsidiary system than to retrace our steps?—We cannot abandon the subsidiary system without endangering our own security; and I consider that the employment of the resident's influence over the management of the affairs of the states connected with us by subsidiary treaties, (I understand, of course, when that influence is exercised with judgment and ability,) will not only be conducive to the happiness of the inhabitants of those states, but will in general be necessary to prevent oppression and injustice on the part of their governments.

227. What was the tenure of land in this country; did the zemindary system prevail?—The tenures are very various; a ryotwar system prevails, in which the most absolute property in the soil is recognised.

228. Were you resident at any other place?—No.

229. Have you any observations of a general nature to make, in addition to what you have given, to throw a light on the subsidiary system?—It appears to me that the subsidiary system is calculated to occasion misgovernment and oppression of the inhabitants, unless it is corrected by the influence of the British resident.

230. Then you think the disadvantage attending the subsidiary system can only be obviated by the personal character of the resident?—By the abilities and integrity of the resident.

231. Do

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231. Do you conceive in general the powers of the resident are too much restricted by the nature of the subsidiary system?—He generally acts under the instructions of his government, which vary according to circumstances; but a disposition has been manifested to abstain from interferences in the internal affairs of the allied states.

232. Without reference to such treaties?—Always with reference to the treaties.

233. The residents are in constant communication with the Government?—In constant communication; they report all their proceedings to Government, and act under its directions.

234. There are no stated times of communication?—No.

235. What sort of intervals did you usually have?—It depends entirely on circumstances; a week or a fortnight, perhaps only a day.

236. What was the longest time you were ever without?—Usually ten days or a fortnight, seldom more.

237. Had you never to wait for answers?—Yes; occasionally there was a delay in receiving answers.

238. Were you ever inconvenienced by the delay?—I cannot say that I was; points of urgency were answered with expedition.

239. There were no points in which it was necessary to refer home: they did not frequently occur?—No, they did not.

240. But sometimes?—They might occasionally have occurred. The Government took on itself to decide on matters relating to the local government that required immediate execution.

241. The other place at which you were resident was Cochin?—Yes.

242. What were the particular circumstances of that?—Very much resembling those in which Travancore was placed. I was obliged to take charge of the internal administration of Cochin also.

243. That had been in a state of maladministration?—Yes, in great confusion; and it had a very heavy debt to pay to the Company, occasioned by the expenses of the war in which it had been engaged against the British Government.

244. Did not a considerable part of the debt originate in a pepper contract?—No, the greater part of it was occasioned by arrears of subsidy, and by the expenses of the war, which those countries had to pay to the English Government. The contract for pepper expired before I arrived in Travancore.

245. The subsidy was paid in money?—Entirely in money.

246. At Cochin, likewise, you found almost the non-existence of justice?—The same general description will apply to Cochin as to Travancore.

247. And in the same way it was revised and improved while you were there?—Yes, the same remedies were employed, with similar results.

248. What proportion did the subsidy bear to the whole revenue of the country?—A very great proportion. I frequently applied for a reduction of the subsidy to the British Government, but without effect.

249. Do you conceive, in consequence of the extent of that subsidy, the country was impoverished so as to interfere with its produce?—Of course, greatly so. The revenues of the country scarcely amounted to seven lacs of rupees, and the subsidy was

was three lacs and a half. The removal of so great a quantity of specie from the country must operate injuriously to its prosperity.

250. What were the amount of the revenues in Travancore?—Twenty-eight lacs of rupees when I took the charge of it; they were raised to thirty-four lacs when I delivered back the charge of the government to a native dewan.

251. In the Company's territories, your idea is that too great a revenue was exacted?—Yes. In the same way I may state, that the drain of treasure from the Company's territories, without any adequate return from a balance of trade, must, in the course of time, produce very injurious effects to their prosperity.

252. You stated that the subsidy was heavy with regard to Cochin; do you consider it heavy with regard to Travancore?—Not in so great a degree as at Cochin, where it amounted to half of the revenue of the country. It was not much greater at Travancore than was necessary to provide a sufficient subsidiary force in defence of the country.

253. In Travancore and Cochin the only use of a subsidiary force is to protect it from external enemies?—Since the conquest of Mysore there is no external danger, excepting from invasion by sea; the presence of the subsidiary force prevented internal commotions. The country had been long subject to insurrections, which were the only remedy the people had against the cruel oppressions and exactions to which they were exposed. Frequent insurrections occurred before the British force was stationed there.

254. Do you understand that insurrections now occur?—I have been informed that discontent prevails; but insurrection is less likely to occur, because the government is supported by the British power.

255. Hence, you suppose, originates the necessity of Government interfering decisively, if it interfere at all?—Certainly; insurrection, which was the only remedy of the people, is now hopeless.

256. When these insurrections took place, having for their object to effect some mitigation in the collection of the revenue, did they ever succeed in their object?—Their success was generally limited to the removal of some very unpopular minister, and the abolition of any obnoxious regulation of the government, after which the march of affairs fell back into its ordinary course.

257. As a mean it was very ineffectual?—Yes, the government resumed their usual system of administration.

258. Do you believe these two countries were in a better or a worse state than the other countries of India; how would you say they stood relatively?—They were in a very miserable state.

259. Rather more so than the other parts of India?—I think they were, from the peculiar oppressive character of the government.

260. What are the peculiar features of the state of Nairs?—Their usages are very remarkable. They are Hindoos; marriage is not known among them; property is inherited through the females entirely.

261. Is it equally divided?—It is equally divided among the sons. There is great corruption and relaxation of morals.

262. That is peculiar to the Nairs?—Yes, on the coast of Malabar.

263. There

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263. There is promiscuous intercourse, and not marriage?—Not promiscuous intercourse; temporary connections are formed and dissolved at the pleasure of the parties.

264. The property goes through females?—Yes. The same rule applies to the government. The rajah's son does not inherit, but the eldest son of the females of the rajah's house.

265. Who would actually succeed him?—The eldest son of any of the females of the rajah's house. The Nairs are a brave and turbulent race of men, degraded, however, especially in Travancore, by great vices. Their character stands higher in the Company's territory in the north of Malabar,

266. Were there many British residents, and in what way were they occupied in Travancore and Cochin?—Some were employed in shipbuilding from the teak wood, and others in private trade.

267. And some were resident up the country in the interior?—Yes, they were.

268. And then you found that they did not ill-treat the natives?—Their conduct was always satisfactory; and they were found extremely useful in introducing the circulation of money in the country, and giving employment to the people.

269. You think it is so much for their interest to treat the natives well, that they do so?—It is so much their interest to acquire the respect and confidence of the natives, that their conduct is generally kind and conciliatory.

270. There is no foreign settlement?—Cochin had been a Dutch settlement, and Anjengo was a British settlement; the latter was under the resident.

271. Has the country improved during your residence; has the agricultural produce and the revenue also improved?—I have mentioned the increase of revenue: the commerce and agriculture of the country were greatly improved.

272. Did the revenue increase, notwithstanding the abolition of the monopolies?—Yes, it did.

273. Did the price of agricultural produce fall?—The free exportation of agricultural produce was allowed, and its price was not found to fall; it was prohibited under the old system, but under the new arrangements the freest exportation of all the productions of the country was permitted and encouraged.

274. Is it necessary to employ troops in the collection of the revenue?—Not while I was in charge of the administration.

RICHARD JENKINS, Esq., a Member of the Committee, examined.

R. Jenkins, Esq.,
M. P.

275. WHAT situation did you fill in India?—I was originally a Writer in the Bombay establishment; I went to the College at Calcutta in 1801, from that I was appointed, in 1804, as an assistant to the Resident in Scindia's camp. On the death of the resident taking place, I acted for a year in that situation; and for the remaining nearly 20 years of my services in India I was Political Resident at Nagpore.

276. What opinion have you formed upon the general nature and character of our subsidiary treaties in India, and of their effect upon the good government of the respective territories to which they relate?—The question regarding our subsidiary alliances seems to require a short reference to the still more general one, viz. are we to maintain our ascendancy as the paramount power in India; and if so, is it to

to be maintained through the means of subsidiary alliance, or through what other system.

The rise and progress of our power in India have been rapid and marvellous. Unlike other empires ours has been in a great degree forced upon us, built up at almost every step against our own deliberate resolution to avoid it, in the face, I may say, of every opposition which could be given to it by the Legislature, by His Majesty's Government, by the Court of Directors acting upon corresponding dispositions in our governments abroad. Each successive Governor-general for the last half century, sent from this country, with minds fresh and untouched by local prejudices, including Lord Cornwallis during his first administration, who went to India under the Act containing the well known denunciation against conquest and extension of dominion; Lord Wellesley, Lord Minto, Lord Hastings, (the two last strongly impressed against the existing foreign policy in India) and Lord Amherst, have seen reason to enter into wars and negotiations, defensive in their objects, but generally terminating in that very extension of territory and dominion which was dreaded.

What are we to infer from this, but that our position in India has always been such, that our existence has depended on the very steps proscribed by the Legislature, and which would surely have been most religiously avoided by those noblemen, had not the public safety demanded a contrary course; that at no one time for the last 50 years have our ablest and most enlightened politicians been able to find a resting-place where we might repose in security amidst the wreck of surrounding states, and that we are now perhaps in the same uncertain predicament, though all but masters of the whole of India.

With regard to the system on which this ascendancy, if necessary to our existence in India, is to be maintained, I have to observe, that a very great proportion of our power has arisen out of the subsidiary policy. It is indeed the main source of our ascendancy, both military and political; it has grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength. *It is interwoven with our very existence, and therefore the question of abandoning, or materially departing from it, seems to me to be quite irrational, unless we are at the same time prepared to abandon India.

We first appeared in India as traders, but it was as armed traders, and our various contests with our European rivals, the prospect of which rendered a warlike garb necessary to support our peaceful objects, were the origin of our military reputation in that region. Courtied even by the Great Mogul, and by the Sophi of Persia, as useful instruments to free their coasts from pirates, we acquired, as the price of our aid, many of those commercial advantages which fixed us on the continent of India. Then again the breaking up of the Mogul empire led to arming our factories, to protect our lives and properties. The same skill and gallantry which had at first won our way to commercial settlements, displayed anew, induced the native powers newly arising out of the wrecks of the empire, to court our aid in their contests with one another; and the views of securing and improving our commercial establishments, through the favour of those powers, forbade our refusing to intermeddle with their politics. Here the first step was the decisive one; once committed we could not recede.

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The French in the meantime, had made still bolder advances to empire in India, and our destruction or their expulsion became the alternatives. Could we hesitate which to choose? We now began to raise armies. These were to be paid; and could only be paid by the princes whose cause we espoused against the French and their allies: pecuniary payments often failing, territorial assignments took their place, and we were obliged to exercise a civil as well as military power. Our whole dominion on the coast of Coromandel arose in this way, and much of that on the Western coast; and through it, and the armies it enabled us to maintain, the power of Hyder was checked, and that of his son Tippoo was annihilated: the French power and influence in the Deccan was destroyed, and the Mahratta empire brought under subjection. In Bengal, the acquisition of the Dewannee gave us the great nucleus of our power in that quarter; still it was extended and secured through the same system of subsidiary alliances applied to Oude; and in fact, if we examine the composition of our territorial acquisitions, we shall find that a very considerable portion of them has accrued to us in payment by the native states of specified numbers of our troops, amounting in revenue, to the whole military expenses of Bengal, as the following rough Statement will show. The civil charges being deducted, the balance is given as applicable to military purposes.

| 1827-28. | REVENUES. | CIVIL CHARGES. | BALANCE. |
|---|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| | £. | £. | £. |
| Carnatic, in lieu of } Subsidy - - - } | 1,404,343 | 493,279 | 911,064 |
| Tanjore - - - | 394,672 | 186,638 | 208,034 |
| Nizam - - - | 584,369 | 132,911 | 451,458 |
| Peishwa - - - | estimated at - | - - - | 430,000 |
| Travancore Subsidy - | - - - | - - - | 89,498 |
| Cochin ditto - - - | - - - | - - - | 22,857 |
| Mysore ditto - - - | - - - | - - - | 280,000 |
| Guickowar - - - | 382,796 | 147,170 | 235,626 |
| Oude - - - | 1,813,565 | 506,223 | 1,307,338 |
| Benares - - - | 778,533 | 232,359 | 546,174 |
| Nagpore Cessions - | estimated at - | - - - | 150,000 |
| No Tribute - - - | - - - | - - - | 60,000 |
| Total Subsidies, and Cessions in lieu } of ditto - - - - - } | | | £. 4,689,049 |

If with these great advantages, and many others, we also experience some inconveniences from our subsidiary alliances, we must not complain; but I really see none of the latter to ourselves at all to be put in competition with the former. I do not believe that we have ever been engaged in a war in defence of our allies, which did not call upon us to interfere in their favour whether they were our allies or not. Whilst having the right to guide their political conduct in the minutest points, we are secure from any involvement in hostilities of an offensive nature through their ambition

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tion or want of faith, many other advantages of our alliances will be obvious on consideration of the general position of the several states and our own. Our subjects, I presume, derive benefit from any political situation which strengthens our power, and relieves them from the dangers of invasion; and by preserving peace and order amongst our neighbours, takes from before their eyes the temptation to a life of plunder and irregularity; settles their minds to a determined adherence to peaceable avocations, and opens sources of foreign trade to their industry and enterprize; and such is the result of the subsidiary system.

With regard to the effect of our alliances upon the native princes themselves, and their subjects, I would premise, that our alliances are such as were concluded with states that were at the time upon some footing of equality with ourselves, though led by some external danger to submit to certain terms implying a diminution of sovereignty, as the Nizam, the Peishwa and the Guicowar, or such as exist with states owing their very existence to our creation or forbearance, or those with inferior states whose internal independence in civil affairs we acknowledge, with certain exceptions inseparable from their subordination to us in military matters and in circumstances affecting the public tranquillity.

With respect to the first class, they have all obtained the benefit they sought, of security from external danger, by which they were left at liberty, if so inclined, to cultivate the arts of peace. The natural effect, however, of such a connection is to lessen the energy and self-dependence of the native state, and to induce it to neglect its natural resources, or only to cultivate them to the degree necessary to swell their personal treasures, with a view to contingencies, either of hostile attempts on their own part or on ours; and the result, speaking broadly, has been a gradual falling of the power of the state into our hands, (even where, by treaty, all interference in internal affairs has been prohibited,) whether from the weakness or the evil disposition of our ally, giving rise to dangers and disorders that would otherwise have dissolved the alliance, and caused the destruction of the state by a contest with us, or its own dissolution from internal or external force. These consequences, too, have occurred, in spite of our efforts to prevent them, at Hyderabad, whilst at Poonah the success of such efforts has not prevented the forcible disruption of the alliance. With the affairs of the Guicowar we have been involved *ab initio* in a direct interference; and the necessity of reverting to it, after a trial of our opposite system, is the best proof of the evils of the latter, if not of the benefits of the former, only adopted from absolute necessity in the first instance.

With regard to their subjects, our support has given cover to oppressions and extortions, which probably, under other circumstances, would have driven them to rebellion; and such evils have only been remedied where we have been forced to a direct interference for the special purpose of remedying them.

The freedom from external invasion, unless accompanied with such interference, I should fear would hardly be a boon to the inhabitants; for with all the horrors of such invasions, especially by the Pindarries, they were usually well prepared to mitigate their effects in part, and in part to turn them to their own account in evading the exaction of their princes.

With regard to the second class of states, as Holkar, Mysore, Sattarah, Oude, and Nagpore, (not to speak of the states of Travancore and Cochin,) we have a formal

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a formal right of interference with all but that of Holkar ; and although with regard to him there may exist some grounds of exception to the conclusion, it appears to me that in all the considerations of the interests (I mean the real welfare, apart from the pride of independence) of the governments and their subjects, the benefits of direct interference and control will be found to predominate. In such cases, if we have the court, the highest classes civil and military, viz. the official classes, the great land-owners, and a few leading bankers against us, we have the middle and lower orders, monied, mercantile, manufacturing, agricultural, and even military for us.

The last class, as the states in Central India and Rajpootana, have undoubtedly received benefits from the connection with us, in being saved from destruction, or at least a constant state of depression and misery, under Mahratta, Pat'han, and Pindarrie domination, beyond that of any other state or people, and the increased cultivation and prosperity of those regions is a proof of it ; still there are difficulties and hazards attending these connections which I am not prepared to go into.

If there be any class of states which may be supposed to embrace our protection with a certainty of its unmixed advantage both to them and ourselves, such states are the latter. The less we interfere with their internal concerns, I should say the less likely it would be that causes of discontent would arise ; and free as they are, or ought to be, from the jealousy of our domination, having been always dependent on one power or other, generally on all who are stronger than themselves, yet the high military spirit of the tribes of which they are composed will hardly submit for a length of time even to the just restraint imposed by us on their hostilities with each other or their domestic feuds. Still we may hope to keep them attached to ourselves in a greater degree than any other class of our allies.

Of the latter I fear we can never be sure, through any course of policy, however liberal, but by the means of our actual military strength ; and although it is, of course, just to do our utmost to keep them in their actual condition, as settled by trustees, and perhaps politic with a view to the alternative of bringing their dominions under our direct rule, and to other considerations of keeping up the respectable classes of natives as long as our institutions are at variance with that object, I am rather of opinion that, in all points of view, such an alternative is not the worst, if we regard our own interest, those of our own subjects or those of foreign states, whether governors or governed. Act as we will we cannot divest ourselves of the high station we are placed in without the danger and almost certainty of a complete fall ; nor, were we philanthropic enough to view such an event with indifference, if conducive to the real good of India, can we anticipate any such consequence. On the other hand, the ebbs and flows of our policy, sometimes interfering for the people, sometimes withdrawing our protecting arm, are a positive evil both to the native princes and to their subjects, and injurious to our reputation for consistency and good faith, encouraging to our enemies, and mortifying to or even worse, disgusting to our friends. I am of opinion, then, that we ought not to recede from any step we have gained, but to improve every occasion legitimately presented, to compensate the inhabitants of India for the unavoidable evils of foreign domination, by securing to them the benefit at least of more enlightened, just, and humane principles of government.

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Placed in the midst of nations foreign to us, and inimical not only to us, but to every other people, by the extraordinary and exclusive nature of their religion, manners, customs, and habits, not to mention language, which hardly alludes to foreigners but in terms of contempt, and not taking into account those sources of hatred and jealousy common to all nations under a foreign yoke, and particularly to those native states who have fallen from a high estate to one of humiliating dependence, it is expecting I may almost say impossibilities, to look to any means of maintaining our footing in India, but by the cultivation and improvement of our intrinsic strength, to exclusion of all reliance on our foreign relations for anything but a gradual preparation for the entire conquest of the Continent.

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Jovis, 12^o die Aprilis, 1832.

Sir CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN, Bart. in the Chair.

Major-General Sir JOHN MALCOLM, G. C. B., called in and examined.

277. WILL you state your opinion with regard to the effect of the subsidiary treaties?—I am aware that a very different opinion will be formed, connected with the policy and result of our subsidiary treaties, between persons who have judged them at a distance, and from records, however full, and those who have personally had an opportunity not only of being instrumental in their negotiation, but have seen them in all their results: the latter is my case. I consider, that from our condition in India, we have had in the Political Branch always an option of difficulties, and that our subsidiary alliances have been formed either for the purpose of defending ourselves through them against our enemies, or subsequently for maintaining that general tranquillity which we pledged ourselves to protect at their original formation. In the war in which we became engaged with Tippoo Sultan, we were obliged to form subsidiary alliances with the Nizam and the Peishwa, and without these alliances, we could not have protected our own dominions in the south of India from the invasion of that prince, much less have subdued so irreconcilable an enemy to the British Government. After we had taken this first step, the fulfilment of our engagements with good faith towards the Nizam, led to the subsidiary alliance with him being maintained and extended, for the purpose of protecting him against a combination of the Mahrattas. That combination assuming a hostile aspect towards our government, obliged the Governor-General of India, of the period I am speaking of, 1802, to adopt the best measures he could for enabling the British Government to resist the attacks with which it and its allies were threatened, from the policy and conduct of the Mahratta princes, Dowlut Row Sindia, Ragojee Bhonsela, and Jeswunt Row Holkar—rulers who continued to be influenced by the principles of predatory warfare, which are inherent in the constitution of

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of Mahratta states. The Peishwa Bajerow, who had long been solicited to enter into a subsidiary alliance, in order to protect himself, as well as us and our allies, against the chiefs of his own nation, was withheld by jealousy of the British power from contracting such an engagement, until an actual attack upon his capital forced him to fly to its territories for protection, and led to the treaty of Bassein. That treaty no doubt might have precipitated the hostilities that took place afterwards with the Mahratta chiefs in 1803; but I am quite confident, that war could not have been ultimately avoided, and that the continual preparation which we had been for several years obliged to make, in order to save us from attack, could have been ruinous to the finances of government. The result of our subsidiary alliance with the Peishwa, gave our troops military positions, before the war of 1803 commenced, within his territories, that insured a success which established for a period the peace of India; and had our subsidiary system been then extended, we should have, I believe, avoided those subsequent horrors to the inhabitants of a greater part of India, and our subsequent expensive measures of defence, as well as the war of 1817 and 1818. These events, in my opinion, resulted from an attempt to adopt an impracticable system of neutral policy, which allowed the great herds of freebooters to become formidable, and to plunder and despoil some of the finest provinces of India, for a period of more than 10 years. About the same period, or rather before the treaty with Bajerow, a subsidiary treaty had been entered into with the Guicowar State of Guzerat, in order through that alliance to protect the possessions and maintain the tranquillity of that province. We had before made a treaty with the Nabob of Surat, and by the treaty of Bassein, some of the richest provinces of that country were ceded to the Government by the Peishwa, in payment for the troops which it furnished; and by the result of the war of 1803, the rich district of Brooch was ceded to the Company by Dowlut Row Sindia, to form and maintain its alliance with the Guicowar, which was matured gradually, and without war or internal commotions of any consequence. The English Government found itself compelled, before it could effect the dismissal of large bodies of subsidiary Arab troops, which had long had a predominating influence at the court of Baroda, to gain to its support the numerous and influential creditors of the state, who held the security of the Arab commanders for loans advanced to the prince, and to give to those creditors what are termed boundary or guarantee engagements for the adjustment of the claims upon the native state. This arrangement, which gave to the Government the great advantages of settling without war the countries of Guzerat, has been since the fruitful source of that embarrassment which has attended the course of this subsidiary alliance, and of which I shall speak hereafter.

With respect to the state of Lucknow, subsidiary alliances, which commenced nearly 70 years ago, have undergone great vicissitudes. The working of these the Committee will no doubt receive from persons that possess more minute information than I do upon the subject. After the death of Tippoo Sultan, the heir of the ancient Hindoo Rajah of Mysore was restored to that country, and a subsidiary alliance formed for his protection, it being of course indispensable to protect a prince whom we had taken from a prison and placed upon a throne. There was also a subsidiary alliance with the petty state of Travancore. This is, I believe, a short

a short account of the principal subsidiary alliances into which we entered before 1803. Subsequently to that date, we entered into a subsidiary alliance with the court of Nagpore, and in 1818 with that of Mulhar Row Holkar, both the latter states having been, from the events of the wars of 1803 and 1817-18, reduced to a condition in which they could not have supported themselves without our protection. We could not have abandoned the Nagpore state without resigning it to the enemies of the British, and I may say of all civilized governments, the Pindarees, as well as to the probable hostility of the Mahratta chiefs, Jeswunt Row Holkar and Dowlut Row Sindia. The young prince Mulhar Row Holkar, after the battle of Mahidpore, was in fact, though not in form, placed by us upon the throne, and the whole of his territories were in that condition, that it was quite impossible they could have been consolidated into a substantive power in Central India by any other means than through the arms as well as the influence of the British Government.

Having thus stated my opinion of the necessity by which we have been impelled to contract these alliances, I shall say a few words upon their general results. These have been very different in different situations, and have been very dependant upon the characters of the princes, their ministers, and I may add, of the British representatives employed at their courts. Several of those states had their countries relieved by these alliances from great and increasing evils. The territories of Mulhar Row Holkar, for instance, was one scene of desolation, and have recovered to one of prosperity with a rapidity that is quite surprising. Mysore for a long period of years improved under our protection, in all branches of its government, as well as in its resources; cultivation was increased, roads of an excellent description made throughout the whole country, and wheel-carriages, which had hardly ever been known, introduced to a very great extent, while the people appeared and were contented and happy. One of the most evil consequences which has attended our alliance in other parts was here in a great degree avoided; I mean the destruction of the chiefs and the aristocracy of the country, by our abstaining from any very minute interference, and by the prince maintaining, according to the stipulations of the treaty, a body of 4,000 irregular horse, under the same chiefs and officers, or their sons, who had distinguished themselves in the war of Hyder Ally and Tippoo against the British Government, and who have evinced for 30 years as much zeal, fidelity, and courage in contributing to the success of every subsequent war in which they have served in association with our troops.

To give the Committee an impression of the character of the commanders of this force, and of those men of whom it is composed, I can almost positively affirm, that during various wars, particularly the campaigns of 1803-4, and of 1817-18, through the whole of which they were in the field, and marched to the distant countries of Malwa and Rajpootana, that there is no instance of the slightest misconduct on the part of any of their high and respectable officers, or any instance that I know, and I was with them on both of these campaigns, of the desertion of one man from this excellent and most useful body of troops. The prosperity of Mysore in its internal administration, was no doubt in a great degree to be attributed to the prince being a minor when the state was established, and to the personal character of Poorneah, who was dewan or minister, an office he held with Tippoo Sultan, and to the experienced

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experienced and able men who having held office for a long period in that country were maintained in different high stations. Since the prince has come of age, I regret to learn that his habits of extravagance and his addiction to vicious courses have combined to give to his government a character of oppression and injustice, and to raise a feeling of opposition in some part of his subjects, which has led to the direct interference of the British Government with his administration. I am not acquainted with the particulars of these transactions, and can therefore only state my hope that they will not lead to the annihilation of this power, being fully satisfied that, upon the whole, the inhabitants of that country, and particularly those of the higher classes, have enjoyed a happiness and consideration superior to what I think our system of rule, and its character as that of foreigners, could have enabled us to bestow upon them. With respect to the Nizam, with which country I have been acquainted for 40 years, it was, when our first subsidiary alliance was formed, in a very distracted state, and continually subject to internal revolts of dependant chiefs, and to a dread of annual visitations from the neighbouring Mahrattas. It is difficult to calculate between the increasing evils which such a condition must have brought upon this state, and those which have undoubtedly been the consequence of our subsidiary alliance. There is no doubt that in this country our influence and support has paralysed the power of the prince, and given the sanction of our name, if not our authority, to the acts of oppressive ministers; and that much of what we have done and left undone appears to have had the same effect of deteriorating the happiness of the people, and the respectability and condition of some of its principal nobles. Many causes have led to this result, on which I shall not now expatiate; one very prominent has been the occurrence of wars, which forced us on measures that, though they might have promoted the success of our military operations, have injured the internal prosperity of the country. But nothing can be less calculated to enable us to form a true judgment upon such a subject than to dwell upon the evils which our system has created in a native state, without adverting to those from which it has been rescued, or looking prospectively to those in which it might be involved by our withdrawing from the connection, or substituting our own rule. The decision upon such points can never be made upon any general principles; they are, from the character of our power in India, and our not being a national government, practical questions, and must be decided in each case with reference to persons and localities, of which it is impossible to judge, except at the moment of their occurrence. This observation refers to our other subsidiary alliances, as well as those of the Nizam. My own opinion is, that the native state is only to be preserved, when connected with us by intimate ties, by suiting our conduct to its actual condition, and by attention to a general principle which equally avoids that fretting, constant interference that degrades men as instruments of rule, and ultimately destroys the government, through the means of British agency, and that abstinence from interference which inevitably leaves such states to destroy themselves. But considering, as I do, from all my experience, that it is our policy to maintain as long as we possibly can all native states now existing, and through them and by other means to support and maintain native chiefs and an aristocracy throughout the empire of India, I do think that every means should be used to avert what I should consider as one of the

the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire, the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule.

It is my opinion that no native state can exist if we exact a strict observance of the terms (in a literal sense) of the various alliances we make. It belongs to good faith to interpret our treaties with consideration to the sense in which they are understood by those with whom they were contracted, and with every indulgence to their lax habits in such points; we can, I think, have no right, except under the most positive and clear breach of treaty on their part, to go in any shape beyond the spirit of our engagements, except on occasions where the public peace of the country under our general protection is threatened in a degree that calls for a change of rule as a matter of positive necessity, in order to preserve the tranquillity of our own territories and those of others. I mean, however, to exclude from this admission that right which has been often assumed with respect to our view of the comparative benefit that the inhabitants would enjoy under our rule, from that which they enjoy under that of their native princes. I am not, from my experience, prepared to admit this result is a general position to be founded upon truth. I particularly allude to the condition of those superior grades of society, without which I consider no community can long exist; and, in a political view, I certainly must apprehend much danger from the extinction of the higher classes. My reasons for this opinion are fully stated in my letter to the Secretary of the India Board (which is before the Committee) of the 26th March 1832. I have also stated in that letter that the native states, who still remain subject to our general influence and authority, but who exercise their internal administration in an independent manner, absorb many elements of sedition and rebellion which, in my opinion, must come into action if their power was extinct, and more certainly, as I should expect that an apparent state of peace might lead, from financial considerations, to the further decrease of our military force, on the very general but very false supposition often made, that because tranquillity is established in a particular quarter, troops are not required; when the fact is, that the tranquillity is referable to the establishment and continuance of that force, and its removal produces the evil which it was calculated to prevent. I have frequently heard it stated that it is consistent with the principles of good policy to increase the territories under our direct rule, and that upon the assumption that we can govern them better than their actual rulers. Some, indeed, assert that it is a moral duty to do so. While I deny the first position, I cannot understand that to argue for our rights to enlarge our Indian territories, on the latter ground, is in any degree different from a doctrine which would justify unlimited usurpation and conquest, on the vague speculation of improving the condition of a native state, by a process that commenced in destroying its established institutions and government.

278. In your opinion, was the substitution of our government for the misrule of the native princes, the cause of greater prosperity to the agricultural and commercial part of the population?—I cannot answer this in every province of India, but I shall as far as my experience enables me. I do not think the change has benefited; or could benefit either the commercial, the monied, or the agricultural interests of many of the native states, though it may of others. It has not happened to me ever to see countries better cultivated and so abounding in all produce

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duce of the soil as well as commercial wealth, than the southern Mahratta districts, when I accompanied the present Duke of Wellington to that country in the year 1803; I particularly here allude to those large tracts near the borders of the Kishna. Poonah, the capital of the Peishwa, was a very wealthy and thriving commercial town, and there was as much cultivation in the Deccan as it was possible so arid and unfruitful a country could admit. But there is no doubt that during the few last years of Bajerow's reign, he fell under the influence of low and wicked counsellors, and the inhabitants of all classes suffered oppression and injustice. This, however, was a temporary evil, and his conduct was in contrast to those of almost all his Hindu predecessors.

With respect to Malwa, I saw it in a state of ruin, caused by the occupancy for a period of more than half a century of that fine country by the Mahratta armies, the Pindarries, and, indeed, the assembled predatory hordes of almost all India; yet, even at that period, as I have stated in my work on Central India, I was perfectly surprised at the difference that exists between a distant view of such countries and a nearer examination of their actual condition. I had ample means afforded to me, as the person appointed to occupy that territory and to conduct its civil, military and political administration, to learn all that the records of government could teach, and to obtain from other sources full information of this country; and I certainly entered upon my duties with the complete conviction that commerce would be unknown, and that credit could not exist in a province which had long possessed, from its position, the transit trade between the rich provinces of Western India and the whole of the north-west provinces of Hindostan, as well as the more eastern ones of Saugur and Bundelcund. I found to my surprise, that in correspondence with the first commercial and monied men of Rajpootana, Bundelcund and Hindostan, as well as with those of Guzerat, dealings in money to a large amount had continually taken place at Oujein and other cities, where soucars or bankers of character and credit were in a flourishing state, and that goods to a great amount had not only continually passed through the province, but that the insurance offices which exist throughout all that part of India, and include the principal monied men, had never stopped their operations though premium rose at a period of danger to a high amount. The native governments of Malwa, when tranquillity was established through our arms, wanted nothing but that which the attachment of the natives of India to their native soil soon supplied them with, a return of the inhabitants. And I do not believe that in that country the introduction of our direct rule could have contributed more, nor indeed so much, to the prosperity of the commercial and agricultural interests, as the re-establishment of the efficient rule of its former princes and chiefs, who, though protected from attack, are quite free in their internal administration from our interference.

With respect to the southern Mahratta districts, of whose prosperity I have before spoken, if I refer, as I must, to their condition before the few last years of Bajerow's misrule, I do not think that either their commercial or agricultural interests are likely to be improved under our rule, except in that greatest of blessings, exemption from war, which while under our protection they equally enjoy, and I must unhesitatingly state, that the provinces belonging to the family of Putwarden and some other chiefs on the banks of the Kishna, present a greater agricultural

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agricultural and commercial prosperity than almost any I know in India. I refer this to the system of administration, which, though there may be at periods exactions, is on the whole mild and paternal; to few changes; to the complete knowledge and almost devotion of the Hindoos to all agricultural pursuits; to their better understanding, or at least better practice, than us in many parts of the administration, particularly in raising towns and villages to prosperity; from the encouragement given to monied men, and to the introduction of capital; and above all, to the jagheerdars residing on their estates, and these provinces being administered by men of rank who live and die on the soil, and are usually succeeded in office by their sons or near relatives. If these men exact money at times in an arbitrary manner, all their expenditure as well as all they receive is limited to their own provinces: but above all causes which promote prosperity, is the invariable support given to the village and other native institutions, and to the employment, far beyond what our system admits, of all classes of the population.

In Guzerat, which I never visited before 1830, I learnt from the records of Government, and much from the reports of those officers who had known it before, and who accompanied me, that the districts of this favoured province which have been ceded to us were to the full in as good an agricultural and commercial state as they are at this moment when that cession was made; but it is necessary to state that this province possesses so many advantages, and has been so completely exempt from wars and other calamities, that it has been subject to few of those violent changes which have visited other parts of India.

With respect to the provinces now in possession of the Guicowar, I travelled through most of them; they are very much intermixed with our own, and I cannot say that I observed in those I travelled through, any difference in their commercial or agricultural state. Indeed, there is one efficient check upon misrule; the ryots, if oppressed, would migrate into our provinces, where many have relatives residing and often possess lands.

The capital of Baroda itself has become, from various causes, and in some degree no doubt from the protection which our guarantee arrangements afforded to the monied men who were the creditors of the prince, one of the richest cities in point of commercial and monied capital that I know of its extent in India. The former capital of Guzerat, Ahmedabad, from its having been subject to a distant government, and latterly much oppressed by Trimbuckjee, the profligate minister of Bajerow, was in a deteriorated state when we received it, but I am glad to say that it is now recovering very rapidly, and promises to be more prosperous, both in its commercial and agricultural population, than it was before. The rich district of Barooch was in the highest state of agricultural and commercial prosperity when delivered over to us by the agents of Dowlut Row Sindia. It has, I regret to state, subsequently declined, owing to indifferent management, which was corrected by my predecessor, Mr. Elphinstone, and by most positive orders from England. It is now reviving fast to the consequence it has long had as a commercial and agricultural province.

With the districts of Oude I am not sufficiently acquainted to be able to give any opinion. The Ceded Districts from Hydrabad had been, before we obtained possession of them, a constant scene of petty warfare, owing to the distance from the

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the capital, and being in possession of chiefs, with troops and forts, which the native government had neither means nor energy to reduce. The appointment of that most able and superior man, Sir Thomas Munro, to the management of these provinces has given them every advantage; but it is here to be remarked, that the means he suggested to restore them to prosperity could not be put in action till a strong military force had reduced the various usurpers and plunderers with which the country was then infested. These provinces have, from the causes stated, increased in commercial and agricultural prosperity since they came into our possession.

With respect to the territories of Mysore which, consequent on the death of Tippoo Sultan, came into our possession, I can only state, that from my own observations during two wars, those of 1792 and 1799, in which I was with the armies that entered that country, that however tyrannical the government of Tippoo had been in other respects, neither he nor his ministers could be complained of, as far as the general face of the country enabled us to judge of its cultivation, and the state of its general internal commerce. I think it however likely, without being aware of facts, that the Baramahal, Malabar, Coimbatore, and Salem, and Canara, and other countries we came into possession of on the fall of Seringapatam, are in a fully equal if not a superior condition, under our government, to what they were under that of Tippoo: I refer here to their commercial and agricultural state.

With respect to the territories of the Peishwa, the provinces of the Deccan have lost sources of wealth by the introduction of our power, which it is almost impossible for any good government on our part to restore. From the healthiness of this climate, and its favourable soil for the breed and food of horses, it always maintained and supplied a large proportion of the Mahratta army; and it was, from that and other causes, a country in which there was great expenditure, into which many luxuries were imported. The Deccan was also the native place of almost all the principal soldiers and princes of the Mahratta army; and from the residence of a court at Poonah, and government of the provinces by the principal chiefs of the country, wealth was distributed among all the higher and many of the industrious classes, while the attachment of the Mahratta to the place of his birth, at whatever distance he might be employed, or however long his absence, sent always a share of that booty he gained, or that wealth he acquired, to promote the cultivation, or to add to the beauty of his native town or village. Under these circumstances, the deteriorated state of this country since it fell into our power is to be ascribed to causes which we cannot control; but every effort has been made to improve it, and the proportion of this country still left to native chiefs, and the peculiar indulgences and privileges granted to these during the administration of Mr. Elphinstone, have tended in some degree to counteract the depressive effects of our rule; and I state this particularly, because I am of opinion, that cherishing such persons and maintaining them in their present condition, and using them as instruments of improvement, is essential to the promotion of the agricultural and the commercial interests of that part of the territories. But I should here mention, that every effort has been made to introduce capital, and some new sources of industry have been created, and particularly the establishment of the cultivation of silk, which promises to be a source of future commercial wealth; but its introduction is yet too young to speak on this subject with any confidence.

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The Concan, which were also ceded from the Peishwa, and are the districts which intervene between the mountains called the Ghalet, which form the table land of the Deccan, and the sea, were in excellent condition when delivered to the English, particularly the southern Concan, which was a favoured province, from being the birth-place of the reigning family of the Peishwas, and many of the Brahmins employed by him. Circumstances arose to obstruct in some degree the prosperity of these provinces; but I am happy to state they are now fast improving, though I do not think they are yet in a better state than they were when we received them.

279. Are you of opinion that the admission of natives into a larger share of government, and perhaps the extension of such distinctions as the privileged classes of the Deccan enjoy, would tend to satisfy the wants and wishes of aspiring natives? —I am of opinion that no measures are so essential to the good government and preservation of our native empire as the advancement of the natives to a share in the administration: that has always been my opinion, and I have had a full opportunity, during the few years I was Governor of Bombay, of proving in practice the truth of the opinions I long entertained upon this subject. I had always considered, that to expect we could, through schools and colleges, do more than give the mere elements by which men would be enabled to fulfil, according to their acquirements, better or worse, the stations to which they might be named, was impossible; and it was only by introducing them into situations of responsibility and trust, and giving them our confidence, that we could expect to elevate their minds in a degree that would render them efficient aids to our government, and their becoming so is, I consider, alike as essential in a financial and a political point of view. I was also satisfied that such encouragement was necessary to ensure the attachment of this class of the natives. My predecessor at Bombay, Mr. Elphinstone, entertained the same sentiments, and he had, both in the fiscal and judicial branches, given the natives employments, salaries, and powers, exceeding, I believe, what they then enjoyed in any other part of India. While I presided over the government of that settlement, these powers were so greatly extended, that at present every civil suit is tried in the first instance by a native ameen or judge, with appeal to an European session judge, and from him to the High Court of Sudder Adawlut. Some of those native judges, who are termed sudder ameens or principal judges of large cities, and the able native who is sudder ameen at Poonah, received, from pay and fees which were attached to his office, a sum, I believe, of not less than 800 rupees a month, which to a native is a very large amount. The other ameens or native judges of provinces received from 200 to 400, as far as I can recollect; but I will give the Committee as correct information as I can obtain upon this subject, my doubt being at present whether the fees they formerly had have not been commuted, as recommended, for fixed salaries.

In the fiscal branch, natives have also been employed with increased powers and liberal salaries, varying from 30 to 600 rupees per month. Referring to those public native servants and others, I deem it necessary here to state a regulation of particular importance. By the rules which I found established by my predecessor, no native in the public service, enjoying a salary of 30 rupees per month or higher, can be dismissed from his office without the sanction of Government. In the measures I adopted

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I adopted to combine education with the promotion of the employment of natives, a regulation was made by which all offices were divided into four classes; the first and second class being of those above the salary I have mentioned, while the third, termed pupils, were below it, and also the fourth, who are called boys. The latter were directed to be chosen from the best scholars of the principal provincial and other schools; these can be dismissed within two years by the person at the head of the office into which they are introduced, while pupils can be dismissed by the head of the department to which they belonged; the two higher classes only, as before stated, by Government. It is fixed, that though they were not to rise by seniority in the office, that no person could be promoted to a superior grade who had not passed the inferior; and by these means the great advantage was gained of encouraging natives of rank and influence to make their sons efficient and acquainted with their duty before they had charge. This rule limited patronage, but gave great encouragement to education, and promoted the efficiency of the service.

The privileged classes of the Deccan were established by Mr. Elphinstone, on the representation, I believe, in the first instance, of some of the principal Mahratta chiefs, who assumed the implied obligation from the proclamation issued by Mr. Elphinstone, in 1818, to protect them and the nobles of that country. This protection was desired against the processes of the adawlut courts and other English courts of justice, of whose forms as well as rules they stand, from the condition of the community and their habits, in peculiar dread. Mr. Elphinstone, with a view to meet what he deemed the just expectations of these chiefs, and to reconcile them to the British rule, formed the privileged classes: the first of those classes included the highest chiefs, with whom we had entered into engagements, who had considerable territories, and in the internal administration of which they were continued independent. They were wholly exempt from all processes of our provincial courts. The second class were jagheerdars or chiefs, not so high as the former, but who possessed heritable lands, and had held high rank under former governments. These were made exempt from ordinary processes, and permitted to answer any suits against them, through a vakeel or agent. The third class are subject to jurisdiction, and obliged to attend in person, but are entitled to courtesy in a variety of forms connected with summonses, and have also individual privileges to which they attach the highest value. A civil officer of rank was appointed what was deemed sirdar agent, and through him all matters connected with the privileged classes were conducted. This public officer attended to all processes, claims and petitions from or against these chiefs, which do not fall into the ordinary courts. The duties of this agency are combined with those of the principal judge at Poonah, but he has for this part of his jurisdiction the aid of a deputy or civil officer of experience, and holds a distinct court for all cases connected with the interests and rights of the first and second class. To the third class several persons have been advanced. It includes some of the highest servants of Government, who have distinguished themselves in various ways; merchants even who have rendered themselves eminent by their public works, have been promoted into it; and on a late occasion a banker was raised by me, on account of his having, in accordance with the desire of his deceased father, built a bridge over a river near Poonah; a gold medal with a bridge engraved upon it was given at the same time. The ceremony took

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took place at a crowded durbar I held at Poonah for the purpose ; nothing could exceed the gratification of the individual, and the effect produced on all present. Another inhabitant of Poonah (a parsee) has since received a similar honour in reward of the zeal and liberality with which he employed his capital in aiding a very skilful Italian in the introduction of the cultivation of the mulberry plant and the manufacturing of silk. It is impossible to describe the value that the higher ranks of natives give to this separation from the other classes, which has been made by the English Government, and its value is greatly increased to our own public servants, in the estimation of the civil and military, from its associating them with men of the highest rank. A gallant old subadar-major (the name of this old and distinguished native officer is Purseram Sing), of fifty years standing, distinguished for his bravery, when he had conferred upon him his commission for the command of a hill-fort, received personally from me at the same time a horse and sword, in the name of the Government. He was also created a member of the third class of the privileged order. The ceremony of his investiture took place at Poonah. The Commander-in-Chief was present, and the troops drawn out, in honour of the native officer and several others receiving the rewards of long service and valour. The elevation of this old soldier to the privileged class, appeared to gratify him more than any other mark of distinction ; “ I am now,” said he, “ on a footing with the jagheerdars and sirdars of the Deccan.” I mention this fact, as a proof of the great value natives give to such distinctions.

Martis, 17^o die Aprilis, 1832.

The Right Hon. CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN, in the Chair.

Major-General Sir JOHN MALCOLM, G. C. B., a Member of the House,
examined.

280. How far, in your opinion, has the substitution of our government for the misrule of the native princes increased the happiness of the agricultural and commercial classes ?—Generally speaking, the boon of protection and peace which our government, from its strength, gives, must render it beneficial to a great proportion of the agricultural classes, and so far increase their happiness ; but from this observation must be excluded the heads of those classes, such as desyes, deshmookhs, patells and other principal hereditary district and village officers.

281. What do they at all correspond to in our country ?—They were hereditary district and village officers. Under the native rulers, many of this description of men had consequence, and often rose to considerable wealth and power. Under us, even when they continue to exist, they have no prospect of rise, and are reduced often to comparative poverty by the subdivision of property which takes place under the Hindoo law, having to support their brothers or sons in idleness.

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For these, under native governments, they almost always obtain employment from individuals or government, and this enabled them to continue in management, if not enjoyment, of the small portions of land that were the property of the younger branches, and relieved the superiors who held office from the necessity of contributing further to their support. These heads of the agriculturists have had in all our provinces where they remain their condition deteriorated, and must, from their feelings and cherished recollections of the situation of their forefathers, have had their happiness decreased by the introduction of our power. Much has been recently done, but more is required to raise this class, particularly the patells or heads of villages. I consider it a political object of importance to attach the superior classes, from the head of a principality to the head of a village, to our government, and to use them as our chief instruments for the administration of our Eastern empire. We have destroyed or depressed those heads, and particularly those of the agricultural class, on the ground of their abusing their influence and power in oppressing those below them. Had we maintained them, and established a strict control over their conduct while we treated them with indulgence and consideration; we might, I think, have reformed their habits and retained the incalculable benefits of their influence over the various classes of society to which they belong. But before our information or knowledge of the various classes of our subjects was complete those entrusted with authority, shocked no doubt at the oppressions exercised by the hereditary officers, which were exaggerated by petitions and by the representations of interested natives in the employ of European public officers, hurried to the work of demolition before they had maturely considered that of reconstruction. The consequence has been constant changes of system; the frequent introduction of persons into office who are strangers to the province in which they are employed, and are often men of low birth, without local character, and having no recommendation but quickness at their business in the cutchery or native office of the collector. These command no respect from those placed under their authority. There are besides other underlings of the European collectors and magistrates, such as peons with badges, taken from the very dregs of society. These underlings, proud of their upstart power, and the badge of their European employer, are too prone to insult the higher classes of the community, and their conduct tends to alienate the attachment of them to our rule. The underlings to whom I have alluded have little alarm at detection, for they are too useful to the inferior native officers to be much restrained by them, and the enlarged duties of the European superior makes it impossible he can supervise the whole of the province entrusted to his management. These persons, it is also to be remarked, were generally men whom even detection and punishment could not place much lower in the scale of society than they were before they were employed in the public service. Much has been done of late to remedy this evil, which has in its operation tended greatly to decrease the happiness and content of the higher classes of the agricultural population of many of the provinces of India subsequent to the introduction of our rule. The principles we have adopted have, in many cases besides these stated, operated very injuriously on their actual condition and in repressing their future hopes; and regard for the happiness or welfare of this class of our subjects, as well as our political interests, alike demand that they should meet with more attention and consideration than they have been,

and

and be used as they might be, as the most beneficial aids in the fiscal administration of their native provinces.

The mass of the cultivators enjoy tranquillity, and therefore are benefited by the change. They are very sensible to the blessings of peace, and they may be said to have had their happiness increased from that being more permanently settled by the introduction of our rule. They are a submissive and quiet race, unless in cases where their claim to lands are at issue. Their attachment and allegiance to the British government is of a very passive character, and they never can be calculated upon as aids on the occurrence of war or revolts; on the contrary, the strongest feeling they have is that of a superstitious character, and would be more likely, if excited, to be against us than for us. The commercial classes of India have been decidedly benefited by the introduction of our rule; more, however, from the tranquillity we have established than the protection we give, for, with very rare exceptions, this class of the community receive efficient protection even from the most despotic of Asiatic princes, who are restrained from oppressing them by a knowledge that they can inflict injury or injustice upon no individual of this class that does not vibrate throughout the whole, and is consequently calculated to diminish one of the greatest sources of wealth of their government. It is here to be observed, that the commercial class are a body of men from whom, although we may increase their happiness, we cannot expect that a sense of gratitude will ever produce results that will give us any efficient aid on the occurrence of emergencies; as they are men of such pacific habits, that they almost invariably shrink from mixing themselves in any way, even through their influence, in case of any revolt, sedition, or wars. There is a considerable portion of this class, which I shall best describe by terming them the money dealers, whom I do not think have had their happiness (which is associated in their view particularly with their personal interest) advanced by the introduction of our rule. These often rented large tracts of countries, and were in all cases associated with the ryots in the cultivation of the soil under native governments. I have explained the working of this system very fully in my Memoir of Central India. It was in many respects beneficial to the prosperity of the country; and they have been too generally condemned by us on grounds that I think are not well founded. These money dealers we often find on our records reprobated as usurers and extortioners, who live on the fruits of the industry of the cultivators, whom they are described as oppressing. Many public officers have taken an almost exclusive view of the evils of this system, and have not given, in my opinion, the consideration it merited to the great benefit that was derived from introducing and keeping capital in the country, the good of which the cultivators as well as the government are always certain to reap in one way or another. I have elsewhere* fully stated the checks that prevented these money dealers oppressing the ryots, much less their adoption of any measures calculated to ruin them. I have shown that their profits, which might be great for one year, were by bad seasons reduced to little or nothing the next; but under all circumstances, it became their interest to support the cultivators, for without these were contented and equal to the

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* *Vide* Memoir of Central India, vol. 2, Revenue Chapter, p. 1, for a full account of the revenue system under native government.

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the duties of their condition, it was quite impossible the monied men could continue to derive any profit from the connection.

A plan is now in progress for equalizing the currency in gold, silver, and copper over all India, which will no doubt have many good effects; but it will injure the interests, and with that decrease the happiness of a very numerous portion of the commercial class, I mean the shroffs or money changers, whose profits, in a considerable degree, depend upon the vast variety of different coins now in circulation throughout the whole Indian empire. While I state this fact in answer to this query, I by no means intend it should be inferred that the partial injury to the interest of the shroffs merits a moment's consideration. The simplifying and equalizing the currency of India will be attended with equal benefit to Government and to the community at large. In reference to this and former queries, I must here make some general observations. Our great error in India appears to me to have been a desire to establish systems founded on general principles, in all branches of our administration, that were often in advance of many of the communities for whose benefit they were intended, but by whom they were neither understood nor appreciated. In our precipitate attempts to improve the condition of the people, we have often proceeded without sufficient knowledge, and been in many cases obliged to retrace our steps with great disadvantage to our own interests, as well as disturbance to the happiness and confidence of our native subjects. The vast difference in character and condition of the inhabitants of the various provinces of our dominions has too often been overlooked by those who were eager for the introduction of favourite plans; and I have been led, by what I have seen, to apprehend as much danger from political as from religious zealots. If the latter at times create alarm to the natives from infringing their superstitious observances and religion, the former unsettle their minds by the introduction of principles and forms of administration foreign to their usage, and at variance with long established habits and prejudices. We should proceed with much caution, for the natives never appear to forget that we are strangers; and I have observed, that throughout the provinces of the interior every report, however improbable or unfounded, that gives a rumour of change, is listened to by all classes, even to the lowest, with unaccountable attention; they attend to and circulate idle and false prophecies respecting future political events, that are of the most extravagant nature. This I think shows a general impression regarding the character of our government, and a disposition to believe that it will not be permanent. We are slow to credit this fact, and draw deductions of the existence of a contrary feeling from the comparison we make of the superiority of our rule over that of the natives, for which it was substituted. The sentiments we entertain on this subject are re-echoed by the natives around us, and with whom public officers in general communicate; but much experience has satisfied me that this will be found a very dangerous delusion, if it ever makes us cease to place our chief reliance on our military power, or to decrease our efforts to merit the attachment of our Indian subjects, by the strictest attention to their usages, prejudices, and religions; and above all, if it encourages us to innovation, or to a premature introduction of improvement in the forms and substance of those parts of our administration which is likely to affect the happiness or interests of any part of the population.

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The higher classes of natives, including all those of the military tribes, who are very numerous, although they enjoy tranquillity and protection from our system, have not the value we suppose for these blessings, particularly when they see that our rule is incompatible with their advancement, and with the attainment of those objects to which they deem themselves born, and have been accustomed from habit to look. In the actual condition of India, unless our administration is so constituted as to give to these classes consideration and employment, as far as is consistent with the nature of our government as foreigners, I must anticipate frequent revolts and seditious movements, and no person but one who has been accustomed to see these in progress can form an idea of the rapidity with which they spread. Every one of such revolts may be considered, however trifling in its origin, as a crisis; for unless immediately subdued, those impressions on which our rule so much depends, are greatly impaired, and the local peace of the quarter in which they occur seriously endangered. Add to this, that while those who desire to throw off the yoke of foreigners are bold, energetic, and enterprising, those whose happiness our rule increases, and who would, from their being attached to peaceable habits, desire its continuance, are unlikely, under any changes that I can contemplate, to be imbued with that zeal and attachment to our government that will enable them to be an efficient aid in repressing those who must continue disposed to subvert it. I state these results of my experience in our relying too implicitly upon sources of believed strength, that will fail in the hour of trial.

282. What is your opinion as to the tyranny of the native princes when left to themselves, particularly with reference to the agricultural and commercial classes?—The tyranny of the native princes over the classes stated in the question, depends much upon the character and power of the princes; but in general I should state, that even with the worst of those princes, (excluding, of course, adventurers and plunderers who have temporarily assumed that rank) there is not that oppression even of the agricultural classes which would appear from a general view of the power of the one party to oppress, and the apparent inability of the other to resist. In all native governments there is, in the first place, a just estimate of the value of a good name. There is also the greatest regard for district and village institutions, and any attempt to injure the ryots seriously is sure to be attended, if upon a large scale, with open opposition; if on a lesser one, with a decrease of the revenue, through the discontent and often desertion to other states of the cultivators of the soil. The heads of villages also, when a prince or his minister are oppressive, enter into collusion with the collectors to defraud the revenue, and these again connect themselves with the principal officers at court, and sometimes with the ministers, who, gained by bribes, grant them their support, and a diminution of the actual revenue is often effected, which more than balances any unjust imposition that has been laid on the country. There is, in short, in many cases relief from tyranny, through the arts and frauds of the village officers and cultivators, and of those who have the immediate collection and receipt of the revenue, and this not unfrequently operates as a check, when others are wanting, on the misrule of oppressive and unjust rulers. When the prince is of a just character, I know of no system that I ever read of or saw for the collection of the public revenue, that is more calculated

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lated to be beneficial to cultivators than that established under native administration in India, particularly that of Hindoo princes. And I could here mention many countries which, for a great number of years, enjoyed as much prosperity as could result from the best and most paternal rule. The opinions we form of the great oppression practised by native princes upon the inhabitants of the agricultural classes are, I know, from its having been on many occasions my duty to make specific inquiries into the facts, much exaggerated. We receive them from discontented persons of the country, and sometimes from those who are anxious for change from their own personal advancement being concerned; and we often judge them on principles little applicable to the condition of the government or community on whose interests and actions we are called upon to decide. I can only further state, that if the effects of our own rule were to be considered by any other judges upon the same data that we so frequently condemn those of the natives, we should be considered as persons who had practised great oppression. Without referring, as I could, to proofs of the truth of this assertion of an old date, I have within the last four years had frequent opportunities of seeing in countries in which every effort had been made to satisfy the inhabitants, and to establish our rule on the best and justest principles, loud and almost universal complaints, in many districts and villages, against what they deemed oppression and injustice; and in several cases the inhabitants of districts and villages have left their homes to seek the Governor of Bombay in a body, abandoning their wives and children, and their houses for several months, to obtain relief from what they deemed injustice. I mention this fact to show, that all governments are liable to such imputations. In most of these cases I have noticed there was little real foundation for the clamorous complaints that were made; and they proceeded chiefly from a desire of forcing government by such means to the lowering of the assessment, or to a change in the mode in which they were governed. The body of the complainants, I found, were generally influenced on these occasions, as I believe they are in many similar ones under the native rulers, by a few interested and seditious individuals. In cases where military adventurers, like the late Jeswunt Row Holkar and the Pindarries, retain power over large tracts of country for a very considerable number of years, although the cultivators were not annihilated or wholly driven out of the country, they suffered great oppression: and in the Nizam's country, circumstances have created, I believe, a great deal of misery to many of the agricultural inhabitants. With regard to the commercial classes, I have before answered this question; they have much influence under native governments, and have many checks upon tyrannical power, and have in many cases many more opportunities of enriching themselves than they have under our government. Their influence is greatly increased by a number of the principal men, and particularly the bankers, being of one sect, that of Jain, who are associated, however scattered throughout India, by the most intimate ties; and the consequence is, that they act, in all cases of tyranny and oppression, with a union that gives them, as a body, great strength. The Bohahs are also a numerous and united commercial class in several parts of India. I must, however, referring to these classes, observe, that their being free from the effects of tyranny and oppression depends upon their keeping themselves clear of all government employment; for from the moment they become servants, or are employed by the State,

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State, they are much at its mercy; and in the difficulties and embarrassments they bring on themselves, or the oppressions they suffer from that cause, they do not receive the support they would from their brethren if they had limited themselves to their commercial concerns.

283. Have you not expressed your opinion, that it is on the happiness of the people that the prosperity and continuance of our empire mainly depends?—I make no doubt I have expressed that opinion often; and that is what always has rendered me so anxious, that in the shape as well as substance of our government, we should adapt it as much as it is possible to their understandings, to their usages, and to the feelings and impressions under which they act, and by the gratification of which, on such points, I consider their happiness can alone be promoted, and their attachment secured.

284. Is it your opinion, that from the complete change in our situation within the last 15 years, a re-construction of our local rule is necessary?—I am decidedly of that opinion.

285. What, in your opinion, would be the nature of that re-construction?—I consider that the natives of India, provided a rule is calculated, upon the principle I have stated, to promote their happiness, neither care nor understand much with respect to the shape we may give it, as far as it affects the European parts of our establishment. With respect to the latter, I do conceive that the changes that have recently occurred require greater power to be vested in the persons entrusted with the general government of India, and that authority should be more concentrated than it now is in individuals who have the charge of the large divisions of that empire. I consider that the vast population of India, and the nature of our government, make it as inexpedient as it is unwise, both in a financial and political view, to continue to administer that country by that multiplicity of European public officers hitherto employed; and I consider the numerous local checks which we have desired to establish, when our territories were more limited, to be impracticable in our actual condition. We should afford ample means of administering this vast country to those who are placed at the head of its separate branches, and who rule over different parts of the empire. From the magnitude of our territories, we are compelled to invest them with great power; but I must consider that such a system, though it confers authority and distinction on individuals that will render them more equal to their duties, in no degree removes them from the strict supervision of their superiors; while their minds are elevated by the great trust reposed in them, they will act under checks equally as efficient, if not more so, than those that now exist. I have, however, stated my sentiments upon this subject in my letter to Lord William Bentinck, which forms an enclosure of a letter to Mr. Villiers, the Secretary of the India Board, and is on the table of the Committee. I can only add, that I think the period has arrived when this subject should be taken into immediate consideration.

286. Is it your opinion that no war has been undertaken which, in your judgment, might have been avoided?—I have for a period of nearly 40 years been employed in the Political department of India, and with the exception of the war of Nepaul, and with the Burmese, when I was not in India, I have had opportunities of forming a judgment on all the others that have occurred; and though I believe

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believe there were some which might have been evaded for one or two years, with increased danger to the English Government, yet I am decidedly of opinion that no war has been undertaken that could have been avoided.

287. Is it your opinion the establishment of our supremacy has enabled us to make great military reductions?—We have within the last three years made as great reduction in our military establishment as I consider consistent with policy or even with safety; for though there is no power in India of sufficient strength and means to engage in a general war with the British Government, the increased extent of the countries to which we must afford protection requires us to keep up a large military establishment, otherwise we shall be exposed to revolts or risings in the quarters from which they are withdrawn, and these will have besides other consequences, that of increasing our military expenditure in a degree far beyond any saving that could be effected by further reduction in this branch. It is, however, necessary to add, that the great reduction which has been recently made could not have been effected had either the Mahomedan power of Tippoo, or that of the Mahrattas and the Pindarries continued in the condition which they were previous to the wars of 1799, 1803-4, and 1817-18. And I must further state, that the defensive system we long pursued compelled us to military preparations, which were attended with all the expenses of war, without giving us or our allies that security which has been the result of success.

288. Then is it your opinion that the government in India, in obedience to maxims from home, wasted millions upon a mistaken system of defence?—I consider that while upon particular occasions expenses may have been increased by attention to these maxims, that upon the whole they have had a beneficial effect, not only as being consistent with our interest, which it has never been to increase our territory to too great an extent, but as it became of consequence in every point of view that our progress to power should be gradual, and also that the natives of India should be satisfied that nothing short of necessity would make us depart from those rules of policy which we had professed since the first day of our occupying territory in India.

289. Do you conceive that they can understand any rules or principles of policy which can put any boundary to conquest?—I do not mean by what I have said to say that the natives give us credit for motives to which they are such strangers, as having the power to increase our territories and not doing it; but I believe that their princes saw that we were limited by attention to treaties, and by never acting as other conquerors had done, except upon the ground of aggression; and that they often refrained from a line of policy they might otherwise have adopted, had they believed we sought every opportunity of aggrandisement through extension of territory. In this view, the maxims by which we were governed have had a salutary influence upon their minds. Independent of what I have stated, it is my opinion that those often-repeated maxims by the authorities in England against the extension of her power, have, though they could not arrest a progress which was caused by circumstances over which neither the authorities at home nor the local government had any control, in many cases had a good effect in rendering our advance slower than it otherwise might have been. It has given time for gaining that knowledge of the inhabitants of India of all classes, as well as of the country, which

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which has rendered us fitter to govern the territories that have become subject to our power. There cannot be a stronger proof of this benefit than the acknowledged difference between those systems of administration over countries which have lately fallen under our rule, and of those for which we proceeded to legislate in the earlier periods of our rule.

290. How far has the increase of population corresponded in those parts of India which are under our immediate control, and those parts which are not under our immediate control?—I cannot correctly answer that question. The increase of the population of India has always depended, as in other countries, upon the supply of food, and the comparative tranquillity which it has enjoyed; and I should consider that of late years it must have increased in an almost equal ratio in the states of the native rulers who have enjoyed peace and those under our immediate rule.

291. What is your opinion of the situation of the country of Kattywar and Cutch?—The province of Kattywar, which lies between that of Guzerat and Cutch, stretching along the sea-coast from the Gulf of Cambay to the Gulf of Cutch, and bounded to the west by the Desert, has been from time immemorial subject to a great number of Hindoo princes and chiefs. These have always paid tribute, or given service to the native sovereigns, who were considered as their lords paramount. Our first intimate knowledge of this country was caused, many years ago, by its being the source for supplying our cavalry with a very superior breed of horses, which are produced upon its sandy plains. We succeeded, by the treaty of Bassein, to the power of the Peishwas over a part of Kattywar, and all the rights of the Guicowar prince have been recently made over to us for the purpose of liquidating his debts. We have by these means become the lords paramount of the country, which imposes upon us a duty very difficult of execution. A full account of this country will be found in Mr. Elphinstone's minutes, and of mine of the 24th of September 1830, and also in that of the 30th of November 1830, which comprises a summary of every branch of the administration, and is before the General Committee. The numerous chiefs of Kattywar have all separate authority over their own territories, and by their general engagements with us, their lands are forfeited if they do not protect the peace of their respective possessions. This many of them have not the power to do, and much embarrassment has been created by our having hesitated in exercising that authority which the native rulers had done, as lords paramount, in punishing criminals whose condition in life, or family connections, made it dangerous for one of the petty chiefs to attempt to bring such criminals to justice. By late arrangements made in 1830, the political commissioner of Guzerat has had this country placed under his authority, and the political agent who resides in Kattywar is under his orders. The political commissioner is directed to visit this country twice every year, and to hold a criminal court, in which he presides, having in aid the political agent and three or four of the principal chiefs of Kattywar, as assessors, for the trial of those state criminals whom it is considered the chiefs have not the power of bringing to justice. The sentence upon any one of these, of death, cannot be carried into execution without the confirmation of the government of Bombay. This plan was adopted as the only one which could enable a great proportion of the chiefs of Kattywar to fulfil their engagements and maintain their principalities in peace; and I earnestly hope that we shall, by it and other

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other arrangements with this high and independent body of military chiefs, be able to avoid, for a long period of years, their falling under the ordinary rule of the British Government, an event which I should greatly deprecate. Their being under our direct rule would bring no benefit to the revenue; or at least none equal, after the expenses it would involve were paid, that could much exceed the tribute which is now punctually paid; and our subjection of them to our courts of justice, and our revenue collection, would not only be attended with internal troubles, but make the most dangerous impression upon the minds of all the military classes to which they belong, along the whole western frontier of India up to the proximity of Delhi, but cause an increased jealousy and dread of our power, that would be very injurious to our local interest in Cutch, Sindé, and on the banks of the Indus, from which Kattywar is only separated by the Desert. We maintain a small body of troops within this country for the protection of its internal peace; but they could not be better situated as belonging to the force necessary for the defence of our western frontier, as Kattywar is much healthier than any part of Guzerat. With regard to Cutch, which is only separated from Kattywar by a narrow arm of the sea, and by what is called the Runn, a sandy desert periodically overflowed by the sea, it is governed by a prince who is the head of the Jarajah tribe of Rajpoots; too celebrated for their crime of infanticide, which it has been an object, through negotiations and engagements with him, his chiefs, and those of his tribe in Kattywar, to eradicate. This small principality has been for many years exposed, from its position, to attacks from Sindé, and from plunderers called Khosas, who inhabit the eastern side of the Desert, by which it is bounded. From these alarms, and from the misrule of its princes, Cutch has been for many years a scene of crime and confusion: it is, since we have formed a subsidiary alliance with it, in the enjoyment of comparative tranquillity. Our troops stationed within its limits have been lately reduced, and the expense we are at to afford it protection exceeds, by a very trifling amount, the sum that is annually paid us by the government. I deem this country from its position to be of much political importance, and that is greatly increased by the recent discovery of the Indus being navigable to steam vessels for at least 1,000 miles. It is also valuable on account of its flourishing seaport, Mandivi; and our alliance with it enabled us to check in a very considerable degree the smuggling of Malwa opium, which, while our former system of realizing that revenue continued, was carried on to a great extent. My minute of the 30th of November, gives full information upon this as upon all other points connected with the various branches of the administration of Bombay, during the three years that I presided over that presidency.

292. What is your opinion as to the expediency of establishing an additional seat of government in Central India?—I have, as particularly relates to Central India, given my opinion most fully upon the subject in various documents, and in my work upon that country, as part of a general system which I deem the present situation of India to demand; I mean the establishment of provincial administration upon an enlarged scale. I must refer the Committee for my sentiments to the letter to Lord William Bentinck, which is upon their table. I certainly think that Central India, with Rajpootana, will form one of the most important subordinate governments.

293. Is it your opinion that, for the good government of India, an enlarged system of policy is necessary, and such as can embrace the whole empire?—In answer to this and the former question, I must refer the Committee to my letter of the 26th of March 1832, to the Secretary of the India Board, and to its enclosure to Lord William Bentinck, under date the 2d December 1830.

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Martis, 21^o die Februarii, 1832.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES MACINTOSH, Bart. in the Chair.

WILLIAM BUTTERWORTH BAYLEY, Esq., called in and examined.

294. WHAT opinion have you formed from your experience and observation of the manner in which the subsidiary system affects the well-being of the inhabitants of the countries where it is established?—I think that it has proved generally injurious to the happiness and prosperity of the inhabitants of those countries.

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295. You have been in the Secretaries' Office of Calcutta?—Yes, in the judicial department.

296. How long have you been in the political department?—I was employed in the political department only for a short period, when I was assistant in an office instituted by Lord Wellesley, called the Governor-General's Office, and in the Persian Secretary's Office.

297. You were secretary in the judicial department?—I was Secretary to Government in the judicial department for about nine years, and for nearly three years of that period Chief Secretary to Government.

298. What judicial situation did you fill?—I held for about three years the office of deputy register and translator in the court of Sudder Dewanny and Nizamut Adawlut, and I was then appointed register of those courts.

299. That was the native court of appeal?—Yes; the chief court of civil and of criminal justice. I subsequently held the situation of Judge and Magistrate of the district of Burdwan for about five years.

300. That is west of Calcutta, how much?—Seventy or eighty miles west of Calcutta. I was afterwards employed in drawing up some new regulations, on the completion of which duty I was appointed Secretary in the judicial department, and ultimately a Member of the Supreme Council.

301. How long were you a member of the Council?—I was called to the Council by Lord Hastings for about 10 months, during a casual vacancy in the year 1822, and was a Member of Council, under an appointment from the Court of Directors, from November 1825 to November 1830.

302. In what respect do you think that the subsidiary system operates unfavourably on the condition of the inhabitants?—The subsidiary system operates to protect the country of our ally from foreign invasion, as well as from the danger

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arising from internal disturbances, and so far ought not to be otherwise than beneficial ; but the prince or ruling power, in the confidence created by our support, feels it less necessary to administer justice, to protect and to promote the interest of his subjects, than he would do if he were liable to the ordinary consequences of bad government ; that is, to prevent the people from deposing a bad prince and choosing a good one, the natural remedy for bad governments in all Eastern states. I think also that the sense of dependence necessarily involved in the plan of a subsidiary alliance operates to weaken the interest of a prince in the administration of his own government. Upon these grounds, and from the result of past experience, I think the system of subsidiary alliances is, on the whole, injurious to the subjects of the allied states.

303. Do you consider that the subjects of a prince, before we interfered at all, were happier than under this system ?—They were doubtless frequently subject to bad government, but they had the power then in their own hands of redressing themselves ; they would not bear long-continued exactions, or oppressions of a nature generally and deeply injurious ; they would ultimately rise against and put down such a government.

304. They were happier, because they had certain violent means of redress within their own powers, but not from being well governed ?—I do not think it a necessary, though certainly a probable consequence of such a connection, that they would be worse governed under a subsidiary system than before such a system was in force.

305. Only that they had greater means of redress ?—They had more power of redressing themselves than they have now.

306. The fear of the exercise of that power you consider is a check on bad government ?—Yes, certainly ; I think good government amongst native states in India is almost always dependent on the personal character of the prince or minister or both. There are no laws, no institutions powerful enough to control the will of the individual ruler. A strong-minded, well-disposed prince has great consideration with his subjects, and has the means of making them happy, and of governing them well.

307. You consider the natives in these ceded territories of which we had complete possession some time were more prosperous than in a dependant or subsidiary state ?—Generally speaking, I do certainly ; but there are instances of native chiefs or states, though our feudatories or dependants, making their subjects more happy than we do.

308. Which would you specify ?—I am speaking rather from what I have read, than from my own personal knowledge. I am not aware that at the present moment the subjects of any native state in India are so effectually protected, or so mildly governed as the inhabitants of our own provinces ; the Mysore country prospered under the administration of Poorneah, and Mr. Elphinstone bears testimony to the good government of the Jageerdars of the Putwurdun family.

309. When you say, in all those states it depends on the personal character of the ruler, do you think there is a greater security for prosperity and happiness under us, guarded by our institutions ?—Undoubtedly ; I think under our institutions, the natives are protected from violence, both in property and person ; their rights

rights and prejudices are regarded ; there is an efficient police, and a fair administration of justice, under laws and regulations which are published and embodied in a code.

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310. There is a greater security of permanence?—Undoubtedly there is. The natives of Oude, adjoining our own frontiers, have long been subject to great misrule and oppression, and are generally supposed to be anxious to come under our government.

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311. That is so?—I have no doubt of it, so far as regards the mercantile and agricultural classes.

312. They think the condition of our subjects is better than those who are left under the nominal rule of the vizier or king of Oude?—So I am led to believe.

313. In fact, the subsidiary force acts as much for good as it does for evil ; and if on the one hand it protects princes from rebellion among their subjects, it seems to be good for the people also?—It is good for the people as preventing foreign invasion ; but the subsidiary force is sometimes used to enforce the payment of revenue, or to put down rebellion, and in those cases it operates always against the people.

314. We could interfere more on behalf of the people than we could do were there no subsidiary force?—Under some of our subsidiary treaties the British Government is authorized or bound to interfere to check or prevent gross misgovernment.

315. Does not that amount to that interference which it is forbid residents to exercise?—In some of our alliances the right of interference forms one of the specific stipulations. Such is the case with Mysore, Travancore, Sattarah, Nagpoor, the Guicowar, and Oude.

316. Has the interference of the resident ever been effectually exercised to rescue the people from the oppression of the princes?—It has. It may be sufficient to refer to the instance of Hyderabad, where European officers were employed in different parts of the country vested with the powers to correct or prevent the injustice and oppression which the natives suffered from the exactions of aumils and farmers sanctioned by the minister of the Nizam.

317. In what way is communication carried on between Government and residents?—The secretary in the Political department corresponds with the residents, and the residents sometimes correspond directly with the Governor-General. There are regular means of communication by post throughout India.

318. There are frequently points occur which can hardly be settled in India, but which require to be referred home, are there not?—In matters of importance, which may admit of the delay, a reference is made to England ; but in cases of emergency, where delay would be injurious, the government exercises its discretion, and acts without previous reference to the home authorities.

319. The native governments in India are pure despotisms, are they not?—They are so : but as regards the agricultural classes, that despotism is softened or modified by the municipal institutions of the villages, where such institutions are still in existence.

320. What is the punchayet?—Any number of arbitrators, generally five, and selected by the parties. It bears the character of a court of arbitration. It is also

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also a kind of tribunal for settling questions of caste, and professional disputes ; but it is seldom resorted to in common civil controversies in Bengal.

321. You do not conceive that a prince deprived of all political importance has the same strong and constant inducement to watch over the safety of his subjects as one who possesses that importance?—I do not.

322. Or to enforce laws for their protection?—No, certainly not.

323. Have there been any gross instances of our interference against subjects?—I recollect some instances in which our troops were employed to enforce the authority of the king of Oude over subjects who had been driven to resistance by oppression and injustice.

324. Is it at the option of the resident to order our subsidiary force to assist princes, or is he bound by treaty to do so at the request of princes?—He would not do it without the request of the prince.

325. Is it imperative?—He would in doubtful cases consult his government, and suspend the order until their authority was received.

326. It is not imperative then?—No ; it has for sufficient reasons been often refused.

327. The only case understood by the treaties is either protection against some foreign enemy, or against domestic revolt?—Generally speaking, such is the case ; but we are authorized by some of the treaties to interpose by advice, and in other instances even to assume the management of the country.

328. That is not in the majority of the cases, is it?—No, our subsidiary alliances do not all warrant our interference in the internal administration of the protected states.

329. At present, in most of the states there is so little chance of foreign invasion and foreign aggression, that the subsidiary force is merely nominal, is it not?—At present we have paramount authority all over India, and have the power to prevent aggression on the part of one state towards another. All our treaties stipulate that disputes between any two states shall be referred for adjustment to the British Government, and that they shall enter into no negotiation without our knowledge.

330. Are the courts of justice in those places with which we are connected by subsidiary treaties exclusively administered by native punchayets?—They have no regular system of justice. Disputes are sometimes settled by the chief of a village or of a district, by a farmer or other person in authority ; sometimes by punchayets or arbitration, and very frequently by a bloody affray. Where there are courts of justice, the natives prefer going to them ; where none exist, they must either fight or resort to arbitration.

331. Is not one practical consequence of subsidiary alliances universally acknowledged, namely, that the multiplicity of business it entails on us prevents our consideration of, and attention to matters of more importance?—The duties devolving upon us in our capacity of the dominant power in India are doubtless difficult, and occupy much of the time and attention of government ; but on the other hand, if we were not in that situation, we should have a great deal more trouble in maintaining our interests, in guarding against hostile combinations, and in repelling aggression.

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332. And it is the most economical system, you think?—Calculating, as I think we have a right to do, on the long continuance of peace and tranquillity in India, I think our present system more economical.

333. Has the Nabob of Bengal any power?—No, he is a mere pensioner.

334. He has no territory whatever?—No, none at all.

335. Do you know since what time he has ceased to have territory?—The internal administration was altogether withdrawn from the Nabob and transferred to the English about the year 1772. The grant of the Dewanny was obtained in 1765.

336. We have residents at the Rajpoot states?—There were residents or political agents at Oudipore, Jeypore, and Cotah. The political affairs of Joudpoor and some other Rajpoot states were superintended by the commissioner at Ajmere. At present the latter officer has charge of our interests, with the state of Oudipore also.

337. What is the name of the prince to whom he is more nearly accredited; what is the head of the Rajpoot states?—The highest in point of rank is the state of Oudipore.

338. Are those countries better governed than those in which we have direct interference?—They are scarcely recovered from the devastations of the Pindarries and other predatory bands.

339. You have hardly had an opportunity of observing their internal condition?—I have not; but it is notorious that they are in a much better situation than before. The internal government, I imagine, is very lax, but they are no longer exposed to the ravages of plunderers.

340. The general tenor of the instructions from home, both from Government and the Company, has always been strongly against conquest?—It certainly has.

341. Then it would seem the Government of India has always been active in spite of their instructions?—Most of the wars into which the British Government has entered have been forced upon us; our interference has often been reluctantly exercised. We cannot recede, and it is probable that, ultimately, the whole of India will come under our own dominion.

342. You are entirely of opinion that the result of what has been done is for our own advantage and the happiness of the natives?—I think that the bulk of the inhabitants of those states which have fallen under our own direct government have derived benefit from our aggrandizement. I cannot say the same with regard to some of those states which are under our control partially.

343. Then these advantages have been achieved in spite of instructions from home?—The instructions from home have always discouraged the extension of territory, and have deprecated war as leading to that consequence; but after having gone to war we have been compelled to extend our dominion, both as indemnity for the past, and as security for the future.

344. It has, then, led to a much better state of things, to a much more easily defended country, which is more likely to lead to the happiness of the natives, and there is less expense, because there is less recurrence of war?—Generally speaking, such has been the result; but the expense of increased military and civil establishments has exceeded in several instances the advantages acquired by our conquests.

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345. Do you think it has increased out of the proportion to the increase of territory?—Out of proportion to the increase of revenue.

346. As they improve, will they not meet the expense?—The revenues will probably increase very considerably. Some of our acquisitions are very productive; others (for instance, the cessions from Ava,) are much the reverse. It will be long before the latter will yield a revenue at all commensurate with the expense incurred in conquering and maintaining them.

347. You consider the superiority of the countries governed by the English administration directly, to be much more clear and certain over the administration of the subsidiary states than over the administration of native powers, independent powers, without giving any absolute opinion on the latter part of the subject?—Yes; I think that those states with whose government we interfere occasionally, and which are supported by our military power, are rarely so well governed as our own territories, or as those which are more completely independent of us.

348. So that the intermediate state is the worse?—Such is my opinion.

349. Taking all the circumstances into account, perhaps the superiority of the English government over a good native government (that is, the appearance of vigour and spirit) is not by any means so certain as the superiority over the others?—The bulk of the people, the agricultural and commercial classes, the bankers, manufacturers and artizans, are all better off under our direct government; but the aristocracy of the country, the military classes, those who had formerly the means of aggrandizing themselves by offices of trust and emolument, have suffered in proportion; their prospects are very much deteriorated, and their occupation is gone.

350. The people are better, and those who prey on the people are worse off?—Generally speaking, such is the case.

351. Do you imagine that it requires fewer troops to keep our own immediate subjects in order, than the subjects of princes with whom we have subsidiary treaties?—The greatest part of our force is stationed either in the territories of our allies beyond our frontiers, or in positions close to our frontiers. In the provinces of Bengal and Behar, containing a population of at least 30,000,000, there are not more than 12,000 or 13,000 troops of all arms, of which one half is stationed in the immediate vicinity of Calcutta.

352. There is no disposition to revolt?—In our old established territories under the presidency of Bengal, I have never seen any disposition to revolt.

353. You think it would be attended with less expense to maintain the government if we had it under us immediately, rather than under the present system?—That is a question which I am scarcely prepared to answer; but I think that if we had complete possession of all India, exercising all the powers of civil government, and collecting the revenue for our own purposes, the expense would be less in proportion to the revenue than it is at present; but there is an obvious benefit in the continuance of some independent or partially independent states to which turbulent and bad spirits may resort, and find some employment. Such individuals might prove mischievous if all India were under our exclusive government.

354. There are back settlements in which there would be still room for them perhaps?—Not if we were in possession of the whole interior of India.

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355. We have to control these bad spirits only under another name?—The individuals to whom I allude would find no employment under us; there have been a vast number of soldiers of fortune in India, many of whom cannot even now find employment. If we had the whole of India under our dominion, and our military system continued as at present, those soldiers of fortune would find no employment whatever.

356. Do you consider that there is a constant indefinite danger existing from our own army?—Constituted as our native army is, it cannot be otherwise than that there should be some indefinite danger; but I do not see any present cause for apprehension; when it does arrive, it will probably have been caused by our own mismanagement.

357. You do not see any particular danger?—Partial mutinies may arise from very trifling causes, and revolt and disaffection may be expected if ever the state of the finances should render us unable to pay the troops with regularity, or an ill-judged economy should enforce a reduction of their allowances.

358. Do you think the subsidiary system as good as any that could be substituted for it?—I do not see how it is possible now to change it. We cannot retrace our steps without weakening our own power, and exposing our dominion to serious hazard.

359. On the plan of governing the country by a dewan, what do you think of it?—I think that is the very worst of all, if by a dewan is meant a minister supported by our influence, and exercising authority properly belonging to the prince.

360. You do not agree with Sir Thomas Munro?—I am not aware that he has given an opinion upon the case I have supposed; the question is a different one if it refers to the administration of a dewan during the minority of a prince. The success of Poorneah in Mysore is an instance of the latter; the atrocious misgovernment of Chundoo Lal at Hyderabad, of the former.

361. Do the natives enlist willingly?—We find more difficulty in getting sepoy than we used to do from our own territories; our Bengal army is chiefly recruited from the territories of the king of Oude; our own subjects have lost their military character, they now follow commercial and agricultural pursuits in preference.

362. That speaks in favour of their prosperity?—No doubt; it is a proof that they are protected in the enjoyment of the fruits of their industry.

363. Have you heard of the scheme of the Supreme Government being discharged from local concerns?—I have.

364. What do you think of it?—I have recorded my sentiments on the subject in a minute, dated the 9th of November 1830, to which I beg leave to refer. I think it impossible for the Supreme Government to exercise an effectual control over the other presidencies, while it has to conduct the administration in detail of extensive territories containing 50,000,000 or 60,000,000 of inhabitants.

365. At what town would you place the central government?—Somewhere in the Western Provinces probably; but it should not be fixed to one spot.

366. Is there a direct overland communication kept up between Bengal and Bombay?—There is a daily communication by post.

367. In what time do they come?—It depends on the season; in the rainy season it is as long as three weeks, but ordinarily 16, 17, or 18 days.

Lunæ, 27^o die Februarii, 1832.

VI.
POLITICAL
OR
FOREIGN.

27 February 1832.

Major Close.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES MACINTOSH, in the Chair.

Major CLOSE called in and examined.

368. How long were you in India?—Rather more than 22 years.
369. What diplomatic stations did you fill?—I had been assistant to the residents at Nagpoor and at Poonah; afterwards I was resident with Scindia at Gwalior.
370. Who were you assistant with at Poonah?—I was assistant with Mr. Elphinstone.
371. At Nagpoor whom did you assist?—Mr. Elphinstone first, and Mr. Jenkins afterwards.
372. For what time in all?—About twelve years.
373. You were afterwards resident with Scindia?—Yes, for about eight years.
374. What is the relation in which Scindia stood to the Company?—He was independent.
375. Has he no treaty with the Company?—Yes, there are several treaties, but they are not such as to abrogate his independence, or to place him in acknowledged submission to the British Government.
376. Are they in the nature of what we commonly call offensive and defensive treaties?—No, not even that.
377. Do they imply any guarantee of his dominions?—No.
378. Is there nothing peculiar in them?—Nothing peculiar in their general character beyond that of reducing his resources and curtailing his influence.
379. Do they not even amount to treaties of defence and alliance?—No, certainly not; unless, indeed, the last treaty which we made with him for a temporary and special purpose might be considered so; but we have no permanent one. His political relations, however, have been effectually confined, and his power of injuring his neighbours equally restrained in consequence of the claim to our protection which all the other states have established by their treaties with us.
380. Do they contain any provision restricting him from employing European officers, foreign officers, or anything of that sort?—They are no more than treaties of peace, very little more than that; at one time there was a treaty of the nature alluded to, but it was dissolved soon after its conclusion, and never came into practical operation.
381. There is none now?—No; there was none when I left India in 1824.
382. Now, under those circumstances, and separating the two parts of your experience, when you were assistant to the residents at Poonah and Nagpoor, what opinion did you form from your observation of the way in which the connection between the Company and its dependent allies affected the good government and good condition of the inhabitants of the countries respectively?—At the time when

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I was at Nagpoor we had no such treaty as we have formed since; so that we had no opening given us to interfere at all with the administration of the country. With regard to Poonah, where we had such a treaty, my opinion was, that the general effect was good, and was favourable to the prosperity of the inhabitants.

383. What do you think of the well-being of the inhabitants, the subjects of the Peishwa, as compared with their condition before we interfered at all in Mahratta affairs, on the one hand, and the condition of those who are the direct subjects of the Company on the other?—Why, inasmuch as those who are our direct subjects live under a more systematic and just government, I should certainly conclude that their condition was infinitely superior to that of the Mahrattas.

384. Do you think, from your observation, that the subjects of the Company were in a better condition than those who were the then subjects of the Peishwa?—I should think so.

385. Do the observations, therefore, which you made, apply to a comparison of their condition after we began to interfere in the Peishwa's internal government, or with what it was before our interference?—Not having been in that country before our connection with the Peishwa's government, I can only speak from general conjecture on that subject; but I should fancy that the condition of our subjects was better, on a comparison with the Peishwa's, at either of those periods.

386. Was the treaty by which there was a certain right of interference the treaty of Bassein?—It was.

387. Did that take place in 1803?—No, it was at the end of 1802, and just before the Mahratta war of 1803. That war arose partly perhaps from the discontent of the subordinate chieftains, at the low condition to which the head of the state was reduced by it, but principally from the mortification they felt at the diminution of their own influence which resulted from it.

388. What was the comparative state of the people in the province of Berar, under the Rajah, and those who were the subjects of the Peishwa before our frequent and familiar interference?—I had never known anything of the Poonah territories before our treaty of defensive alliance with the Peishwa in 1802.

389. When you were at Nagpoor there was no treaty authorizing our interference?—No, not at Nagpoor.

390. What was then the condition of the security of person and property, and the administration of justice in the Rajah of Berar's government?—Indeed, I should say there was very little of either.

391. Did he collect his revenue by military means?—It was not always necessary to employ military force; but occasionally it would be so.

392. In the Mahratta territory, was it generally necessary to employ military means to collect the revenue?—I should not suppose that it was so on all occasions.

393. Was a great part of the revenue of the Mahrattas derived from a tribute paid by the neighbouring states?—A considerable part.

394. Was that collected by force?—That was generally collected by force before our engagements with the Mahratta states, which put a stop to their violent aggression.

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395. Who

395. Who paid chout to the Mahrattas so late as the period immediately following the war against Mysore?—Little or no tribute of that description was collected by the Mahratta states south of the Nerbudda, but to the north of it there was.

396. Do you remember any of the states that paid chout to the northern Mahrattas?—All the Rajpoot states, without exception, I believe.

397. But confining yourself to the Poonah Mahrattas at present?—There certainly was none paid to them after 1802; nor do I suppose there had been for some time before.

398. Did all the Rajpoot states pay chout to the Mahratta chiefs?—Yes, to those situated north of the Nerbudda, of which Scindia and Holkar were the principal; but that system of plunder and exaction has ceased with the extension of our influence and the formation of our engagements with nearly all the states lying north of the Nerbudda.

399. Have you anything to state further with regard to the subsidiary system?—I can only say generally, with respect to the subsidiary system, that it was calculated to promote our own interests, and also, under good management, to increase the prosperity of the country at large. It has given the means of maintaining, without a constant drain upon our ordinary resources, a well equipt force, ready at all times for any emergency; and it has enabled us to preserve, in a great degree, the peace of the country, which before its introduction was constantly exposed to the ravages of undisciplined and contending armies. The effect has also been to put it in our power to control, or in a considerable degree to moderate, the defects of at least some of the native governments, much to the advantage, as I should conceive, of their subjects.

400. Can Major Close specify any state in which that system had been under good government, so as to promote beneficial effects?—As far as my observation has gone, I have formed the opinion that the system had not answered so well under some of the Mahomedan governments as in the Hindoo states; but I think that in the Hindoo states it has generally been productive of advantage.

401. Is there any direct cause which would account for its being more beneficial in the Hindoo states than in the Mahomedan states?—I do not exactly know to what it is to be traced; but if true, it may perhaps be ascribed to this, that the Hindoo governments may harmonize better with the feelings of the inhabitants, the great mass of whom are themselves Hindoos; and that the Mahomedan government may not be so acceptable to the people at large.

402. Would that have anything to do with the subsidiary system?—No, I should apprehend not; unless it be that the Mahomedan governments might therefore stand more in need of our assistance to support their authority.

403. Do you think, or not, that the success of the English administration in Hindoo countries was likely to be greater than in those under Mahomedan government, partly because the Mahomedans were a set of conquerors like ourselves, and therefore disliked our presence?—I should not say that it was from any aversion borne by the Mahomedan governments to us that those effects to which I allude had proceeded; it has not been from that cause, since although the cordiality of our intercourse with them has occasionally met with slight interruptions, they had, up to the

the period of my leaving India, eight years ago, proved more faithful to their alliance with us than some of the Hindoo governments.

404. Were not a great number of Mahomedans driven out of military service at Mysore?—Very many. 27 February 1832.

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405. The peace which has been established in India has injured their interest very materially there, has it not?—Yes, very much; but the same effects must in some degree have been felt by the Hindoo soldiery also.

406. But as to Hindoo officers or chiefs, does that remark apply?—Not to the same extent, certainly. I should wish to explain a previous allusion to our treaties of peace with Scindia, by observing that those treaties were the consequence, either of open hostility, or of a state of things nearly approaching to war; that in the former case our purpose had been to effect such a reduction of Scindia's power as should disable him from prosecuting future wars against us; and in the latter, to give such a direction to his employment of the resources still left to him, as might contribute to the general and permanent peace of the country.

The Hon. EDWARD GARDNER called in and examined.

407. WERE you engaged in diplomatic service in India?—Yes, I was.

408. For how long a period?—I resided in India altogether about 27 years, of which time I was employed in the Political department from 1808 to the period of my leaving India. I was attached first to the Delhi residency, in the situation of assistant to the resident; and I remained there until the Nepaul war, which occurred in 1814, when I was called to that quarter, and have been employed within that country until I left India in 1829.

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409. How long were you at Delhi?—About six years in the Delhi territory, but very little at Delhi itself.

410. In Nepaul how long?—I was about 12 years altogether in Nepaul.

411. Now the principal duty which you had to perform at Delhi was administrative, was it not, with respect to the district?—I was in a subordinate situation, and was employed during nearly the whole time I was there in charge of the district of Hurriana, a territory that fell into the British government in consequence of the chief to whom it was assigned not being able to maintain his own authority in it, and he gave it up to the Government for a certain stipend.

412. Then were you employed for six years in Delhi in the duties of local administration, and 12 years at Nepaul in diplomatic negotiations?—Just so; I was political resident at Khatmandoo, at the court of the Rajah of Nepaul.

413. What is the nature of our political relation with the Rajah of Nepaul?—It is founded upon a treaty of amity consequent on the war which we were engaged in with that state, and which ended in its being compelled to admit a treaty with the British Government of that nature.

414. There is no subsidiary force?—None whatever; we were under no obligations for its support or defence, neither was anything required from it in the shape of subsidiary or of military aid.

415. From your long residence in that territory, you will be able to inform the Committee what you think of the condition of the inhabitants, especially the lower classes of that territory, compared with those of the Company's territories which

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you have seen?—I think their condition generally would bear a very favourable comparison with those of the Company's territory; the people I consider, on the whole, to have been well governed, and in as good and happy a condition as those of any other states with which I have been acquainted.

416. Have you seen the whole of the Company's Bengal presidency?—I have had very little experience in Bengal; I resided chiefly in the Upper Provinces and within the Delhi territory; I have passed through the country, certainly, but I have not sufficient knowledge to speak to its actual condition.

417. Had you any opportunity of seeing the Nabob of Oude's territory?—Simply as a traveller through it.

418. What do you think of its state?—It was, when I passed, considered to be in a disturbed state as regarded the police, but it appeared to be very highly cultivated; it was no doubt in rather an unsettled state at the time.

419. Who are the inhabitants of Nepaul?—The Goorkahs are the ruling race.

420. Have the Goorkahs always remained Hindoos?—They are entirely and strictly Hindoos, and no part of the inhabitants profess the Mahomedan religion. I suppose there are not a dozen Mahomedans in the whole country.

421. Do you apprehend any danger to our possessions from their vicinity?—Not in the position in which they have been placed in consequence of the late war between the British Government and the Goorkah nation; before that event, they certainly held a very threatening and commanding position along the whole extent of our northern frontier.

422. What was their native state?—They came from a place called Goorkah, whence they derive their appellation.

423. Where is that?—It is a small mountain territory situated to the northwest of the valley of Nepaul, whence the Goorkahs issued, and successively conquering all the petty states into which the whole of that region was formerly divided, united them under one rule, and established the government in their own tribe and family.

424. Had the conquered people the same institutions and manners with the conquerors?—Not exactly; the inhabitants, for example, of the valley of Nepaul are called Newars, and although Hindoos, they are Boodhists in religion, while their conquerors, the Goorkahs, are of the Braminical faith.

425. What time did the Goorkah's conquest begin?—I think the conquest of Nepaul Proper, as it may be called, was effected in about 1767-8, between 60 and 70 years ago.

426. You think the condition of the people in the Nepaul country, in the whole province of the Goorkah dominions, might be advantageously compared with the subjects of the Company?—I have not visited the whole of their dominions, but considering the nature of their government, which is a military one in its character and arbitrary in its form, I think the inhabitants generally are under a lenient government, and that the condition of the people would bear a very favourable comparison with the subjects of the Company, or those of any other state in India.

427. Have they one supreme head, or is it a federative state?—The authority is vested in the Rajah alone, but its exercise is much modified by the influence of the baradars, or chiefs of the state, who claim a voice in their national councils; they

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they are summoned by the Rajah, or by those acting in his name, on all important occasions, where they deliver and express their sentiments very freely, and the majority of their opinions generally decide questions of peace or war, or other matters of moment; the authority is usually in the Rajah's hands, no doubt, but modified in this way.

428. Is the Rajah's authority hereditary?—It is.

429. Are these chiefs hereditary in general?—In general they are; they are the heads of the families whose ancestors bore a share in the conquests effected by Prithwee Narain, their chief; they generally fill, like ourselves in India, all the principal offices of state, and have the command of the troops, keeping the conquered people in inferior situations under the government. These chiefs have always, therefore, been looked on as having a direct interest and voice in public affairs, and they thus modify the power of the Rajah.

430. Are there many slaves in Nepaul?—There does exist a species of domestic slavery, but not in the acceptance of the word in which it is understood in Europe.

431. Have you any labourers slaves?—If the family they belong to is an agricultural one they are sometimes employed in the field, but not particularly so; they are used for all domestic purposes. They cut wood and fetch water, and are employed as servants.

432. Can they be sold?—I apprehend they may be.

433. Without the soil?—They are not attached to the soil at all.

434. Did you ever know any instance of a sale?—I cannot say decidedly that I have. I believe that it did take place; but I had no means of knowing absolutely that it did.

435. Do they form a large proportion of the inhabitants?—By no means.

436. May it be called an inconsiderable proportion?—An inconsiderable proportion. Indeed, I believe they are chiefly foreigners from the side of Thibet principally, and from among the Bhoteea people.

437. Are any of them those who have been made prisoners?—No; they are people, who, I believe, have been chiefly sold when children, in times of famine and scarcity.

438. By what means have we secured our possessions against the danger which formerly existed from the Nepaul state?—Its power has been considerably reduced by the treaty. All the mountain territory which had been acquired by us in the course of the war to the west of the river Kulce was ceded to the British Government; to the eastward, the Nepaul government agreed to abstain from any interference with the petty state of Sikim, which forms its boundary on that side, and to submit any disputes that might arise between them to our arbitration. Consequently, the Nepaulese are now confined on three sides by the British power and territory, or by the Sikim country, the possession of which is guaranteed to the Rajah; and on the north they are shut in by the Hemalaya, or great snowy range of mountains which extends along that portion of their frontier, and now forms part of the Chinese empire, so that they are completely inclosed, and have no power of acting in any direction beyond their own territory.

439. Is the source of the Ganges within the Goorkah territory?—It was, but is now within the province of Kumaon.

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440. These are now English provinces?—Yes; Kumaon has been annexed to the British possessions, and the petty states lying to the westward of Kumaon, about eight in number, were restored under British protection to the chiefs from whom they had been taken by the Goorkahs in the progress of their conquest. They are insignificant in extent, and their revenues are very small; and with the exception of a few places which were reserved as military stations for some hill corps, that were raised as an employment for the military classes in the country, were restored to the chiefs in the same condition as they had originally possessed them, without their paying tribute or furnishing military aid, which they are unable to do.

441. Has the Mogul any independent territory at all?—None.

442. Is Delhi his?—No; the country round Delhi was assigned for his support, but the revenues are collected by our government, and a stipend is paid to him out of it.

443. Does Nepaul appear to differ from any other Indian state, in its government and in the condition of its people?—Yes, it differs very essentially. The country has never been subdued by any of the foreign invaders or conquerors of India. The people are more simple, unmixed, and original in their manners, less superstitious, and less bound by rules of caste and other Hindoo observances than the people of Bengal.

444. Before the Goorkah conquest, was the country divided into small rajahs?—Yes, in the valley of Nepaul alone, which is only about 50 miles in circumference, there were no less than three princes whose capitals were within a few miles of each other; they each had a share of the valley, which was considered the most valuable portion of their principalities. One of the articles of the treaty engages that they shall not give service to any European without the sanction of the British Government.

445. Is there any restriction on their rights as to making peace and war?—The usual article in our treaties with the native powers, by which they bind themselves not to enter into political negotiations with any other state, is not a part of the treaty with Nepaul.

446. Was Sikim a Nepaul state?—No, but the Nepaulese were in progress of its conquest when the war broke out, and it was restored to the rajah, and the possession guaranteed to him with the view of forming a barrier in that direction against the further aggression of the Nepaulese, and to put an end to that career of conquest to which they had so long been accustomed, and which, but for the war with the British Government, would in all probability have carried them eventually to Cashmeer.

447. In what manner are they armed?—Their troops are armed, disciplined, and clothed on the model of the sepoys in the British service; the words of command are given in English, and the gradations of ranks are copied from ours, or rather applied as they were used in the time of Mr. Hastings' administration. They cast some cannon, and to each of their battalions they have two guns attached; they were taught this by a Frenchman, who was in their service formerly. They manufacture their own muskets, from excellent guns produced in their territory. Their artillery is not, however, of much use, from the difficult nature of their country.

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448. Is their force chiefly infantry or cavalry?—Entirely infantry; they have no cavalry; there is not a road in the country on which cavalry could be moved.

449. How do you travel?—Generally on foot: women are carried in a kind of hammock. Horses, except in the valley, are nearly useless.

450. Did you walk to Khatmandoo?—On my first going there I travelled in a kind of litter used for the purpose; afterwards I frequently walked on journeys, or used a litter, or rode on small ponies which are brought from Thibet.

451. Have the inhabitants of this place made greater progress in science than in other places?—They know not much of science; education, as far as it goes, is very general: it is uncommon to see a person who cannot read or write, or know something of accounts: every village has its instruction in some way, but it seldom proceeds further than that; and the higher branches of learning are quite unknown.

452. Have you had an opportunity of comparing the territory of Nepaul with other parts?—I have been entirely employed at the court of the rajah of Nepaul since the peace of 1816.

453. In the administration of justice, is there more security of persons and property than elsewhere?—Yes, I never knew it more so elsewhere. The Nepaulese, like all mountaineers, are particularly honest, and very little given to crime or violence of any kind.

454. Are there tribunals there?—Yes; heinous crimes are very unfrequent; petty criminal cases are heard in the first instance by the magistrates of the towns, or local authorities in the country; they punish to a certain extent. Graver crimes are brought before the rajah, or those exercising his authority, and are decided once a year. There is, I think, a greater degree of security for person and property than I have ever observed in any other part of India.

455. Have they public works?—Scarcely any. They have built a few bridges, and made a few roads in the vicinity of the capital, but it is contrary to their policy to construct roads or throw open their country in any way.

456. Is it quite an agricultural country?—Yes; and it is well cultivated where circumstances admit of it, and the valley itself is cultivated by what in this country is called spade cultivation, and is productive.

457. Have they any commerce?—Not much; it has increased somewhat since our connection with them; they export some things not got from other parts of the world, such as musk and borax. It is not found in their own country, but comes through it from Thibet.

458. Is there great facility for merchants?—Why no, every thing must be carried on porters' backs; but merchants meet with every protection.

459. Have you much tea from China over land?—No.

460. Do they bring it down to Benares?—I believe not. It comes down in cakes occasionally, but we should not consider it as good, or drinkable indeed.

461. Did you ever hear of a tea plant being raised?—I remember seeing one in Nepaul. The Nepaulese are considered as tributary to China, and every five years they send a mission to Pekin through Thibet; on one occasion of this kind they brought a tea plant with them, and in a Cashmerian's garden close to Khatmandoo, it was still growing where I saw it, at a place between the residency and the town.

462. Is it a good climate?—An excellent one, I think; not much unlike that of Switzerland, I should suppose.

Mr. FRANCIS WILDER called in and examined.

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Mr. Francis Wilder.

463. How long were you in India?—Exactly 22 years.
464. In what department did you serve?—Chiefly in the political department.
465. In the diplomatic department?—Yes.
466. Were you diplomatically employed?—For the first six years I was employed at Delhi in a subordinate situation entirely in the local administration, and afterwards at Ajmeer for six years more; during which time the states of Joudpoor, Jesselmere and Kishengurh were placed in communication with me; but I still continued under the Resident as an assistant.
467. Just state where you were afterwards?—I was afterwards at Sangur for one year; and after that (in 1827) I succeeded to the residency at Nagpoor, where I remained until the end of 1829, when I came home.
468. Whom did you succeed?—I succeeded Mr. Jenkins.
469. How long were you resident at Nagpoor?—About three years.
470. In what condition, compared to neighbouring countries, did it appear to you that our territory around Delhi was when you were employed there?—At Delhi the territory was entirely under the British Government.
471. In comparing that country with the neighbouring native dominions, what do you think of their comparative well-being?—I think the subjects of the Company in the Delhi territory were far better off than the subjects of the neighbouring native princes.
472. Who are the native princes whom you make the subjects of comparison chiefly?—The Seik territories to the north, Ulwur, Biccaneer, and the other Rajpoot states to the westward.
473. Do you know anything of the dominions of the King of Oude?—I do not, I never was in that country.
474. You have seen the country of Rajpootana?—Yes, I have.
475. In what state, in the country you have seen, is the security of persons and property and the administration of justice?—I do not think, in any of the Rajpoot territories I have visited, there is much security for persons or property, though the state of things has very much improved since we have formed an alliance with them.
476. Had they any regular administration of justice?—No regular system.
477. What is the nature of our federal connection with the Rajpoot chiefs?—Entirely protective; and in return for our protection they bind themselves to afford military aid on requisition, to submit to our arbitration of external disputes, and not to form any new alliance with other powers.
478. Anything with regard to foreign officers?—No.
479. Would that be prevented?—Certainly, I should suppose so.
480. Is there any subsidiary force on foot?—Not in the Rajpoot states, but Joudpoor is bound to furnish 1,530 horse, when called upon.
481. Do the residents interfere to prevent anything wrong taking place?—They would do so; but during the time I had charge of Joudpoor and Jesselmere there was no occasion for any interference whatever.
482. Do you think that was in consequence of the improved administration?—I think it was owing to the nature of our connection with them.

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483. Do you ascribe that improved administration to the effect of the presence of the English resident, and the fear of displeasing the English?—Yes, I think it was.

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484. Do they show anxiety to maintain a connection with the Company?—The states with which I have had any concern, I conceive, certainly do.

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485. So that you think there is no stipulation in any one of the treaties with them for the resident's interference?—No, none whatever in their internal affairs.

486. So that with that very limited degree of influence, you think the connection with England and the fear of the displeasure of the English Government have very sensibly improved their administration?—I think it has.

Veneris, 2^a die Martii, 1832.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES MACINTOSH, in the Chair.

Major CARNAC called in and examined.

487. You were the Resident at Baroda?—I was the Resident there for nine years, and an assistant to the Resident eight years previously.

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488. How long is it since you ceased to be Resident?—I ceased to be Resident in 1819.

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489. What is the population of the Guicowar territories?—The population of the dominions of the Guicowar I estimate to be from five to six millions in the province of Guzerat, the states tributary to it, and in the Surat Attaveesy, possessions in the neighbourhood of that city.

490. When did we enter into any subsidiary engagement or treaty of alliance with the Guicowar?—Our first negotiation to establish an alliance with the Guicowar state was early in the year 1802, when the prince deputed a mission to Mr. Duncan, the governor of Bombay, to solicit the aid of the East-India Company to put down the rebellion of one of his own family (Mulhar Row), who was aiming at supremacy in Guzerat.

491. Was there any diplomatic intercourse between the two governments prior to that?—A treaty of amity was entered into with the first Futteh Sing Guicowar so far back as the year 1780; but for the purpose of a more intimate connection, none except through the agency of the mission in 1802 to Bombay.

492. Was there a Resident at that time or previously at Baroda?—Not at any time. The governor, early in 1802, went to Cambay (the territory of a Mahomedan), in order to have an opportunity of a nearer communication with the Guicowar, on the subject of the alliance proposed; he was accompanied by a small force, placed under the command of Major Alexander Walker. A negotiation ensued with the minister of the Guicowar at Cambay, the result of which was the advance of the force for the suppression of the rebellion of Mulhar Row Guicowar, which, after several engagements with his forces, was accomplished. At this

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period, namely, May 1802, there was merely a written engagement with the Guicowar minister, dated the 15th March of that year, to reimburse the expenses of the expedition against Mulhar Row, and for the Guicowar state to subsidize a permanent force from the Company. In June 1802, articles of agreement were drawn up, which were afterwards consolidated into a definitive treaty. It was then engaged that we should liberate the Guicowar from the thralldom of his mercenary troops, composed of Arab sebandy, and to assist in discharging the debts which the Guicowar state had largely contracted. This laid the foundation of the extensive system of interference which prevailed at the court at Baroda, different from that pursued with any of the other powers with which we are allied in India. In consequence of the wars which took place in 1803, 1804, and part of 1805, with the confederated Mahratta powers, Dowlut Row Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Row Holkar, the definitive treaty was not executed until the latter year. It contracted that a contingent of three battalions of native infantry, a company of European artillery, and a company of lascars should be furnished, the expense of which was provided for by the Guicowar state, by cessions enumerated in the schedule attached to the treaty, amounting to 11,70,000 rupees per annum. It was also stipulated that the subsidized troops should be stationed within the territories of the Guicowar state, and that one battalion should be employed in the province of Kattywar.

493. Is that treaty existing up to this time?—It was in full force till 1817, when supplementary articles were added to the definitive treaty, which I will advert to presently. The expulsion of the Arab mercenaries from the service of the Guicowar, and their ultimate ejection from Guzerat, involved the Company in the responsibility of engagements to bankers who had advanced monies to the state for the payment of arrears to troops and general debts. The Company also advanced from its own resources a sum of 30 lacs of rupees, and guaranteed to the bankers or soucars a further sum of not less than 70 or 80 more. It was at this time stipulated with the minister (the Rajah Anund Row having long been in a state of mental imbecility), that a reformed scale of expenditure should be adopted, and that the resident with the minister should form a commission for the government of the affairs of the state. These arrangements were made by Major, afterwards Lieutenant-colonel Walker, and came into full operation immediately after the period of his quitting India, and my succession to his office in 1810. There were other important arrangements also made in 1807 by that distinguished officer, Colonel Walker, with the states tributary to the Guicowar and Peishwa, in the province of Kattywar, which are fully developed in the despatches of that time. Shortly after my succeeding to the residency, it was deemed proper by the Bombay and Supreme Governments to introduce into the commission of government the heir presumptive, Futteh Sing Guicowar, who was considered the president of the commission, and measures of internal administration or foreign intercourse were conducted in the durbar of his highness Futteh Sing, in the name of the Rajah Anund Row, but with the cognizance and under the direction of the resident, in conjunction with the minister of the state. The reformed scale of expenditure was strictly followed till the year 1817, when the war with the Pindarries and the Peishwa took place. In November 1817 the Guicowar government

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was called upon to augment the subsidiary force by two regiments of native cavalry and one battalion of native infantry of the complement of 1,000 men. He was also required about that time to furnish a contingent of his own troops to act with the forces then employed in the province of Malwa, which necessarily caused a very heavy expense. The supplementary treaty was made on the 6th November 1817: it not only provided for the augmentation of the subsidiary force, and the cession of all the rights which the Guicowar had obtained from the perpetual farm of the Peishwah's territories, subject to Ahmedabad, but for his highness maintaining at all times a force of 3,000 horse, to be paid by himself and mustered by the resident or his agent, and to act under the command of the officer commanding the subsidiary force wherever employed. As far as concerns the debt guaranteed by Colonel Walker, I may say that it was entirely discharged, although when the honourable Mr. Elphinstone visited Baroda in 1820 and 1821, he found the state encumbered with a heavy debt, created chiefly by the Pindarry and Mahratta war of 1817, and other causes which will be found reported in the public despatches. Subsequently to my departure from India, I have understood that Mr. Elphinstone had directed the resident to withdraw from all interference with the internal affairs of the Guicowar state, and placed in the Guicowar's hands the uncontrolled power of his dominions. Having arranged that the Rajah should pay within seven years the debt then existing, it was discovered on the expiration of that period, that the debt was increased very considerably from the rapacity of the Rajah, who had diverted the resources of the country to his own coffers: he was required in 1828 by Sir John Malcolm, who had succeeded Mr. Elphinstone in the government of Bombay, to adhere to the engagements he had contracted in 1820-21, and in consequence of his manifesting no inclination to do so, Sir John Malcolm had deemed it proper to sequester, in March 1828, a portion of his dominions for the liquidation of the debts for which the Company were responsible. He also required him in 1830 to provide the funds for the payment of the contingent of horse stipulated for in the supplementary treaty, which having persisted in refusing, these troops have consequently been maintained by the East-India Company, and further territory sequestered for their maintenance. These troops are now employed under the orders of the commissioner of Guzerat, Sir John Malcolm having abolished the residency at Baroda; the territories sequestered have been placed under the management of one of the late ministers of the Guicowar, subject to the supervision of the commissioner, whose residence I should state was fixed in the city of Ahmedabad. No alteration has taken place in this state of affairs up to the present time. The revenue of the ceded territories, on account of subsidy, amounted in the whole to about 27 lacs, as realized by the native government, and the gross amount of the remaining revenue of the Guicowar state was upon an average something more than 70 lacs.

494. What proportion should you conjecture that the two successive sequestrations of territories produced of the Rajah's whole revenue?—I have no means of knowing exactly the amount of revenue derived from these sequestrations, but I believe the revenue at the disposal of Seeagee Row, the present rajah, divested of claims guaranteed by us for personal stipends and pensions, does not

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much exceed 20 lacs. I should imagine that the value of the sequestered territory is rather more than that of the territory ceded in subsidy.

495. You mentioned some territories of the Peishwa and the Guicowar, they were chiefly in Kattywar, were they not?—On the conquest of Guzerat by the Mahrattas, the states of Kattywar (composed principally of Rajpoots) and the principality of Junagur (the only remnant of Mogul power at Guzerat) were in a state of independence. On the decline of the Mogul empire, incursions were made annually by the Mahratta forces, which levied what sums they could obtain from each of these chieftains, and in instances of resistance, which were very general, it was their practice to devastate the open country. On the Mahratta power being established in Guzerat, these states were willing to compromise for a fixed tribute: the larger portion of this tribute was allotted to the Peishwa as the head of the Mahrattas, and the smaller to the Guicowar, then the local governor of the whole province. The Guicowar tribute was afterwards fixed by Colonel Walker, and amounted to something less than four lacs of rupees, and that of the Peishwa (subject to his Soubah of Ahmedabad) to more than six lacs. The tribute to the Guicowar is included in what I before stated as the average amount of his revenues.

496. And with respect to the tribute paid to the Peishwa, what has become of that?—It became the right of the East-India Company, by virtue of the conquest of the Peishwa in 1817.

497. What was the province of the Company's territory which adjoined the Guicowar's country before 1802?—The possessions under the presidency of Bombay were extremely limited in the year 1802; the only possession subjected to it was the town of Surat and the circumjacent country, obtained in 1800 from the nawab of that place, and the island of Salsette.

498. What opinion have you formed from your observation, of the condition of the people in the Guicowars and the Company's territories?—As long as the British resident was associated with the Guicowar government, I consider its subjects to have been in quite as prosperous a condition as any of those belonging to the Company: this will, I think, be corroborated by the reports of the governor, Mr. Elphinstone, on his first visit to the province of Guzerat.

499. During the time of the commission of government for the whole of the Guicowar territories, the resident interfered as generally in the territory left under the nominal authority of the rajah as in the ceded or sequestered territory, did he not?—The resident had no concern with the territory ceded; and the sequestered territory is, as I have already explained, under the charge of the late minister of the Guicowar, subject to the control of the political commissioner.

500. Can you state what system of government was adopted on our acquiring the Deccan?—We adhered as nearly as possible to the system we found; but in subsequent years, I have been informed that it has been deemed advisable to introduce the courts of adawlut, and the Company's judicial regulations.

501. What was the system of the native government?—The mamlutdars or farmers of districts were the chief local authorities; judicial and revenue powers were vested in them, subject to the control of the prince or his ministers, which was very irregularly exercised, and seldom but on urgent occasions.

502. Has

502. Has the Deccan improved since it came into the possession of the Company?—I do not believe that it has equalled the expectations which were entertained on our first possession of it; the revenue derived from the country has fallen short of anticipation; but much of this has arisen from the depression of agricultural produce.

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Jovis, 8° die Martii, 1832.

Sir FRANCIS VINCENT in the Chair.

Mr. WILLIAM CHAPLIN called in and examined.

503. Will you have the goodness to state how long you were in the Company's service?—I have been in the Company's service 26 years.

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504. In what parts of India were you?—I was in several parts of India. I was originally employed for a short time in the Northern Circars; I was then appointed registrar under Colonel Munro, in the ceded districts, in which situation I remained about a year and a half. I was then promoted under him to a subordinate collectorship, a situation which I held for about a twelvemonth; and upon Colonel Munro's departure for England, I succeeded to the charge of the particular ceded districts of the Cudapa division. About a twelvemonth afterwards, I was transferred to the other division of the ceded districts, in which situation I remained till the year 1818, when I succeeded Sir Thomas Munro in the charge of the Southern Mahratta country; there I remained for about a year and a half, as principal collector and political agent, when I succeeded Mr. Elphinstone as sole commissioner of the Deccan, on his appointment to the government of Bombay; and the administration of the Deccan I held for about six years, till I returned to England. I returned to England about five years and a half ago.

505. Will you have the goodness to state your observations upon the subsidiary system during your residence in the Deccan?—I myself was never employed as a political resident at any foreign court, and had never personally any opportunity of seeing the effects of the subsidiary system.

506. You were chiefly collector, I think?—I was general superintendent in the Deccan.

507. You have never been much resident at the courts of any of the native princes?—No, I have never resided at any of the courts of any of the native princes.

508. Was there any great improvement observable in the condition of the natives?—After we had charge?

509. After you had charge of it?—Yes, there was considerable improvement; there was a gradual extension of cultivation, and a great improvement of revenue.

510. And the condition of the natives themselves, they had greater security of their persons and property?—Their persons and property were more secure unquestionably

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questionably under our rule than under the Peishwa, which had been a system of mismanagement for some years previous to our getting possession of the government. The Peishwa's system of government for several years past had been as bad as possible; the districts had been farmed out to managers, and again sub-rented by them to under-managers; nothing could exceed the misrule that had prevailed for several years; but that is not to be attributed to the subsidiary allowances, but rather to the propensity to disorder which prevails in all the native states.

511. That is to be attributed to the native princes?—Chiefly so; because the system of misrule had commenced before our subsidiary treaty had been formed with the Peishwa.

512. You had no opportunity personally of observing the effect of the subsidiary system?—No, I had not.

513. Were there courts of law established in the conquered territory?—There were no regular courts of law established for three or four years after we took possession of the country; the judicial affairs were conducted by the collectors and revenue officers under my superintendence.

514. Since then regular courts of law have been introduced?—Yes, they have.

515. Had you an opportunity of observing the condition of other neighbouring countries under the dominion of native princes, as compared with the territory in which you served?—I had an opportunity of observing the management of the countries of several of the native chiefs which were immediately under me, particularly the Putwurdun family.

516. That I believe was a favourable instance of native government?—They were in a particularly prosperous condition, and very well conducted.

517. Although you were not in the courts of any of our independent alliances, you must have heard a great deal of current opinion with respect to the subsidiary system, I should think?—I have heard a great deal of opinion certainly.

518. What was the particular objection to it?—The objection was that they tended to impair the vigour of the native government, and destroy the independence of the princes, and gradually to bring those native states under our subjection; that was considered to be the effect of those native alliances. I am myself disposed to think that the evils that have been too exclusively ascribed to the alliances rather than the misrule, ought to have been ascribed to the misrule.

519. Did it appear to you that the inhabitants of the country regretted their former system of government?—The upper classes, I think, unquestionably regretted their former system of government.

520. With regard to the great bulk, I should think it had little effect one way or the other?—I conceive the lower orders were rather favourable to the change of government, as it gave them greater security, and made them less liable to exaction.

521. It was conducted with more regularity?—Yes, it was.

522. Do you apprehend that any cause of apprehension exists to the Company from the discontentment of the upper classes in these ceded districts?—It has been the policy of our government, since we have had possession of the Deccan, to conciliate the upper classes and allow them almost the whole of the privileges which they enjoyed under the former government, and therefore they have no great reason

reason to be discontented ; but one may fairly conceive that they must feel that they are under foreign rule, and that they are excluded from all the higher offices of government, and therefore in a degraded condition.

523. Your observation would apply principally to those territories that were under the dominion of the Hindoo princes ; it would not apply to provinces under the dominion of the Mahomedan?—It would apply to all, I think.

524. Do you think it would apply equally to the country under the dominion of the Mahomedan as of the Hindoo?—The Mahomedans are more assimilated to the native Hindoos than we were. They would also feel the subjection to the Mahomedan government.

525. All offices were open to the natives under the Mahomedan rule?—They were ; almost all offices were open to the native Mahomedan.

526. Does not the effect of the partition of property lead gradually to the entire subversion of all hereditary aristocracy in India?—It has, unquestionably.

527. Is not that very much increased by there being no lines of employment open to them, by which they could accumulate property?—Unquestionably, I think that is very much the case.

528. Do you apprehend that the force necessary for maintaining obedience in the conquered districts is kept up at a less expense than the subsidiary force in a district of equal extent?—I have never had an opportunity of forming a comparison between the two.

529. Do you know whether the expense is less to the Company?—I am not able to answer that question with any sort of accuracy.

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Mr. Wm. Chaplin.

Martis, 27^o die Martii, 1832.

H. GALLY KNIGHT, Esq., in the Chair.

Mr. JOHN CRAWFURD called in and examined.

531. WHAT political stations did you fill in India?—I was first, from 1811 to 1817, in various political situations in the island of Java, during the British occupation of that colony ; I was Resident at the court of one of the native princes, called the Sultan of Java ; and I went afterwards on a mission to Siam, and Cochin China, which was of a commercial description. Afterwards, I was British Resident of the new commercial settlement of Singapore ; I was in that situation for a period of about four years. I was then a commissioner in the Burman country, and latterly envoy to the court of Ava.

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Mr.
John Crawford.

532. Is that your letter of the 24th of February 1832, Mr. Crawford?—I have written my opinions in that letter which has been delivered in. I beg to refer to that as my evidence.

[*The Letter is delivered in.*]

See Appendix.

Jovis, 23^a die Februarii, 1832.

VI.
POLITICAL
or
FOREIGN.

The Right Hon. CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN, in the Chair.

Colonel J. BAILLIE called in and examined.

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533. WHAT diplomatic situation have you filled under the East-India Company?—I filled during the period of four years, from 1803, the commencement of the Mahratta war, till the middle of 1807, the office of Political Agent to the Governor-general in the province of Bundelcund; and from that period till my return to England in 1815, the station of Resident at the court of Lucknow.

534. During that period had you an opportunity of tracing the character and effects of the subsidiary system?—From my political situation and duties at Lucknow, at the court of the sovereign of Oude, with whom a subsidiary engagement subsisted, I had necessarily an opportunity of tracing the origin and character, and marking the general consequences of that system.

535. Will you be so good as to detail to the Committee the observations which occur to you upon it?—I should say of the subsidiary system, that I have always viewed it as just and expedient; if not indispensable in its origin, as natural and necessary, I may add, with some exceptions, wise and liberal in its progress; and in its consequences, according to circumstances, occasionally beneficial and occasionally injurious to the interests of the protected state; meaning, thereby, however, the sovereign or head of the state, rather than the people; the government of the protected state rather than the mass of its population. I should say further, that whatever may be the difference of opinion regarding the original character and present tendency of that system in its practical operation, I consider the abandonment of it to be quite impossible now, without hazarding the subversion of our empire in India by a more rapid transition than that of its rise.

536. At what period did the first subsidiary engagement take place with the state of Oude?—That is a matter of history, but I believe the date of the first subsidiary treaty between the British Government and the state of Oude was during the time of the vizier Shoojah-ood-Dowlah, about the year 1765. By that treaty, if I mistake not, a small detachment of our troops was provided to be stationed near the person of the prince, and a brigade stationed in his dominions.

537. Was that intended as a permanent treaty, or merely for temporary purposes?—Unquestionably a permanent treaty.

538. Will you state the progress of the subsidiary system in Oude?—I am not aware of any alteration in the arrangement established by treaty with the vizier Shoojah-ood-Dowlah, until the death of that prince, when on the accession of his son Asûf-ood-Dowlah, I think in 1775, a considerable pecuniary subsidy was granted to the Company for the maintenance of a large body of troops to be stationed in the vizier's dominions, under the command of British officers; and that treaty

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treaty continued to subsist, with occasional modifications, till the year 1798, when Sir John Shore (now Lord Teignmouth), on the deposition of Vizier Ali, and the substitution of Saadut Ali Khan in his stead as the sovereign of Oude, contracted an alliance, offensive and defensive with that prince, under which the pecuniary subsidy was greatly increased, and a stipulation introduced which placed a further augmentation of the British military force in Oude at the discretion of the Company's government, and bound the vizier to increase the pecuniary subsidy in proportion to the augmentation of force, as also, in the case of arrear in the regular payment of the subsidy, to furnish such security as should be satisfactory to the British Government. Under the provisions of that treaty, our political relations with the state of Oude continued without alteration till 1802, if I mistake not, during the administration of Lord Wellesley, when some arrear in the payment of the subsidy, and a just apprehension on the part of Lord Wellesley of essential injury or inconvenience to the British Government from the state of the vizier's government and country, induced his lordship to propose to the vizier a new subsidiary treaty, by which a great territorial cession should be substituted for the pecuniary subsidy, and other rights of interference on the part of the British Government in the concerns of Oude should be established; and that proposition (to the acceptance of which an alternative having been offered, the justice of which may be questioned, namely, the total abdication of the sovereignty of Oude by the vizier, and his retirement from the cares of government with an allowance for the support of himself and family) having been finally acceded to by the vizier, a treaty was accordingly concluded in the month of January 1802, by which a moiety of the vizier's dominions was ceded in perpetuity to the Company, and some new obligations were imposed upon the sovereign of Oude, for a detail of which I refer to the treaty. Such is the nature of our present relation with the state of Oude. The result of that relation has unquestionably been continued misgovernment on the part of the sovereign, and oppression of certain classes of the people, which however may perhaps with justice be ascribed to the inefficient exercise of the legitimate right of interference possessed by the British Government under the last-mentioned treaty, rather than to any inherent quality in the general system of subsidiary alliances, or to the effect of that system in particular as regarding the state of Oude.

539. Have the subsidiary engagements superseded all other military force maintained by the king of Oude, or does he employ any force in addition?—By the last treaty with the sovereign of Oude the number of his own troops was limited to, I think, four battalions of infantry and 2,000 horse; but that the treaty will show. I should have said that the last treaty of Lord Wellesley was meant to supersede entirely the necessity of the vizier's maintaining a force of his own, by furnishing an ample force for his protection.

540. Then he is not subject to a contingent force?—No.

541. When Lord Wellesley proposed that alternative, the abdication of the vizier, did he intend to take the territory for the Company, or to give it to some other person?—To take on himself the government of the country, to administer the government on behalf of the East-India Company.

542. The vizier was considered a dependent of the Mogul, was not he?—Yes; nominally a servant of the empire, but always independent of the emperor since the

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commencement of his alliance with us, and ultimately declared to be even nominally independent of that sovereign, by an act of the British Government during the administration of Lord Hastings, who permitted and encouraged the vizier to assume the title of sovereign.

543. Was that with the concurrence of the Mogul?—Certainly not.

544. He is now called King of Oude?—He is.

545. In fact, we freed him from his allegiance?—Yes; but the allegiance has been almost entirely nominal ever since our political connection with Oude, except in its very beginning.

546. What has been the effects of the subsidiary engagement, as far as regards the sovereign of Oude, as to relieving him from all the cares of government: has not the resident assumed all the powers of government?—It has certainly relieved him from most of the cares, and almost all the charges of government? but I am not aware that the resident has ever assumed any of the powers of the government, nor interfered with them in any respect beyond the most limited sense of the provisions of the subsidiary treaty. I cannot, perhaps, better explain the immediate effects of that treaty, as regarded the vizier's power and wealth, than by stating, that whereas at the date of the treaty the state of his treasury was such as to occasion a great arrear in the payment of the subsidy to the British Government, there being a load of public debt besides, and although by that treaty one half of his territory was ceded to the British Government, yet at the period of his death, which happened when I was minister at his court, in the year 1813 (11 years after the date of that treaty), his treasury was ascertained to contain a sum of not less than 13 millions sterling, realized from half his original territory during a period of 11 years. It is obvious, therefore, that he must have derived considerable advantage in one respect at least from the stipulations of that treaty.

547. In what manner had that revenue been collected?—In a variety of ways, not altogether creditable, I fear, to the character of the sovereign.

548. Had it been collected under the influence of the British force?—Certainly not altogether, though the British force was frequently employed in assisting the collection of the revenue.

549. Was there not a case in 1810 where the collection of the revenue was enforced by the subsidiary force?—It was always enforced when it was necessary so to do, under an express provision of the treaty by which we are bound to protect the state of Oude from foreign invasion and internal commotion; and therefore every resistance to the authority of the prince must be put down by our assistance.

550. Do you apprehend so large a sum could have been collected by the sovereign of Oude, but under the terror of the employment of the British force, if necessary, to collect it?—The great amount which I have stated to have been found in the treasury of the vizier cannot all be supposed to be the realized revenue of his dominions during the period of 11 years, but unquestionably was partly the result of extortion practised by himself, not from the general population of the country, but from wealthy individuals connected with his person and government, over whom at all times he exercised an uncontrolled authority, except in particular cases, where the subjects of his government or the relations of his family having become by particular circumstances the objects of especial regard to the British

British Government, and entitled to claim its protection, were protected from the extortion of their sovereign.

551. You have stated he exercised an uncontrolled power; supposing the subsidiary engagement had not existed, might not that have been controlled by the terror of insurrection or resistance on the part of his subjects?—It is possible that the government of Oude might have changed its possessor several times during the period of its connection with us, if that connection had not subsisted, and general commotion or rebellion might thus have been productive of much worse effects to the country than any that can possibly be ascribed to the effects of the subsidiary alliance.

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552. But does not the fear of insurrection or resistance, in fact, operate as a control over the native princes in their natural state, when the British Government does not interfere to protect them?—It may have that tendency certainly in some cases, while, on the other hand, the fear of British interference may produce a similar effect to a still greater degree.

553. During the period that you exercised the functions of resident, did it appear to you that the sovereign interested himself more or less in the concerns of his government, in consequence of the subsidiary alliance?—The vizier, Saadut Ali, was a person of extraordinary talents and powers of mind, although those were unhappily perverted to the gratification of the leading passion of his mind, avarice; but unquestionably his time was very much occupied in and devoted to the management of the concerns of his government.

554. Is not the general effect of the subsidiary system to direct the minds of the native rulers rather to increase their own private treasure than to consult the general welfare of the country?—I am not aware that it can be justly said to have generally that tendency, inasmuch as the predecessor of the prince to whom I have referred, though certainly inattentive to all the concerns of his government, was also constantly poor and labouring under the pressure of debt, without any accumulation either of public or private treasure; while, on the other hand, the condition of his successor affords an example of the contrary tendency, namely, of great attention to the concerns of his government, and also of great accumulation of wealth.

555. Has the king of Oude two separate treasures, a private and public treasure?—I believe not. I never understood there was any separation.

556. Have not some of the native rulers?—I should say not, as far as my observation or knowledge extends.

557. Was the interference of the resident ever exercised to relieve the inhabitants of the country from any oppression or extortion?—Constantly; on every necessary occasion, as far as his power extended.

558. Was his right of interference recognised to the extent of making him a medium between the prince and his people, so that they both referred to him as to their natural protector?—That question, if I understand it right, may be answered affirmatively in only a limited sense. The immediate relations and other subjects of the vizier, who had from particular circumstances on certain extraordinary occasions established claims to the protection of the British Government or to its mediation with their sovereign, naturally, on all occasions when necessary,

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appealed to the British resident for protection, and his right of interference in their behalf was recognised by the vizier; but with that exception alone, the resident could never be considered as a medium of intercourse between the people of Oude and their sovereign.

559. Did you find the necessity for that interference gradually and unavoidably increased?—The number of persons entitled to the mediation of the British Government, as above explained, was fixed either by treaty or by occasional conventions between the two states, and therefore was not subject to increase, but rather to diminution, except in cases where large families succeeded to individuals, and the number of claimants was increased though the subject of interference remained the same. As for example, a person entitled to British protection, whose pension was guaranteed to him for his life and to his descendants after him, if he died and left a number of children, the number of claimants or protected persons was increased, as a distribution of his pension must have followed, and the arrangement of that distribution was a matter generally settled between the prince and the British minister, that is, between the power from whom the stipend was derived, and the representative of the power who guaranteed it.

560. The Committee wished to have directed the question to the interferences of the British Government in the internal concerns of the government of the country, whether that did not increase the necessity for interference?—The necessity for interference must always in a great measure, if not exclusively, depend on the character of the prince. If his demands from his subjects be just or unquestionable, or if they be submitted to without resistance or appeal, no interference on the part of the British Government can ever take place: it is only in cases of resistance on the part of the subject, and demand of assistance by the prince, that our interference can ever be exercised.

561. Do you mean that the interference of the resident in the internal concerns of the country is confined to cases in which the people resist or object to the payment of revenue?—In my own case, I should say positively that it was. Cases of individual appeal from subjects or dependents of the British Government residing in the territory of the vizier, may occasionally have required my interference, but that was of a different nature from the interference to which the question refers.

562. But the resident interferes in no other part of the internal administration?—No; only in the cases which I have stated.

563. Can you state to us the beneficial results which in any instance have followed the exercise of your interference?—I have no hesitation in stating, that during the period of my residence at Lucknow many cases of injustice and extortion on the part of the vizier and his subordinate functionaries, in the collection of the revenue and otherwise, were either entirely prevented or greatly diminished in their effects.

564. Will you state more in detail what the interference was to which you alluded?—In every instance of an application from the vizier for the aid of the British troops, either to enforce a demand or to quell an insurrection, it was my duty, if I had any doubts on the subject, first to ascertain as nearly as possible the true cause of the resistance complained of, and to submit the result of my inquiry for

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for the consideration of the prince, before proceeding to employ a military force in support of his authority. In many cases my representations were productive of beneficial results; on some occasions the vizier was less disposed or indisposed to listen to my representations, and the result was necessarily different.

565. You have mentioned that there was no other interference in the internal administration than when application was made for assistance in collecting the revenue; did the resident never enter into discussions with the sovereign as to a reform of the expenditure or diminution of his expenditure?—Never, to my knowledge, as to his expenditure. The great question of a general reform in the vizier's government, which was agitated between him and me for several years, as may be seen in the Oude Papers, was of a different nature entirely from that of the question of his expenditure.

566. Was it not the practice with the residents at the other native courts?—Not to my knowledge, nor do I see how it could be so, except in the supposed case of an arrear of subsidy.

567. In most instances have our subsidies been changed into cessions of territory?—They have.

568. In which case all interference on that head is out of the question?—Yes.

569. If any serious rebellion had taken place in consequence of a very gross act of oppression, should you as resident have felt yourself at liberty to refuse giving your influence to suppress it, or to refuse to allow the troops at your disposal to act?—Certainly not.

570. However gross the oppression might have been?—It was the duty of the British Government, under the stipulations of the treaty, to put down any actual rebellion without stopping to consider either its remote or proximate cause; but in all the ordinary cases of a demand for assistance in the collection of the revenue, I should have felt it my duty to inquire into the causes of resistance, and if possible to suggest a remedy without the employment of military force.

571. If you conceived the enforcement of the claim to be decidedly unjust, should you have thought yourself at liberty to refuse the assistance of the subsidiary force to collect it?—I should have stated the case to the Government in all its details, and have required the order of Government before I proceeded to comply with such a requisition for the employment of the subsidiary force.

572. Has there ever been any case within your knowledge in which such a requisition has been refused to be complied with?—The volume of Oude Papers, comprising my correspondence with the Government during the time I was resident, contains several of the cases referred to.

573. Are the instructions given to residents very precise, or is there a considerable latitude allowed to them?—It is impossible generally that they should be so. I have stated in my written answer to one of the questions proposed by the Board of Control, as nearly as I could, what is the nature of a resident's duties, and I beg to refer to that statement in answer to this question.

574. Will you refer to some of the cases contained in that volume?—There are several cases of the nature referred to in these Papers, and in one page, accidentally opened at this moment, I see an extract from a letter of mine to the vizier, in
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answer to a requisition for the aid of troops, which shows the nature and extent of the interference that was exercised by me on that occasion.

575. There was also the proposal of appointing an officer of your own selection to conduct the inquiry proposed?—Yes, on that occasion.

576. Would not that be taking the patronage out of the vizier's hands?—So it was considered by the vizier, and therefore refused, and immediately abandoned by me.

577. A very sudden emergency might happen, in which it was impossible to refer to the Government; in that case the resident would consider himself bound to support the reigning prince under all circumstances whatever?—Unquestionably.

578. In short, the vizier is completely relieved from all fear of deposition?—Completely so.

579. Is there not usually an article in the treaties restricting the prince from employing the subsidiary force in the collection of the revenue, or in any part of the civil administration?—No; I am not aware of any such stipulation.

580. Not a soldier can move without the orders of the resident?—No, not of the subsidiary force.

581. You have mentioned the increase of the public treasure during this period; did it appear to you that the internal condition of the country derived an equal improvement during that period?—I should say not. I should say that there has been little or no improvement in the state of the country since I have known it; in that portion of the country I mean which remains under the government of the vizier.

582. Has there been deterioration?—I should say that there must have been since my return to this country; indeed I have reason to know that the state of the country is much worse than it was in my time, or at any antecedent period; but that I ascribe to the want of an efficient interference on the part of the British Government.

583. Did you consider that the country had at all improved during the time of your residence?—In some districts which were committed to able management, I did perceive a manifest improvement in the state of the country. I cannot say any great amelioration of the condition of the inhabitants, but an improvement by increased cultivation of the soil, and augmented sources of revenue.

584. Did you, during that period, conceive the general situation of the inhabitants to be ameliorated, deteriorated, or stationary?—Stationary, I should say.

585. Was the condition of the ceded territory improved since its cession?—Very greatly.

586. Is the non-efficient interference of the British residents attributable to the restrictions imposed on them?—No doubt.

587. Then a more efficient interference would amount to their assuming the whole powers of government?—Not altogether that; much must depend on circumstances. It is impossible to suggest a perfect remedy for any evil the exact nature and extent of which are unknown. I should say that an efficient interference, is unquestionably preferable to the vacillating and inefficient system which has sometimes prevailed in the state of Oude, to which of course I apply my observation.

588. Will

588. Will you describe some of the occasions to which you allude as examples of vacillating interference?—There are a few striking examples of what I mean afforded in this collection of Papers. It will be seen, that on several occasions of requisition for military aid to enforce the collection of the revenue, a doubt had naturally arisen in the mind of the resident respecting the justice of the demand, inasmuch as the employment of military force for the collection of revenue is entirely unknown in our own dominions. In consequence of that distrust, the resident naturally felt himself bound to inquire into the circumstances which produced the requisition for military aid, and finding his suspicions confirmed by the result of his inquiry, he suggested to the prince a mode of accommodation short of the employment of military force. The adoption of that recommendation was generally productive of the desired effect; whereas the rejection of it necessarily required on the part of the resident a statement of the facts of the case for the consideration and instructions of the government. In some instances the efficient support which was afforded to him by direct remonstrances on the part of the Governor-General, or otherwise, occasioned an acquiescence in his suggestions; in other cases that support was withheld, and in consequence the influence of the resident was necessarily diminished, and effects more injurious were produced than might have been the consequence of his immediate compliance with the requisition for military aid. Examples, however, of improper interference may also be supposed, and perhaps discovered in these Papers, on the part of the resident himself, without any reference to the government; and thus it may be said that the degree of interference to be exercised, and the result of that interference, must depend at all times partly on the character of the resident, partly on the conduct of the government, and mainly on the character of the prince.

589. You never had an opportunity of seeing the effect of native government by means of a dewan?—In my own personal experience I never had, but there were two ostensible ministers of the vizier's government supported for a series of years by Lord Cornwallis, under whose administration the state of the government and people of Oude was certainly not better, and I should say generally worse than at any other period of my observation.

590. In short, it is not a system you approve of?—I cannot speak of the two systems comparatively from my own experience. There are certainly some examples of good government by means of a dewan, of which I can speak historically; for instance, the dewan of Mysore.

591. Which is very much attributable to the personal character of the minister?—Yes.

592. And that was during a minority?—Yes.

593. Do you conceive the internal state of the districts which were ceded to the British Government to differ materially from the rest of the territories?—Yes; I have no doubt whatever of the great amelioration of the condition of the people, the great improvement of the lands, and a very great increase of revenue, which have arisen under the Company's management.

594. Is it your opinion that the subsidiary system generally tends to produce good or bad government, as far as regards the condition of the people?—I am very doubtful, I confess, of its tendency to produce either the one or the other. The principal

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principal objection which has been stated to our subsidiary alliances in general, is the great inconvenience and embarrassment occasionally produced to our government by the practical operation of those alliances; with regard to which I would observe, that to deny the existence of those embarrassments would be, in fact, to maintain the proposition that the cares and difficulties necessarily attendant on the government of a mighty empire, are no more than those which attend the direction of a commercial establishment; or that it is as easy to govern the vast empire which we now hold in India, as to superintend our original commercial concerns. But, on the other hand, to infer from the existence of such embarrassments as those, that the subsidiary system in itself is either unjust or impolitic, or that the disadvantages attending it counterbalance the benefits which it has produced by contributing to the establishment of our empire and to the maintenance of public tranquillity in India, is, in my humble judgment, as extravagant as to maintain the other proposition.

595. You stated you were first employed in the province of Bundelcund?—Yes. We occupied that province in 1803, partly as a measure of defence against the confederated Mahratta states, and partly under the provisions of a supplemental article of the treaty of Bassein with the Peishwa. I was employed in conducting that occupation.

596. Were you with the Peishwa at that time?—No; Bundelcund is a province of Hindostan.

597. You can hardly speak to its effects there?—There is no subsidiary system there.

598. There is no subsidiary treaty existing with Bundelcund?—No.

599. Is Bundelcund now under our own dominion?—Yes.

600. Did you administer the government of the ceded territory, or were there agents from Calcutta?—The treaty of cession took place in 1802, and I became resident in 1807.

601. Does the resident administer the government of the ceded territory?—No, he has no connection with it whatever; it is under British rule, like the original dominions of the Company.

602. Is it your decided opinion, then, that the subsidiary system is the best which, in the existing circumstances of our Indian empire, can be adopted for its government?—I am decidedly of opinion that it cannot be totally abandoned without hazarding the subversion of our empire. In some instances, particularly with regard to the more remote and the more recent subsidiary arrangements, and more especially those with the petty states of Central India, it may perhaps justly, and if so, I think ought to be modified.

603. Our late subsidiary treaties have been more definite, have they not, with regard to interferences?—Yes, I believe so. The subsidiary treaty with the rajah of Mysore was in some important respects more definite than the original treaty with the sovereign of Oude; but I have no distinct recollection of the precise stipulations of any of the treaties referred to, except those which I have already described.

604. In what year did you leave India?—In the year 1816; I was nearly nine years resident at Lucknow.

605. Would

605. Would your idea of an efficient resident be realized by giving him a seat in the cabinet or council of the prince, so that he should have a voice in his measures?

—The prince to whom I was accredited had no cabinet nor council; there was no such thing during my residence at Lucnow. The government was purely despotic, in the person of the sovereign alone.

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606. He has his leading minister, and he takes a part in the public business himself; would not it be as well to associate the resident with the sovereign and the minister; would not that be giving him an efficient control?—The present sovereign of Oude has, I believe, an efficient minister, but I doubt the practicability of the suggestion, in the first place, and the efficiency of it, even if acceded to by the prince.

607. Did you not conceive yourself authorized under the treaty to interfere with your advice in every part of the internal administration of the state of Oude?—Certainly not in every part of the internal administration, if by that is intended the household concerns of the vizier.

608. That is, not with his private transactions, but an interference with the internal concerns of the country?—I should say not, unless my advice was desired, or until I became aware of some act of the government having a tendency to infringe the relations established by treaty; and here I beg again to refer to my description of the duties of resident, according to my conception of them, contained in the written answer to the questions of the Board of Control.

609. Under the treaty do you not conceive there was an express stipulation for the resident to offer his advice on every part of the internal administration of the country, and an engagement on the part of the vizier to act in conformity with his counsel?—In answer to that question, I must state that my conception of the rights and duties of the British Government and its representative at the court of Lucnow, under that particular provision of the treaty, was always more extensive than its interpretation by any of the governments which I served.

Mercurii, 30^o die Maii, 1832.

The Right Hon. CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN in the Chair.

HENRY RUSSELL, Esq., again called in and examined.

610. Is there anything you wish to state to the Committee in addition to your former evidence?—There is one fact in my former evidence which I am desirous in the first instance of correcting; and after having done so, with the permission of the Committee, I should wish to take this opportunity of making a few additional observations on the subject of the subsidiary system. When I had the honour of attending the Committee before, I stated that the first treaty that could fairly be called a subsidiary treaty was that of Paungul, concluded with the Nizam in 1790, preparatory to Lord Cornwallis's war with Tippoo. The treaty of Paungul was not in terms a subsidiary treaty, though the conclusion of it was, in point of fact,

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the origin of our subsidiary relations with the Nizam. By the treaty of 1768 we had engaged to supply the Nizam with two battalions whenever he should require them : but he did not require them ; and it was only when the treaty of Paungul was made, with a view to combined operations against Tippoo, that those troops were required by the Nizam, and furnished by us, which constituted the foundation of our subsidiary force at Hydrabad. Having in my former evidence laid stress upon the mischief that has been done by our subsidiary system, I am anxious to make a few observations respecting the circumstances under which we resorted to that system ; the consequences which were likely to ensue if we had not done so, and those which would in all probability be produced if we were now to abandon it. At the time when Lord Wellesley concluded the treaty of Hydrabad in 1798, the power of Tippoo and the Mahrattas was unbroken. Tippoo's hostility against us was implacable : he was actuated by both political jealousy and religious fanaticism, and would unquestionably have attacked us if we had not attacked him. The Mahrattas were alarmed at our progress, and would rather have assisted to overthrow than to support us. Bodies of disciplined troops, commanded by French officers and influenced by French feelings, were maintained by both Scindia and the Nizam ; and Tippoo had to a certain extent adopted the same policy, though his jealousy of all Europeans, and his hatred of all Christians, prevented his allowing the French in his service to acquire the same influence which they had attained under other governments. The Nizam, who had been just defeated by the Mahrattas, and was afraid of a renewal of their attack, was compelled to look abroad for support ; and if he could not obtain it from us, was resolved to seek it from the French. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for us either to abstain from acting at all, or to act differently than we did. Our alternative lay, not between enlarging our possessions, and preserving them as they were, but between the abandonment of what we had and the acquisition of more. Standing still was out of the question ; we were compelled either to advance or to recede : to advance was, as it has proved, to subjugate by degrees all the native states ; to recede was to sacrifice our own power, and not only to throw away but to throw into the hands of our enemies all the fruits of our previous enterprize. We had no longer the choice of peace or war ; our only option was whether we would attack our enemies at our own time, or leave it to them to attack us at theirs. A system of protracted defence was wholly incompatible with our position ; it would have exhausted us by its expense, and have given our enemies that confidence, in their want of which our superiority mainly consisted. We had a choice of difficulties ; and even now, with all the consequences before us, there is no reason to suppose that we should have fared better if we had pursued a tamer course. Whatever effect our measures may have produced upon the native states, they at least served the purposes for which we adopted them ; they prostrated all our enemies, both Indian and European, and averted those dangers by which, if they had not been averted, we should unquestionably have been crushed. It is not easy to say what shape events would have taken if Lord Wellesley had rejected the overtures of the Nizam for a closer alliance, and abstained from making the provocations of Tippoo a ground of war. Things could not have continued as they were ; a crisis had arrived in which some state or other must have taken the lead. India had,

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had, from long usage, become accustomed to acknowledge one dominant power, and if we had hesitated to take that character upon ourselves it would have been assumed by some of our rivals. The French, from their want of naval power, and the consequent inability to draw resources from their own country, could hardly have reached a higher position than that of auxiliaries: but although they could not have acquired so firm a footing as we have, they would still have prevented our acquiring any footing at all; and be the advantages that any European power can derive from an establishment in India what they may, they would have secured all those advantages for themselves. The struggle for supremacy would have been between Tippoo and the Mahrattas, and neither of them would have suffered us to retain what we had acquired; whichever had prevailed, whether Mahomedans or Hindoos, we should not, as a political state, have been tolerated by either. In the progress of events some enterprising leaders might have established separate principalities, and some small states might have risen to consequence at the expense of their neighbours; but the probability is that the Nizam and other feeble princes would have disappeared, and that their territory would have been divided or contended for between Tippoo and the Mahrattas. Strong governments would have been substituted for weak ones; and after a process, which has been of too frequent occurrence in India to be looked upon as a very grave calamity, the people generally might have attained a degree of prosperity greater than we have been able to confer upon them, certainly in the protected territories, and probably even in our own. But although the people of India might have fared better if we had originally thought of them rather than ourselves, we could have promoted their interests only by the sacrifice of our own; and it by no means follows that it is now in our power to repair the mischief by the abandonment of our ascendancy. If we were to withdraw our control and protection now, in what condition should we leave the native states, and in what condition should we place ourselves? Though we may take from them what we have given, we cannot restore what we have taken away. Our control has been so long in force, and has been pushed to such an extent, that not a government is left capable of standing by itself. There is neither any single power to take our place, nor any number of powers to contend for it. The only bond that holds the political community of India together would be broken; the native states would fall to pieces from their own weakness, and become the victims of intestine commotion, or the prey of lawless plunder. The contagion once abroad, would spread in every direction; India would be a scene of universal anarchy and rapine; our own possessions would be invaded and distracted by the disorders that surrounded them; and we should find that our change of policy, instead of restoring the power of our allies, had been the destruction of our own. Peace and order, though they might be the ultimate, would be a distant result, and would be that order only into which anarchy subsides; India would have many a bloody struggle to undergo before she was at rest. It is now too late for us to recede, either with justice to other states, or with safety to ourselves. Whether we consider the interests of India, or those of England only, we must pursue the career in which we have advanced so far. It is vain to think of stooping from our ascendancy, or reviving among the native states that vigour which has been extinguished. Their

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decline is not to be arrested by any sacrifice we may make of our own power. They must proceed and complete their course; in spite of all that we can do to prevent it, they must fall successively into our hands, and partake at last of our downfall; of which, whether it be slow or sudden, violent or easy, the period will probably be hastened by every increase of our territory or subjects.

611. Can you state what, in 1798, was the opinion of the English authorities with respect to the system of policy adopted by the Marquis Wellesley?—I have not the means of speaking positively as to any orders which may have been transmitted on the subject from England. I apprehend that a general disapprobation prevailed of any measures likely to lead to an extension of territory, or to more intimate relations with the native states of India; but the position and designs of Tippoo at that time constituted a crisis which suspended all ordinary principles and orders.

612. Are you of opinion that it will be advantageous to increase our interference in the states of India, so as to give it a more direct character, or to continue the subsidiary system upon the best regulated plan possible?—I am afraid that where we have already contracted subsidiary engagements, we must of necessity increase our interference; but at the same time we ought to do what we can to check the extension of it, and to administer it in such a spirit as to give as little offence as possible to the officers of the native states whom it is intended to control, and by whose opposition, if we drive them to oppose it, its efficacy must be essentially counteracted.

613. Do you think it would be advantageous to increase it so as to give it a more direct character, or not?—It is almost indispensably necessary to increase it where it already prevails. I am afraid that much of the mischief that has arisen has been the result of an indecisive mode of exercising our interference; we have acted without any uniform principle, sometimes going beyond and sometimes falling short of the proper line.

614. Then your decided opinion is that, where it has already begun, you think it must of necessity be increased?—Precisely so; I am afraid there are no means of curtailing it.

615. Does that opinion apply generally to India, or do you think there would be reason for distinction in the different states?—Generally to that part of India under the rule of native princes.

616. Should you say it applied to the Rajpoot states?—Our alliance is not of such long standing in the Rajpoot states, and therefore has not acquired so firm a hold; but I am afraid it will in the end be the same there as everywhere else. We have taken the native states generally under our protection; and one of the objects for which we are bound to exercise our interference, is to protect the people against their own sovereigns, as well as those sovereigns against external enemies.

617. Then it has not gone to so great a length in the Rajpoot states as in the other states?—Certainly not; it has not been so long in action.

618. Will you be good enough to state how long it has been in action?—It has been more or less in action since the war which took place in 1803. At that time we formed engagements with the Rajpoot states, which were subsequently abandoned; but they have since, after a considerable interval, been renewed.

Martis, 17^o die Julii, 1832.

The Right Hon. CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN in the Chair.

RICHARD JENKINS, Esq., a Member of the Committee, examined.

616. How far, in your opinion, have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to in the general course of policy towards the Native States of India since 1813?—In answering this question, I shall confine myself to that field of politics with which I am chiefly conversant, viz. the last great advance of the subsidiary system, and its justice and expedience, as connected with the war of 1817–18. The great powers of India unconnected with us by subsidiary alliances, in 1813, were Sindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. Our treaties with all of them, the result of their confederacy against us in 1803, were mere instruments of general amity. Their intercourse with one another was unrestrained; but they were bound to submit to our arbitration in all disputes with our allies. Sindia and the Rajah of Berar only had residents at their courts, but they were left perfectly independent in their internal concerns; all three had been sufficiently weakened to prevent them from endangering the existence of our empire by a new confederacy, and their strength was too equally balanced to lead us to fear the union of their resources in the hands of any one of them by conquest; whilst it was believed that a judicious system of internal defence, joined to the established reputation of our superiority in arms and policy, would avert the only danger we had to fear, which was the predatory incursions of the irregular bodies of horse scattered over Central India.

These expectations, however, proved fallacious, and partly the weakness and partly the insidious policy of the Mahratta powers, guided by their enmity to us, were the means of bringing upon us and our allies a succession of serious losses and expenses not inferior to those of open war. Between 1806 and 1817, besides other military charges of considerable magnitude which we had been compelled to incur, (two armaments, for instance, against Meer Khan, in 1809 and 1812,) to prevent the establishment of a predatory Mahomedan power in the Deccan, our own provinces had several times, and the dominions of our allies, the Nizam and Peishwah, incessantly been plundered by the Pindarries; and to guard against their ravages we were exposed to the annual burthen of extensive military arrangements on all our frontiers. The armies of Sindia and Holkar too were broken into different bodies, acting under the mask of independence of their nominal masters, though in real concert with their views, and had on several occasions violated our territories, and those of our allies and dependants.

The field for plunder was daily becoming exhausted in Central India and the Deccan, and year after year was distinguished by some extension of plundering expeditions; Hyderabad and Poonah, Surat, and Mirzapore even, no longer bounded them. The Carnatic to the south, and Cuttack and the Northern Circars to the east, felt their ravages, and vain were all defensive arrangements against an enemy whom no difficulties or distance could deter, no obstacles, natural or artificial, impede

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impede in their rapid career of plunder and devastation, which, especially in our provinces, was attended with cruelties and horrors that have hardly a parallel in history.

We had applied in vain to Sindia and Holkar to take effectual measures, with or without our aid, to repress the Pindarries. The only measures adopted by Sindia were directed to render their subservience to his purposes more strict and definite than they had lately become ; to secure a share in the fruits of their depredations on us and our allies ; at the same time covering his secret support of them by some show of zeal for their suppression, in order to prevent us, as long as possible, from taking our own measures. Finding, however, that we were not to be deceived by such demonstrations, he ratified our suspicions of his hostile dispositions by uniting them with his own army, and even assuming a tone of defiance during the Nepal war.

Holkar's government was entirely in the hands of Meer Khan, who, we had certain grounds of knowing, was in league with the Pindarries ; and the proceedings of Holkar's government, under the councils of that chief, with regard to those bodies of Pindarries who were acknowledged to belong to the Holkar State, were parallel with those of Sindia towards his portion of them.

The Rajah of Berar (Raghogee Bhoosla) was equally hostile in disposition with the other Mahratta powers ; and whilst his weakness and perverseness had exposed us to dangers, through his position with reference to our rich provinces of Bengal, Behar, Cuttack, and the Northern Circars, as well as those of our ally the Nizam, to which his territories furnished an unmolested route to the Pindarries, he was not disposed to join with us in any efficient plan against those freebooters. It was not till his death, in 1816, that an alliance with the Bhoosla was effected. But the consequent advance of our troops to the Nerbudda, which at first alarmed the Pindarries, and if any defensive measures could have been effectual, would have kept them in check, in the end only served to aggravate the evil, by showing the futility of such measures, and rendering those freebooters bolder than ever.

Considering, then, the Pindarries as subjects of Sindia and Holkar, we had a right to demand their suppression at the hands of those chiefs, as well as restitution and reparation to ourselves and our allies, on pain of instant war ; or, if we found those chiefs unable to remove the nuisance, and at the same time too perverse to admit of our interference ; still more, if we found them in league with the plunderers, as was the fact, we were justified in taking our own measures, and acting for them as they ought to act, according to our views of their duty, and of the plans requisite to place our interests on a permanent footing of security, in spite of any appeal on their part to treaties or to arms.

If, then, the justice and expediency were admitted, and indeed it could not be denied, of putting down the predatory powers, and providing permanently against their revival, it appeared that no half measures could be adopted, with any sort of justice to ourselves. The strong probability that existed of hostile opposition on the part of the Mahratta powers, singly or united, required us to put forth all our strength, and under such enormous charges as this would involve, we could not submit to be thwarted, or to be cajoled, by any of them, into anything short of a radical cure of the system. No military operations, based upon any trust in the assistance

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assistance or good-will of those powers, would have been effectual to the destruction even of a tithe of the predatory bodies in question. The chiefs of Rajpootana and Central India, whose co-operation was essential, and who were anxious, as joint sufferers, to assist us, would not dare to do so, unless we guaranteed their future safety from the revenge, which could only be done by releasing them from the yoke, of the Mahrattas and Pathans. Nor had we a shadow of ground for anticipating any improvement in the native governments, great or small, who, during 10 years, had neglected, and even fostered, the growth of the predatory system, without the constant exercise of a close and vigilant control on our part over their future conduct. This could only be effected through a new system of treaties and military arrangements, supported by corresponding acquisitions of means, in territory, subsidies, or tributes, and uniting the States of Central India in one common bond of defensive alliances, under our supremacy. Such was the plan adopted by Lord Hastings in 1817. Under it, the spirit of predatory association has expired; our own dominions, and those of our old allies, have been allowed to flourish, unvexed by foreign invasion. The prosperity of Rajpootana and Central India has been resuscitated, and to this day they remain substantially in peace, both domestic and external; whilst, as far as I know, the occasional inconveniences and embarrassments which naturally attended such complicated concerns, have scarcely been a blot on the general happiness and good feeling of the rulers or inhabitants of those regions.

The contests with Holkar, the Peishwah, and the Bhoosla, were most important episodes in what is called the Mahratta and Pindarry war, but what was intended to have been purely a Pindarry war, until those princes identified themselves with the predatory powers. I have said before that resistance was anticipated from Holkar and Sindia; the latter, indeed, was only kept out of the field by the masterly military combinations of Lord Hastings: but no one could have foretold, without the imputation of unjustifiable distrust in their good faith and honour, the treacherous defection of our allies, the Peishwah and the Bhoosla, who had both suffered, and particularly the latter, from the Pindarries and the Pathans, most severely, for a series of years.

The whole course of these contests, in their origin, progress and consequences, are fully developed in the printed collection of papers relative to the Mahratta and Pindarry War; and their justification, as far as we are concerned, is therein so complete, in my opinion, that I will not attempt further to enlarge upon them.